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Abstract   
The threat of dangerous climate impacting on, economies and communities require urgent 
collective action to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gases mainly from energy 
production and use. The UK energy policy has a strong focus on energy security and 
climate change with an emphasis to accelerate a transition from a fossil fuel to low-carbon 
based electricity supply system. The development of a low-carbon electricity supply 
system faces a multiplicity of challenges ranging from policy instability and capital 
investment. At the backdrop of these complex transitional challenges, this research tracks 
the evolution of the UK electricity sector to a low-carbon 2050 future. It examines the 
dynamics affecting the electricity generation system as it adopts and adapts to a regime 
of domestically engineered low-carbon policies designed to develop a near carbon neutral 
electricity supply infrastructure by 2050. 
This thesis explores the resilience of the UK electricity generation infrastructure as it is 
exposed to security of supply risks particularly at a time when the system is threatened 
by potential capacity shortfalls arising from the eminent closure of aging nuclear and coal 
power plants, with the latter facing total demise in the wake of the crippling European 
pollution regulations targeting large combustion fossil fuel plants. The large scale 
deployment of variable renewable energy technologies for the electricity generation 
sector has a potential to impact on the security of supply.    
This research uses the ‘Energy Optimisation Calculator’ (EOC), a quantitative approach 
to develop a least-cost and pollution electricity generation portfolio for the UK 2050 
future, taking into account the technological, investment, and environmental constraints 
that characterise an energy system under transition. The flexibility of the model adopted 
allows for the dynamics that affect the electricity generation sector to be analysed in an 
integrative manner, providing results that shed insight into the projected outlook of the 
electricity generation sector as it decarbonises. The model develops different energy 
scenarios to reflect on the potential pathways the energy supply system could follow to 
achieve the energy policy objectives. The results generated from this thesis provide an up 
to date, focused and integrated perspective on how the electricity system could potentially 
evolve as it transitions towards a low-carbon future
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Climate Change and the global energy economies  
Global energy production and use is estimated to have contributed about two-thirds 
of the world’s annual greenhouse gas emissions (IEA, 2015). There is worldwide 
consensus that climate change is a reality and threat to human civilisation, and thus 
it is fundamental that international frameworks are developed and agreed to tackle 
greenhouse gas emissions from industrial activities. The agreement reached at the 
21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris, pledging to keep the rise in average 
temperatures below 2 oC (UNFCCC, 2015) relative to pre-industrial levels is 
another commitment by the international community to tackle the threat of the 
human induced climate change. The decarbonisation of energy economies, which 
to date, remain heavily dependent on fossil fuel resources is central to the 
achievement of the emission reduction milestone agreed at the COP21.  
Climate change mitigation is at the heart of the European Union (EU) and UK 
energy policy frameworks. In order to align the energy policies with the objective 
of limiting global temperature rise to 2 oC to pre-industrial levels, the EU and the 
UK government have made commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
in 2050 by 80 % below the 1990 levels (European Council, 2009; HM Government, 
2008). In order to guide the UK economy on a cost-effective path to the 2050 
emission reduction target, the fifth carbon budget (2028-2032) developed by the 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC) recommends a 100 gCO2/kWh grid intensity 
to be achieved by the UK electricity generation sector (CCC, 2015). The UK’s 
progress in decarbonising all sectors of the economy, particularly the electricity 
supply sector could significantly play an important role in assisting the EU’s 
Member States to achieve an agreed emission reduction target of at least 40 % by 
2030 relative to 1990 levels (Erbach, 2014). The quest to decarbonise the EU, and 
indeed the UK economies through climate and energy policies is part of the global 
initiative seeking to combat dangerous climate change. While the climate and 
energy policy strategies driven by the EU and international forums such as the 
COP21 are a welcome development towards stabilising global temperatures, the 
process of decarbonising energy related economies is fraught with deep 
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uncertainty. The evolution of global energy economies to low-carbon and 
sustainable futures has to overcome financial, technological, political and social 
acceptance barriers in order for the national, regional and global climate and energy 
targets to be met. Above all, these climate and energy policy strategies should 
endeavour to promote security of energy supply in line with the global energy 
assessment (GEA) which prioritise robustness, sovereignty and resilience of energy 
systems (GEA, 2012).    
1.2 The UK electricity supply infrastructure: Addressing the 
‘energy trilemma’ 
The Climate Change Act set a legally binding target of 80 % emission reduction 
by 2050 against the 1990 levels to be achieved by the UK economy (HM 
Government, 2008). The Act enacted a system of five-year carbon budgets framed 
to guide the economy on a cost-effective path to the 2050 emission reduction target. 
The decarbonisation framework proposed by the Climate Change Act is to be 
driven by a transition of the electricity generation sector to a low-carbon future. 
There is strong consensus within industry, policy and academic quarters that the 
decarbonisation of the electricity supply sector by 2030 is central to the UK 
achieving the 80 % emission reduction target by 2050 cost-effectively. Faced with 
the potential difficulties in decarbonising the UK transport, industry and buildings 
sectors, the energy supply sector is strategically the prime candidate by which this 
decarbonisation campaign for the entire economy could be advanced.  
The repositioning of the electricity supply system on the path to a low-carbon future 
is a timely development for the UK energy policy. This is mainly because the UK 
electricity supply needs to date have been extensively sustained by a fossil-fuel 
powered infrastructure, which is not only threatened by domestic and regional 
pressures to decarbonise, but is reaching the end of its technical operation life. The 
majority of the UK coal-fired generation fleet is over forty-five years old having 
being built in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the absence of a strong and prohibitive 
domestic and regional regulations to drive coal out of the UK generation mix, the 
coal generation sector is likely to maintain its position in the electricity system 
through the 2020s regardless of the age of plants or the cost of upgrades required 
to meet environmental policy standards. While the future role of coal generation in 
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an electricity supply system supposedly in transition to a low-carbon future remains 
uncertain, the UK government has proposed a complete phase-out of coal-fired 
plants by 2025 (DECC, 2015a). Suffice it to say that the impetus to decarbonise the 
UK power sector through the deployment of low-carbon energy technologies is set 
to contribute towards achieving carbon emission targets while at the same time 
alleviating the security of supply threats by filling the capacity deficit created 
following plant closures. 
The erosion of the UK electricity generation capacity is set to intensify in the early 
2020s as the existing nuclear electricity generation fleet is set to be retired as it 
reaches the end of its operational life, as is the case with the coal generation plants. 
The UK government is fully aware of the urgency required to replace this capacity. 
To this end, a policy framework has been adopted which could see the development 
of a fleet of new nuclear energy plant designs and other low-carbon energy 
technologies to assist in driving down emissions as well as building up the capacity 
margins following the potential closure of existing old nuclear and coal electricity 
generation plants. The development and deployment of baseload and low-carbon 
new nuclear energy plants from now through the 2020s is significantly important 
if the UK electricity sector is to achieve a level of decarbonisation which is 
consistent with the fourth and fifth carbon budgetary requirements seeking to 
achieve a 100 gCO2/kWh grid intensity by 2030.  
The transition of the UK electricity generation sector to a near zero carbon grid 
intensity 2050 is dependent on the electricity supply sector achieving a 
decarbonisation status by 2030. The CCC suggested to the UK government that the 
power sector should reach a 50 or 100 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target by 2030 
in order to meet the 2050 emission reduction target cost-effectively (CCC, 2014). 
This radical emission reduction target within the electricity generation sector has 
to be realised through the rapid deployment of low-carbon energy technologies 
such as offshore wind, nuclear and fossil fuelled plants fitted with carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) technology. Modelling assessments from government, industry 
and the research community have unanimously proved that it is feasible to 
decarbonise the electricity generation infrastructure by 2030 with the right policies 
and technologies in place. To this end, the UK government has indicated that a low-
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carbon technology portfolio of 40-70 GW would need to be deployed through the 
2020s in order to decarbonise the electricity supply sector while ensuring the 
security of energy supply to the UK economy (HM Government, 2011). The 
accelerated development and deployment of low-carbon energy technologies from 
2014 through to 2030 was estimated to require a capital investment portfolio of up 
to £200 billion (CCC, 2013b). The level of investment required to develop a low-
carbon electricity supply system requires a policy framework that appeals to the 
investor community as well as promoting research and development for the 
emerging technologies such as CCS and new nuclear energy technologies.  
In confronting the trilemma challenge facing the UK energy system, that is, 
decarbonising the electricity supply, maintaining security of supply and provision 
of affordable energy to consumers, the UK government introduced the electricity 
market reform (EMR) programme to finance the development of the electricity 
generation sector. This low-carbon financing programme was legislated through 
the Energy Act 2013 and it provides the basis through which a transition to a low-
carbon electricity supply system could be achieved in the period to 2030. The 
estimated low-carbon generation capacity required to mitigate the UK energy 
trilemma would be driven by the EMR characterised by new reforms to the energy 
market in the form of Contracts for Difference (CfD) and Capacity Markets. 
Considering the level of capital investment required to develop a clean, secure and 
affordable electricity supply system consistent with the 2050 emission reduction 
target, it is imperative that the EMR programme is implemented in a consistent way 
that promotes and maintains investor confidence in the UK energy markets. The 
creation and maintenance of a functional energy market is a key driver in bringing 
forward the large scale deployment capacity of mature and emerging technologies 
required to clean up the electricity generation sector whilst maintaining the security 
of supply and the provision of affordable energy supplies to the UK economy.  
1.3 The new UK energy policy: A roadblock to sector 
decarbonisation  
After creating a radical policy platform for decarbonising the energy economy by 
2050 (HM Government, 2008), the new UK energy policy appears to be heading 
towards a carbon intensive locked-in electricity generation infrastructure. The 
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newly announced energy policy initiative (DECC, 2015a) is proposing an 
ambitious new gas plant renaissance to be supported by a new fleet of nuclear 
power plants and possibly with offshore wind if deployment costs do come down. 
In this new UK energy policy, a phase-out plan for the existing coal plants is 
proposed for 2025. Contextually, the proposed phase-out of coal generation by 
2025 would have to take into account the likely scenario that could result in only 
one new nuclear energy plant commissioning by the end of 2030 out of a possible 
16 GW capacity projected by the UK nuclear industry to be deployed in the same 
period (HM Government, 2013c). The prospects of a new nuclear energy plant 
renaissance in the UK electricity generation mix is currently not encouraging as the 
first planned new nuclear energy plant at Hinkley Point C is yet to reach the 
financial investment decision (FID). Hence, the future of a fleet of new nuclear 
energy reactors for the UK electricity generation sector remains worryingly 
uncertain.  
A new dash for gas-fired generation in the period to 2030 appears to be a plausible 
solution to addressing two of the pillars of the energy trilemma, except 
decarbonisation. The low capital investment required to build new gas plants could 
provide the deployment momentum for gas-fired generation infrastructure 
expected by the UK policymakers to fill the capacity deficit likely to be created 
following the stall in new nuclear plant development and the retirement of existing 
old coal and nuclear electricity generation plants. As the new UK energy policy 
embraces energy security as its main priority, its focus on developing a low-carbon 
electricity supply future is further dented by the UK government’s decision to stop 
funding the commercialisation of CCS technology. This implies that the new gas 
generation plants set to define the new energy policy may not be fitted with CCS 
to abate emissions. 
Therefore, in the absence of CCS technology in the generation mix by 2030, the 
ambition to build a sustainable electricity supply infrastructure for the UK energy 
future by 2030 and 2050 could be impossible, let alone be aligned with the goal of 
keeping the UK economy on track to the 2050 emission reduction target. The case 
for new gas generation plants is contentious particularly in the face of the UK 
government’s decision to end subsidies for onshore wind and solar PV, a decision 
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which is widely believed to have an impact of increasing policy uncertainty in the 
future promotion and development of low-carbon energy investment markets.  
The future direction of the current UK energy policy is difficult to predict. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that terms like “incoherent, unstable, inconsistent” 
(Scottish Government, 2015) have been used to describe the seemingly ‘start and 
stop’ approach apparently characterising the energy policy of late. The apparent 
lack of clarity and direction in the allocation of contracts at the capacity market 
auctions is arguably one of the key features where the new energy policy is seen to 
be presenting a conflicting framework on how the UK government intends to 
achieve the security of supply objective. The first two capacity market auctions 
have seen coal, small gas plant operators and diesel generators being awarded 
contracts at the expense of large gas plant investments, the sector which is 
supposedly meant to drive the security of supply agenda as unveiled by the new 
UK energy policy. At the backdrop of this seemingly conflicting policy framework, 
the prospects of the new gas generation plant renaissance aspired by the new UK 
energy policy could be difficult to achieve under the prevailing market 
environment for the gas generation sector. 
The polarisation of the gas investment community through an ad hoc 
implementation of the capacity markets is not a price the UK government can 
afford to pay given the manifold factors currently working against the sector’s 
potential contribution to driving the entire UK economy towards the 80 % emission 
reduction target by 2050. A depressed market for new gas generation plant 
development is not likely to benefit from the shale gas development projected to 
take-off in the mid-2020s (Economic Affairs Committee, 2014). Therefore, a series 
of attractive incentive mechanisms designed to promote a new wave of new gas 
plant development would need to be prioritised and fast tracked if the UK 
government remains strongly committed to the complete phase-out of coal 
generation by 2025. By so doing, this could create a viable domestic market for the 
prospective development of the shale gas resources in the UK, and thus bolstering 
the energy sovereignty objective sought by the new energy policy.  
A new UK energy policy outlook by 2030 without CCS and potentially without 
new nuclear plants, but a new fleet of gas generation plants is not likely to get closer 
7 
 
 
to meeting the emission reduction target of 100 gCO2/kWh proposed for the fifth 
carbon budget set for the 2028-32 period. The role of offshore wind in driving this 
new UK energy policy is dependent on the technology achieving cost 
competitiveness as the UK government expressed unwillingness to subsidise 
offshore wind. However, if development costs for offshore wind does fall below 
the £100/MWh threshold (The Crown Estate, 2012), the UK government envisages 
that the sector could be funded to yield a total installed capacity of up to 20 GW by 
the 2020s (DECC, 2015a). While the development of a portfolio of offshore wind 
could contribute towards decarbonising the electricity generation sector, renewable 
energy technologies are variable by nature. This weather dependent power output 
characteristic of renewable energy sources poses a real threat to the UK security of 
supply objective, especially if the accelerated deployment of offshore and onshore 
wind and solar energy is not matched by a strategic plan to mitigate the impact of 
intermittency to electricity supply. 
The dynamics affecting the UK electricity generation sector are so immense to the 
extent that the proposed phase-out of coal generation by 2025 may not happen. The 
existing energy market landscape and decarbonisation policies could provide a 
leeway that could potentially perpetuate the operation of coal in the UK electricity 
generation mix. Under these enabling conditions, there is a potential that the 
existing coal plants could be upgraded to comply with the pollution regulations as 
well as extend their operational life if the new gas plants fail to achieve the 
accelerated deployment levels anticipated by the new UK energy policy. It is in 
this context that a cocktail of carbon intensive generation technologies consisting 
mainly of unabated coal, gas and reciprocating diesel engines in the generation mix 
by 2030 could be detrimental to the sector’s capacity to meet the fourth and fifth 
carbon budgets, let alone in assisting to keep the UK economy on track to the 80 
% emission reduction target by 2050. Given the uncertainty in the development and 
direction of the new UK energy policy, it is difficult to determine how the UK 
government intends to fulfil its domestic legally binding emissions targets as well 
as contribute to the global goal of stabilising the global temperature rise blow the 
2 oC threshold.  
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1.4 The dilemma of intermittent renewable energy resources 
The transition of the power sector to low-carbon future is dependent on an 
accelerated deployment of renewable energy technologies. The increased 
penetration of low-carbon and renewable energy technologies aims to displace the 
high carbon intensive fossil fuels from the electricity generation mix. The UK 
government estimates that 40 to 70 GW capacity of low-carbon generation would 
need to be deployed through the 2020s to guarantee security of supply as well as 
decarbonise the sector by 2030 (HM Government, 2011). A large proportion of this 
low-carbon energy capacity development comprise of renewable energy 
technologies such as wind, solar, wave and tidal, whose output is influenced by 
environmental conditions. The variance of intermittent output from these 
renewable energy technologies have diverse implications on the operation of the 
entire energy supply system. With offshore wind projected to play a major role in 
guiding the power sector to a low-carbon energy future, this thesis uses statistical 
wind data and wind turbine power characteristics to quantify variable power output 
from offshore wind and its implications on policy and the energy supply system 
outlook by 2030.   
Since the model framework used in this thesis does not consider and reflect the 
impact of variability on renewable energy sources in its scenario outputs, a study 
on wind variability is designed to quantify and integrate this element in the model 
structure. By addressing the limitations of the model in addressing the issue of 
intermittency, it is anticipated that the scenarios developed by the model could 
contribute significantly in providing insights into the development of the future 
energy policy and the electricity supply infrastructure. The level of variability of 
offshore wind output established through the wind data analysis is used to 
determine the amount of reserve unabated fossil fuel capacity that could be required 
to mitigate any supply deficit. The frequency at which unabated fossil fuel plant is 
operated to mitigate fluctuations in offshore wind output has a cost and emission 
penalty on the operation of the energy system. Therefore, by integrating the full 
impact of variability of renewable energy sources into the modelling framework, 
the results from this thesis could shed valuable insights into the development of 
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policies, technology and investment strategies for the UK low-carbon energy 
futures. 
1.5 Aim of this study 
The literature review analysis presented in Chapter 2 has revealed the challenges 
facing world communities in their quest to achieve energy sovereignty while 
minimising the threat of dangerous climate change. The global energy policy 
landscape has been defined by a system of targets seeking to drive energy 
economies towards low-carbon futures through the transformation of energy 
supply systems. The energy security and decarbonisation have been entrenched in 
the national and regional energy and climate policy fabric, and thus underscoring 
the strong link between the energy transformation processes and the threat of 
climate change and energy sovereignty. Various approaches have been developed 
and deployed to explore the evolution of energy economies towards low-carbon 
futures. 
This thesis uses the (EOC) to trace the evolution of the UK electricity generation 
infrastructure to a low-carbon future consistent with the legally binding emission 
reduction target of 80 % by 2050 against the 1990 level. The analysis adopted in 
this research endeavours to capture the low-carbon transition of the UK electricity 
supply sector under a policy framework experiencing insurmountable pressure to 
reconcile the technical, economic and climate facets of energy system development 
against the national objective of achieving security of supply and affordable energy 
to the UK population. Following up on the gaps identified in the literature review 
presented, the principal research question and a series of sub-questions are 
proposed in this thesis to provide the platform through which the UK energy policy 
trilemma can be discussed in the context of the dynamics affecting the electricity 
generation infrastructure.  
The principle research question at the heart of this thesis is: how can the technical, 
economic and political components of the UK energy system development be 
effectively aligned to transform and guide the electricity generation infrastructure 
to a low-carbon future by 2050?  
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A series of sub-questions have been adopted to provide the necessary structure in 
the form of result chapters which form the arenas where the investigation of this 
research question is deliberated in greater detail. The following sections provide a 
selection of the research sub-questions with a brief description of the main aspects 
covered in each:  
RSQ1: How can a transition to a low-carbon energy future be conceptualised in 
the context of technical, economic and decarbonisation constraints? 
This section of the research question explores alternative approaches that have been 
employed to investigate the evolution of energy systems in the quest to develop an 
optimal electricity generation mix that achieves the key facets of the energy 
trilemma.    
RSQ2: To what extent is the current UK energy policy intervention a threat to the 
objective of decarbonising the electricity supply sector?  
An abrupt disconnect to the Climate Change Act oriented energy policy framework 
precipitated by the newly unveiled UK energy policy is creating a degree of 
uncertainty within the entire energy system development and transition. The 
apparent lack of policy continuity is posing a major risk to the technical, innovation 
and investment aspects of the energy system development. This uncertainty in the 
energy policy which is created by a series of incoherent decisions present a major 
risk in balancing sustainability, security of supply and affordability priorities.  
RSQ3. How can the potential shale gas resource development and use in the UK 
electricity generation sector achieve the environmental sustainability and security 
of supply objectives of the UK energy policy?   
With a legal binding emission reduction target in place, the prospects of a shale gas 
‘revolution’ would put to test the UK government’s commitment to decarbonising 
the electricity generation sector. The potential energy resource independence likely 
to be enhanced through the development and use of locally sourced unconventional 
gas could create conflicts within the energy policy framework if a balance between 
sustainability and energy security is not struck in the exploitation of this resource.  
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RSQ4. How can we use insights and knowledge derived from the analysis of 
intermittent renewable energy resources to evaluate the role of renewable energy 
technologies in low-carbon energy transitions?  
As the UK electricity generation supply system transitions to a near zero carbon 
grid intensity by 2050, an unprecedented level of renewable energy technologies 
would have to be deployed to achieve this level of decarbonisation. While the 
deployment of these technologies is fundamental in decarbonising the electricity 
supply system, their variability characteristic can pose a threat to the security of 
energy supply. It is through the RSQ4 that the full extent of intermittency of 
renewable energy technologies can be explored in its entirety as the energy supply 
system transitions to a low-carbon future.    
1.5.1 The structure of the thesis  
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters as shown in Figure 1.1. The introduction 
presents an overview of the energy supply systems and their impact on the goal of 
keeping global temperatures below 2 oC of pre-industrial levels from a global, EU 
and UK perspective. Furthermore, the focus of the introduction shifts to illuminate 
on the challenges facing the UK energy policy in balancing the technical, financial 
and sustainability aspects defining the energy system in transition to a low-carbon 
future. The thesis devises a series of research questions to present a chronological 
assessment of the main concepts defining the evolution of the UK energy policy as 
shown in Figure 1.1. Chapter 2 gives an exposition of the body of literature 
currently available to shed insight into the developments affecting the transition of 
energy systems to a low-carbon future. Also, the literature review contains a review 
of related concepts and features in the studies involving energy transitions. The 
methodology section in Chapter 3 alludes to the EOC, the approach used to 
investigate the UK energy system transition to a low-carbon future. Through this 
simulation approach, a series of scenario assessments are generated in order to 
develop insights into the transition of the UK electricity generation sector in line 
with the principles of the energy trilemma. A section of Chapter 3 is devoted to 
model testing, an exercise seeking to establish the model calculator’s robustness 
and suitability for use in developing energy scenario frameworks for this thesis.  
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Figure 1.1. The thesis structure and the connecting research sub-question 
framings. 
The results section is made up of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which form the main body 
of this thesis where the dynamics affecting the UK energy policy are discussed in 
the context of the principle research question and the sub-questions outlined in 
Section 1.5. Chapter 4 explores the potential threats to the UK security of electricity 
supply in view of technical, investment and policy dynamics affecting the 
development of the energy system. Chapter 5 introduces the UK shale gas 
development and its potential wider implications on the decarbonisation of the UK 
electricity generation sector and the general transition towards a low-carbon energy 
future. It can be concluded that chapters four and five bring to life the dilemma 
confronting the UK policymakers in trying to achieve a balance between security 
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of supply and climate change, the two key pillars of the UK energy policy 
objectives. The impact of variability from renewable energy technologies in the 
generation mix is discussed in Chapter 6 with its related effects on security of 
supply, the operation of reserve gas CCGT generation and the carbon emission 
generation. Furthermore, this chapter reviews the limitations of the EOC in 
addressing the issue of variability and its impacts on the development of future 
low-carbon energy scenarios. The thesis signs off with Chapter 7 which provides 
concluding remarks from the research in its entirety. A designated section on future 
work within this chapter outlines ideas that emerged during the course of the 
research, which by virtue of the level of detailed required to analyse them could 
not be incorporated within the current thesis. Therefore, these emerging ideas could 
form new areas of research which could be deemed to be of great benefit to this 
thesis, and as such, they are set aside to form part of the future work.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1  The global energy production, use and climate change 
The energy industry is arguably the largest contributor to global greenhouse gas 
emissions as the current electricity generating infrastructure is still heavily 
dependent on carbon intensive primary fuels such as coal and natural gas. 
Decarbonising the electricity supply system is not only a catalyst for reducing air 
pollutants and GHG emissions, but it is also essential for stimulating economic 
growth and enhancing energy security. The proportion of the global electricity 
generation infrastructure portrayed in Figure 2.1 confirms the dominance of fossil 
fuels, and hence the level of investment, policy and innovative challenges that 
would need to be overcome in order to decarbonise the sector. With 3606 GW, that 
is, 65 % of total installed capacity in 2012 shown in Figure 2.1 comprising mainly 
of coal, gas and oil, confirms the International Energy Agency (IEA) assessment 
that fossil fuels will continue to meet more than 80 % of the primary energy demand 
and that over 90 % of the energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide are from 
fossil-fuel combustion (IEA, 2015). 
   
Figure 2.1. The 2012 global installed electricity generation capacity (EIA, 
2012). 
The insatiable global demand for energy, which is spurred by the ever increasing 
economic and population growth, could increasingly make it more difficult to 
reduce emissions to levels commensurate with the internationally agreed goal of 
keeping the temperature increase below 2 oC, relative to the pre-industrial times 
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(IPCC, 2014b). Early action in the form of switching from high carbon intensive 
technologies to low-carbon energy alternatives such as nuclear, CCS and 
renewable technologies is imperative for decarbonising the electricity supply 
system. However, based on the 2012 electricity generation capacity distribution 
shown in Figure 2.1, the global initiative towards a low-carbon electricity future 
needs to be accelerated to increase the build-up of wind, solar, and other low-
carbon energy technologies that are fundamental for stimulating sufficient 
decarbonisation of the electricity generation infrastructure. 
The penetration of individual renewable and low-carbon technologies and their 
capacity to mitigate climate change and energy security issues can be hampered by 
a wide range of constraints. Economic factors, environmental concerns, public 
acceptance and the integrative nature of the existing infrastructure could hinder the 
deployment potential of various renewable and low-carbon energy technologies. 
Nonetheless, in the context of global warming, there should be no compromise, but 
to decarbonise the ‘high carbon lock-in’ generation infrastructure. The case against 
fossil fuelled economies was hinted in a recent nature study which suggested that 
a third of oil reserves, half gas reserves and over 80 % of current coal reserves 
should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of a 2oC 
reduction target (McGlade & Ekins, 2015).       
However, the problem of “lock-in” by existing high emission technologies, 
political, regulatory and social systems could make the goal of limiting the rise in 
global mean temperature to the 2 oC target much costlier and more difficult to 
achieve (IEA, 2012). These transitional barriers to a low-carbon global electricity 
supply system are reinforced by the absence of an agreed global framework to 
enforce climate change mitigation measures. Therefore, there is a need for the 
development of a policy framework that prioritises and supports energy supply 
technology development and deployment.  
The power sector, particularly the electricity generation system is central to climate 
abatement. Traditionally, coal has been and continues to be the backbone of power 
generation for the global electricity demand and by so doing, it is believed to have 
contributed more than 40 % of the worldwide energy-related CO2 emissions growth 
since 2000 (IEA, 2015). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
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asserts that approximately 35% of the total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010 
were derived from the energy supply sector, with an increased share of coal in the 
global fuel mix being one of the main contributors (IPCC, 2014a). Shifting 
electricity supply from fossil fuel to clean energy alternatives requires strong and 
drastic policy interventions to accelerate the investment in low-carbon energy 
technologies, as well as adopting an incentivised framework to phase out coal 
generation in the long-term. The development of an overarching policy strategy for 
the global electricity sector, which balances environmental and energy security 
concerns, is dependent on a thriving and internationally established agreement on 
climate change mitigation. The absence of a strong global initiative is a roadblock 
to each country’s motivation and willingness to formulate and implement domestic 
climate policies as well as the establishment of credible investment structures to 
accelerate technology innovations for low-carbon technology transitional 
purposes.  
Significant reductions in the role of coal-based electricity generation, accompanied 
by a low-carbon and renewable energy technology revolution underlines the 
current global climate change and energy security policy rhetoric. While this policy 
paradigm is central to decarbonising the global economies and achieving energy 
sovereignty, the challenge lies on the extent to which this policy framework could 
be unpacked in communities and constituencies ravaged by widespread energy 
deprivation. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 2010), there are 1.4 billion people globally that lack access 
to electricity, with 85 % of them predominantly in rural areas. This state of energy 
deficiency and deprivation creates further strain on local resources as communities 
struggle to find sustainable alternatives to meet their energy needs. 
With an estimated 2.4 billion people relying on traditional biomass fuels (Modi et 
al., 2005), there is growing fear that such dependency on biomass fuels could 
accelerate environmental degradation as well as the health and wellbeing of poor 
communities dependent on these unsustainable biomass-derived fuel resources. 
Energy underdevelopment challenges particularly in poor-emerging economies 
need to be given the same attention as that accorded to the climate change and 
security of supply issues at global forums hosted and promoted by the developed 
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market economies of the OECD (Birol, 2007). A balanced policy approach could 
not only heighten the scourge of energy deprivation in poor communities in Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia and South East Asia, but could assist in alleviating fuel 
poverty by providing financial and technical support that could promote economic 
growth and the social wellbeing of communities in developing countries as they 
transition to sustainable energy development futures. 
Therefore, it is crucial that a global energy policy framework that fosters an 
understanding of the relationship between energy security, environmental 
sustainability and fuel poverty is developed and implemented to address energy-
related challenges affecting worldwide economies. The adoption and application 
of a globally integrated energy policy, even in energy deprived communities, could 
contribute significantly in addressing energy related issues transcending across 
geographical boundaries. Since the poor-energy emerging economies currently lie 
outside the emission reduction framework, Bradshaw (2010) expresses the opinion 
that an integrated policy approach would have the advantage of keeping their 
energy and emissions within the carbon emission reduction framework, and thus 
assisting in reducing the challenge of stabilisation and reduction of global 
emissions. Also, it is envisaged that through increased investment and technology 
sharing, the energy-poor emerging economies’ future growth in energy service 
demand could be met with greater efficiency especially from low-carbon energy 
resources that have a higher potential to improve energy security and keep carbon 
emissions in check (Bradshaw, 2010).  
2.2 The European Union’s framework for a sustainable 
electricity future  
2.2.1 Brief energy policy overview 
In its quest to contribute towards global decarbonisation, the EU launched its 
Energy Roadmap 2050 which explores various approaches to transitioning towards 
a cleaner energy system. Its decarbonisation agenda is underpinned by the “20-20-
20” targets where a 20 % reduction commitment on GHG emissions, renewable 
energy resource deployment and energy efficiency was adopted by Member States 
(European Union, 2012). Keeping abreast with the 50 % global emission reduction 
target commensurate with the 2 oC objective, the European Council endorsed the 
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long-term goal of reducing EU GHG emissions by 80-95 % by 2050, relative to 
1990 levels, in the context of similar reductions committed by other developed 
countries (European Council, 2009).    
As the concentration of GHG emissions continue to rise within the atmosphere with 
no binding international agreement in sight, the European Commission has 
proposed a binding 40 % target for GHG reductions and 27 % target for the 
renewable energy resources deployment by 2030 (Erbach, 2014). The adoption of 
these targets sends a strong message to the global community, particularly to other 
developed countries outside the EU on the need for a binding international 
agreement on greenhouse gas emission reduction. Collective effort by both 
developed and developing nations is urgently required to facilitate a 50 % fall in 
global emissions compared to the 1990 level by 2050, which effectively equates to 
a 60 to 80 % reduction by most developed countries by 2050 (European Comission, 
2007).  
2.2.2 The dilemma of security of energy supply  
While leading the fight against climate change, the EU policy has also been 
dominated by the energy security narrative. Taken in a wider context, the “20-20-
20” package combined with the 2030 and 2050 milestones have an overarching 
objective of mitigating climate change while at the same time attempting to address 
the EU’s insecure fossil fuel economy which is heavily dependent on foreign 
energy sources. With a diversified source and supply of imported hydrocarbons, 
the EU energy system and economy is still vulnerable to supply disruptions and 
incessant price vitalities owing either to the political instabilities, commercial 
disputes or infrastructural failures arising along the gas transitional routes or within 
the Russia-Ukraine boarders.  
The magnitude of this vulnerability to imported energy supply is aggravated by the 
EU’s over-dependency on one single external supplier, which in this case is Russia. 
Based on the 2013 figures, Russia supplied 39 % of the EU natural gas imports 
which represents almost two fifths of the total EU imports (European Comission, 
2014). There is a risk associated with such over-dependency on one supplier, who 
as observed by Toke and Vezirgiannidou (2013) can use such a position for geo-
political gain. The development of an integrated and diversified network of gas 
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corridors from the Caspian region and Middle Eastern resource routes as unveiled 
in the “Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan” (European Comission, 2008), 
underscores the goal of fostering an uninterrupted physical availability of energy. 
This focused investment in a diverse intercontinental fossil fuel gas infrastructure 
linking Europe with its primary energy suppliers confirms the IEA’s assessment 
that about 70 % of the energy supply investments today are related to fossil fuel 
extraction, transportation and transformation (IEA, 2010). 
 However, as observed by Tricarico and Gerebizza (2012), the channelling of 
billions of euros into large fossil fuel based infrastructures appears to be at odds 
with the decarbonisation and sustainability aspirations projected through the “20-
20-20” objectives, the 2030 target of 27 % renewable energy resource as well as 
the 80-95 % emission reduction by 2050. This kind of investment could perpetually 
‘lock-in’ the EU economy, and in particular the energy system to fossil fuels with 
the detriment of further increasing emissions into the atmosphere.   
2.2.3 The EU era for renewable energy development  
In the long-term, the EU is committed to protecting its economy from the external 
vulnerability to imported hydrocarbons by ensuring that the 20 % and 27 % 
proposed share of renewable energy supply is achieved by 2020 and 2030, 
respectively. The EU’s renewable energy deployment landscape appears to be 
making significant gains as an estimated 14.1 % renewable contribution to final 
energy consumption was achieved in 2012 compared to 8.7 % in 2005 (European 
Comission, 2014). The growth in the renewable energy sector is mainly driven by 
the renewable energy support scheme stimulating investment in solar photovoltaic 
(PV) and onshore wind. Latest figures from 2013 indicate that 25.4 % of the EU’s 
gross electricity consumption was derived from renewable energy sources with the 
bulk of the output derived from hydroelectricity, wind turbines, solar and biomass 
(Eurostat, 2015b) as shown in Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2. Installed renewable capacity in EU in 2013 (EWEA, 2014 p 8). 
The increased share of renewable energy capacity in the generation mix has seen a 
gradual rise in the annual contribution to the gross electricity supply in the EU from 
2004 to 2013 as highlighted in Figure 2.3. The penetration of renewable energy 
resources across the EU has led to 25.4 % increase in the overall electricity supply 
being sourced from renewable technologies as shown in Figure 2.3. This 
remarkable penetration of renewable energy technologies into the electricity 
generation mix is driven by a policy framework which seeks to transform Europe’s 
energy system. Renewable energy development is essential to the EU energy 
system as it contributes in meeting all the Energy Union objectives such as the 
delivery of security of supply, a transition to a sustainable energy system with 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions and industrial development which leads to 
growth, job creation and lower energy cost for the EU economy (European 
Commission, 2015). The continuity in the existing renewable energy policies 
within the Member States could sustain the momentum in renewable energy 
deployment demonstrated in Figure 2.3, and thus increasing EU’s potential to 
achieve the 2020 and 2030 targets.  
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Figure 2.3. The EU percentage share of electricity from renewable sources 
(Eurostat, 2015a). 
2.2.4 The future of coal-fired electricity generation in the EU 
Fossil fuel generation, mainly from coal and gas will continue to be Europe’s 
dominate electricity generation system, both in the short and medium-term, that is, 
53 % in 2010; 43.5 % in 2020 and 39.8 % in 2030 (European Comission, 2010). 
The dominance of fossil fuel generation in the energy mix, which accounted for 
about 419.9 GW in 2013 (EWEA, 2014) could pose a major obstacle to the EU’s 
policy attempts to find the right balance between sustainability, competitiveness 
and security of energy supply issues. The competitiveness of coal prices over gas 
in the EU has strengthened its market share in the generation mix. This has been 
facilitated partly by the increased coal imports from the US displaced by the 
increased switching to gas in the power generation sector following the boom in 
shale gas, as well as the impact of the emissions regulations (Lu et al., 2012). The 
depreciation of the carbon prices in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), that is, from €28/t before the 2008 economic crisis, to less than €5/t for 
most of 2013 (Honore, 2014), has further consolidated the coal generation position 
as the most favourable alternative to gas despite its higher carbon intensity. The 
collapse of the carbon market system as a driver for decarbonisation is believed to 
have accounted for the 38 % emissions recorded in the power sector in 2012 (IEA, 
2014a). 
The future role of coal in the generation mix is dependent on the compliance of 
both existing and new plants to the EU environmental regulations in the form of 
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Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) and Industrial Emissions Directive 
(IED). These pollution regulations seek to reduce acidification, ground level ozone 
and particulates by controlling the emissions of sulphur dioxide (SOx), oxide of 
nitrogen (NOx) and dust particles (pm10) from large combustion plants. As a result 
of these pollution regulations, it is estimated that about 55-60 GW coal capacity 
will be shut down across the EU by the end of 2015 (Honore, 2014). The investment 
challenges to upgrade the coal generation infrastructure to meet the higher national 
and EU emission standards and other political and market pressures could combine 
to fast track the coal generation infrastructure closures, particularly on aging energy 
plants.   
While coal contributes about 27 % share in electricity generation at EU level 
(EURACOAL, 2013), its long-term future role in the energy mix can only be 
enhanced and consolidated through the adoption of the best available technologies 
such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other advanced systems that 
achieves higher efficiency measures. The sustainability of fossil fuel power plants, 
that is, their capacity to attain a near-to-zero emission status hinges on the 
commercial viability of CCS technologies. As a climate change mitigation option, 
a CCS process consists of capture, transport, deposition and monitoring of CO2. 
The components of the CCS chain are in commercial use today elsewhere in the 
economy, but are yet to be used in an integrated chain envisaged for mitigating 
carbon emissions from industrial processes in Europe. The successful roll-out of 
CCS technology in the electric power sector requires sufficiently stringent limits 
on GHG emissions to make it economic to incur additional costs, regulatory 
mandates that would require the use of CCS or direct or indirect financial support 
(Herzog, 2011). The progress in CCS development and deployment does not rest 
on technical and financial barriers alone, but also on the political appetite of 
individual governments as well as on public acceptance.  
The successful transition of the EU coal infrastructure towards clean technologies 
is eagerly anticipated, especially at the backdrop of heightened gas security 
concerns as well as energy security dilemmas associated with the increased share 
of intermittent generation in the electricity supply mix. Generally, the outlook for 
coal in an energy system transitioning to a low-carbon future is limited, however, 
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the current slow progress in CCS development and the potential investment risks 
for new coal and aging plant upgrades could further decrease the long-term coal 
capacity in the EU generation mix. In the event of a legally binding carbon target 
being agreed in Paris in December 2015, there is a danger that coal plants in the 
EU could be stranded, thus aggravating the EU’s electricity infrastructure capacity 
to address the challenges of meeting the future energy demand, promoting diversity 
of supply and supporting large scale intermittent generation in the system.  
2.2.5 The role of natural gas and shale gas in EU energy transition 
Gas-fired power plants in Europe face an uncertain future in the generation mix 
mainly due to the boom in renewables, lower coal prices, lower power demand and 
the collapse of the CO2 emissions prices in the EU ETS, and thus making gas 
generation less competitive. These factors have successfully created stranded gas 
generation infrastructure, a phenomenon described by Caldecott and Mcdaniels 
(2014) as that depicting assets that become uneconomic to operate when their 
marginal cost of generation exceeds the price for electricity over an extended 
period of time, and thus leading to them being temporarily idle or shut down 
(mothballed), or permanently retired ahead of their planned decommission. 
Despite being considered the most flexible thermal base-load technology ideally 
suited to mitigate the challenges of increased intermittent generation in the energy 
mix as well as assist in future decarbonisation, combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) 
plant future under the prevailing market climate is bleak. Expert reports estimate 
that about 110 GW CCGT capacity across Europe could be retired or mothballed 
within the next few years (Caldecott and Mcdaniels, 2014), and thus compromising 
on the EU security of supply as well as climate change objectives. While price 
differentials between coal and gas are projected to remain unchanged over the 
foreseeable future, the resurgence of gas competitiveness can only be thought of 
depending on the extent and impact of nuclear and coal closures through the 2020s.  
As the natural gas price remains at a record high level and is projected to remain 
unchanged in the foreseeable future, one could hope that the US “shale gas 
revolution” could spill over the EU continent with similar impacts, particularly on 
the gas markets. With 472 trillion cubic feet (tcf), see Figure 2.4 of the potential 
recoverable unconventional gas resource estimated for the EU (EIA, 2013), shale 
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gas development could potentially boost EU security of supply by lowering natural 
gas prices, guarantee gas supplies on the EU markets and adding diversity to the 
EU’s gas pipelines (Pearson et al., 2012). Although this resource estimate map 
could change over time as more explorations are undertaken, the shale gas resource 
potential portrayed in Figure 2.4 is a welcome development given the decline in 
the indigenous gas production across EU producing regions. 
 
Figure 2.4. Unproven technically recoverable shale gas resource (Tcf) (EIA 
2013).  
At the backdrop of this prospective EU shale gas potential, most analysts concur 
that the development of this resource in Europe could be more expensive than in 
the US due to differences in geology, and the need to address public acceptance 
and environmental impact (Erbach, 2014b). It is also understood that 
environmental constraints or potential environmental compliance costs could 
prevent significant volumes of unconventional shale gas development (Pöyry, 
2011). On the other hand, these benefits likely to arise from the successful 
integration of shale gas in the EU’s electricity supply sector could come at the cost 
of increased environmental degradation and the potential risk of induced seismic 
activity. Furthermore, the development of unconventional shale gas in the EU 
could be deemed retrogressive to the EU-wide energy and climate change strategy 
if cheap gas discourages investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy 
sources (Erbach, 2014b).  
To this end, unconventional gas exploration in the EU and its potential 
development in the future has been received with widespread scepticism, leading 
to some EU countries imposing moratoria on hydraulic fracturing processes 
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(Johnson & Boersma, 2013). France, with an estimated 137 Tcf of potential shale 
gas resource, the second largest in the EU after Poland, (see Figure 2.4) has together 
with countries such as Bulgaria and Spain, imposed a moratorium on shale gas 
exploration and extraction citing many uncertainties overshadowing the industry 
as well as potential impacts on the environment.  Assuming that the combustion of 
natural gas has less carbon dioxide emissions and is potentially the cheapest and 
fastest means of decarbonisation compared to other fossil fuels, it is argued that the 
increased development and use of shale gas in electricity generation could play the 
role of a ‘bridging fuel’ until a permanent transition to renewable source of energy 
can be achieved (Johnson & Boersma, 2013; Pearson et al., 2012). It is widely 
believed that the future climate impact of shale gas could be positive if it replaces 
carbon intensive coal, and that fugitive methane emissions are tightly regulated 
from the extraction, processing and throughout the supply chain. 
2.2.6 Nuclear energy challenges in the EU generation mix  
Although nuclear safety is a major concern, to global electricity supply networks 
especially after the Fukushima disaster, 26.9 % of electricity was derived from 
nuclear plants in 2014 (World Nuclear Association, 2015). Therefore, this 
consolidates nuclear power status in the EU as a competitive, reliable and base-
load energy source. Despite the terrible impact of the Fukushima disaster over 
global energy economies, the EU still believe that within a diversified fuel and 
technology supply base, nuclear power plants can assist in ameliorating the energy 
security concerns as well as decarbonising the regional economy. However, the 
future of the nuclear energy industry is currently facing tough challenges within 
the EU. On the path to 2030, there are stronger indications that a proportion of the 
122.3 GW nuclear installed capacity (EWEA, 2014) could be lost due to the closure 
of a number of reactors as they reach the end of their operating life or due to 
political opposition. In their analysis of nuclear energy in the World Nuclear 
Industry Status Report 2014, Schneider et al. (2014) ascertained that in the period 
2000 to 2013, nuclear decreased by 13 GW compared respectively to 105 GW, 103 
GW and 80 GW increases in wind, natural gas and solar installed capacities. The 
level of plant closures will vary among the EU Member States depending on 
political, investment and public perception. 
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Under the existing EU low-carbon energy oriented policies, the greater penetration 
and use of renewable energy technologies could undermine the operating regime 
of both fossil fuel and nuclear plants. Based on Eurelectric analysis, the impact of 
the accelerated penetration and use of renewable energy has seen the average 
operation hours of Spain’s CCGT plants fall from 5-700 hours in 2004, to below 
1000 hours in 2013, while in Italy, gas plant operation fell from 5000 hours in 2007 
to below 3000 hours in 2012 (Eurelectric, 2014). This trend is likely to continue in 
the foreseeable future as the global investment in nuclear and fossil fuel plants 
continues to trail that of renewables. According to the EIA, the 2000-2013 global 
investment in power plants shows the dominance of renewables with 57 %, fossil 
fuels 40 % while nuclear accounted for just 3 % (IEA, 2014b). The investment 
outlay to 2035 for the electricity generation technologies was estimated to be about 
US$700 billion for wind and solar, with an additional US$300 billion for 
hydroelectricity compared to less than US$600 for both fossil fuels and nuclear 
combined (IEA, 2014b). Given the deeper decarbonisation commitments 
earmarked for the period to 2030, the EU’s energy and climate targets could 
continue to undermine the operational regime and ultimately the financial viability 
of nuclear power plants. As the future of the EU new-build nuclear plants remain 
shrouded in uncertainty owing to high investment costs and policy uncertainty, the 
regional commitment to decarbonise the electricity sector and the economy could 
be compromised.  
2.3 Developing a clean and secure electricity system for the UK 
2050 future  
2.3.1 UK electricity policy development overview 
A transition to a sustainable electricity generation future is a priority to the UK 
energy policy development framework. Faced with the threat of dangerous climate 
change and the uncertainty over the current electricity supply infrastructure’s 
capacity to meet the challenges of future electricity demand likely to be 
exacerbated by the increased deployment of variable renewable generation, the UK 
energy policy would have to transform and adapt to these transitional issues. In 
response to the global challenges of climate change and domestic energy security 
concerns the UK government set a legally binding target to cut GHG emissions by 
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80 % by 2050 against the 1990 levels (HM Government, 2008). The UK electricity 
sector is dominated by fossil fuels which account for 63.7 % of the total generation 
derived mainly from coal, gas and oil as illustrated by the 2013 figures shown in 
Figure 2.5.  
 
Figure 2.5. Percentage total electricity generation in the UK - 2013 (DECC, 
2013). 
Since the power sector accounted for 27 % of the total emissions in 2010 (HM 
Government, 2011), the CCC proposes that the sector should reduce its grid 
emission intensity from 500 gCO2/kWh to 50 gCO2/kWh by 2030 and to almost 
near zero in 2050 (CCC, 2010). Contrary to the CCC’s strong recommendations 
for the adoption of a cost-effective approach to achieving the 2050 target without 
putting strain on other sectors of the economy, the government assessments appears 
to consider or favour a 100 gCO2/kWh and 200 gCO2/kWh target as possible 
alternative decarbonisation targets that could be adopted to transform the electricity 
sector by 2030 (DECC, 2012). The uncertainty over the 2030 decarbonisation 
target could possibly be resolved by the end of 2016, a date by which a decision 
could be made as to whether to impose a decarbonisation target on the electricity 
sector or not. 
In order to monitor the nation’s progress towards the 80 % emission reduction 
target by 2050, the Climate Change Act enacted a system of carbon budgets which 
set a 50 % emission reduction target to be achieved by 2025, the mid-point of the 
fourth (2023-27) carbon budget (CCC, 2013). While the government remains 
committed to establishing a sustainable electricity system, this could be achieved 
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through a robust and strategic policy framework that could create an infrastructure 
base with a capacity to address climate change requirements while adapting to the 
challenges of meeting the future demand for electricity, facilitating diversity of 
supply as well balancing the system that is likely to overwhelmed by the large scale 
renewable energy deployment. The development of such a policy framework 
would not only address pressing energy policy challenges for the UK, but would 
also ensure the EU’s 15 % mandated renewable energy target is achieved by 2020 
(HM Government, 2009).  
The UK coal-fired and nuclear generation fleet is facing potential closure, by the 
end of 2023, as they reach the end of their operational life. The decommissioning 
of coal-fired plants could be accelerated by the combined impact of the LCPD and 
IED owing to the investment challenges of retrofitting expensive abatement 
technology to comply with the pollution regulations. According to Skillings (2013), 
about 15 GW capacity is likely to ‘opt-in’ to the IED and undertake refurbishments 
to meet the EU environmental pollution standards. Despite the potential of coal-
fired generation to be operational beyond 2023, the EMR unveiled policy measures 
aimed at delivering a decarbonised electricity system with a capacity to maintain 
sufficient generating capacity with minimum costs to consumers (DECC, 2014). 
As part of the EMR, the emissions performance standard (EPS) seeks to limit 
annual CO2 emissions from new fossil fuel power stations to 450 gCO2/kWh, 
which is designed to prevent coal-fired stations from being built unless they are 
fitted with CCS to mitigate emissions (DECC, 2011a).   
While maintaining a stranglehold on heavy polluters, the carbon price floor (CPF) 
promotes low-carbon investment by introducing a carbon pricing mechanism based 
on the ‘polluter pays principle’. The CPF came to effect on April 2013 at £16/tCO2 
and is expected to follow a linear trajectory to achieve a target of £30/tCO2 and 
£75/tCO2 by 2020 and 2030, respectively (HM Treasury, 2011). However, the 2013 
Budget reformed the CPF and caped the carbon price at £18/tCO2 from the 2016-
17 to 2019-20 period, citing the need to protect and support the UK business 
competitiveness, restrain increases in household bills while maintaining incentives 
for low-carbon investment (HM Revenue & Customs, 2014). The prevailing 
economic and policy landscape appears to be favourable for coal generation, and 
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hence this bolsters the chances of continued coal operation beyond 2023. The 
exclusion of the existing fossil fuel plant from the provisions of the EPS, a freeze 
on the CPS and the inclusion of coal in the capacity market mechanism indirectly 
signals the perpetuation of the coal legacy in the UK generation mix through the 
2020s. 
At the backdrop of this seemingly coal-enabling EMR policy, a recent study on the 
future of the UK coal generation in the mix concluded that, potentially 5-9 GW 
capacity could still be operational by 2030 at the detriment of the decarbonisation 
ambitions (Gross et al., 2014). The prospects of nearly 15 GW coal-fired capacity 
opting-in the IED and their eligibility to participate in the capacity market 
mechanisms pose a great threat to new gas investments as well as on the existing 
gas plants that have been withdrawn from system and mothballed due to the 
prevailing unprofitable operating conditions (Skillings, 2013). Conversely, the 
analysis set above suggests that the security of supply and the provision of 
affordable energy to consumers could be fulfilled by the EMR framework with coal 
in the generation mix.   
Out of the 9.39 GW operational nuclear capacity in the UK to date, 7.143 GW 
capacity is planned for closure by the end of 2023, leaving 2.248 GW to continue 
operating beyond 2023 (Nuclear Industry Association, 2015). However, it is 
understood that an average of five-year life extensions for plants due for closure by 
2023 is being considered by the operator subject to commercial viability and 
compliancy with security requirements (EDF Energy, 2015). This is a welcome 
development for the policymakers who otherwise could have been planning for the 
combined loss of about 20 GW of existing generation capacity with profound 
implications on the nation’s security of supply over the next decade (DECC, 
2011b). In anticipation for a significant capacity deficit due to plant closures and 
future growth in demand, the CCC’s analysis estimates that 30-40 GW of low-
carbon capacity needs to be developed in the decade from 2020, with about 45 GW 
required to decarbonise the sector to 50 gCO2/kWh (CCC, 2013b). To this end, 
depending on future demand and generation mix, projections supplied by UK 
nuclear industry and the government indicate plans to deliver 16 GW capacity of 
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new nuclear power plants, a 10 GW outlay of fossil fuel plants fitted with CCS 
technology by 2030 (DECC, 2012a; HM Government, 2013).  
With the decarbonisation of the electricity generation infrastructure high on the UK 
policy agenda, the renewable energy contribution to 2030 could potentially result 
in 25 GW onshore wind, and 25-40 GW offshore wind installed capacity delivered 
by 2030 taking into account the regulatory and political uncertainty that could 
affect the investment and financial provisions (CCC, 2013b). Following the 
expansion of the UK solar PV sector, and its advent inclusion in the renewable 
energy roadmap, a deployment potential range of between 7–20 GW is projected 
to be achieved by 2020 (DECC, 2013). An accelerated deployment of low-carbon 
and renewable energy technologies in the period to 2030 is set to be driven largely 
by the EMR’s Feed-in Tariffs with Contracts for Difference (FiT CfD). This new 
electricity pricing regime illustrated in Table 2.1 is contractually agreed between 
the government and energy generators, and is established on the basis of the 
difference between an estimate of market price of electricity (the ‘reference price’) 
and an estimate of the long-term price needed to bring forward investment in a 
given technology (the ‘strike price’) (DECC, 2012b). The ability of the EMR 
programme to protect investors from electricity price volatility and investment 
risks could be catalytic in spurring investment in renewable and low-carbon energy 
technologies through the 2020s, and thus assisting in transforming the electricity 
generation infrastructure in order to align with the 2050 emission reduction target. 
This ambitious low-carbon energy future would require a total investment outlay 
of £100 billion up to 2020, followed by an additional £90 billion required to build 
the low-carbon electricity infrastructure through the 2020s (CCC, 2013a). 
Table 2.1. Strike Prices (£/MWh) based on 2012 prices (DECC, 2013b). 
Technology 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Dedicated Biomass (CHP) 125 125 125 125 125 
Hydroelectricity 100 100 100 100 100 
Onshore Wind 95 95 95 90 90 
Offshore Wind 155 155 150 140 140 
Large Scale solar PV 120 120 115 110 110 
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Energy from Waste (CHP) 80 80 80 80 80 
Biomass Conversion 105 105 105 105 105 
Wave 305 305 305 305 305 
Tidal Stream 305 305 305 305 305 
The allocation of CfD for nuclear and CCS projects is set to be negotiated as per 
individual project. This approach was demonstrated in the approval of an 
agreement between the EDF Group and the UK Government to build Hinkley Point 
C at a ‘strike price’ of £92.50/MWh over a 35 year period (DECC, 2014b). While 
the CfD could be one of the key drivers in delivering the ‘first of a kind’ fleet of 
new nuclear power plants in the UK, there is growing uncertainty over the delivery 
timeline and targets planned for 2030. Considering the UK government’s decision 
to cancel funding for CCS technology, the role of new nuclear plants in 
decarbonising the electricity infrastructure is vitally important. However, the 
current experiences with the new European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) in Europe 
(Flamanville and Olkiluoto), the same generic design earmarked for the UK have 
been characterised by delays amounting to several years behind schedule with a 
total of €5.1 billion (77 %) over budget (National Audit Office, 2012). While 
lessons can be learnt from these experience in Europe, the policy framework needs 
to have contingent measures in place to mitigate challenges that might humper the 
delivery of new nuclear power projects on schedule. 
2.3.2 Dimensions of UK security of electricity supply  
Energy security has been described as a multidimensional and context dependent   
concept whose meaning evolves as circumstances change over time (Ang et al., 
2015). A definition of energy security presented in a report by the Asia Pacific 
Energy Research Centre (APERC, 2007) identified three fundamental elements 
namely;  
i. Physical security denoting availability and accessibility of energy supply 
sources.  
ii. Economic energy security representing the affordability of resource 
acquisition and energy infrastructure development. 
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iii. Environmental sustainability that prioritises the development and use of 
resources in a sustainable way.   
The IEA defined energy security as an uninterrupted availability of energy sources 
at an affordable price (IEA, 2014a). The energy security paradigm is widely 
associated with a spectrum of threats and risks that impact on the energy system. 
The sources of threats/risks to the energy system can take the form of technical, 
human and natural (Winzer, 2012). In contrast, a study by Hughes (2012) on the 
concept of security of supply used availability, affordability and acceptability as 
the key indicators that could be used to conceptualise the premise of energy 
security. Based on this characterisation framework of the energy security 
paradigms (APERC, 2007; Winzer, 2012; Hughes, 2012) availability and 
accessibility are associated with human and natural risks while affordability and 
acceptability elements are identified with economic and environmental impacts of 
energy. The components or facets of security of supply changes in synchrony to 
advances in energy supply technologies as well to policies oriented towards climate 
change and sustainability. A study by Ang et al. (2015) identified seven major 
themes or dimensions of security of supply from definitions derived from a wide 
range of publications, namely energy availability, infrastructure, energy prices, 
societal effects, environmental, governance, and energy efficiency. Collectively, 
these indicators can be used to explore the vulnerability of the economy to the 
energy supply risk and its resource diversification in the context of fuel portfolios, 
political risks of acquisition and import dependencies (APERC, 2007).  
In the context of the UK energy system, security of energy supply challenges have 
been focused exclusively on the potential exposure to vulnerabilities emanating 
from the imminent closure of aging generating infrastructure, increased fuel import 
dependency as well as intermittency of variable renewable resources. The new 
direction of the UK energy policy (DECC, 2015a) seeks to ameliorate these threats 
by proposing to build more new gas and nuclear energy plants. However, under the 
prevailing unprofitable investment and operational environment for gas generation 
plants, the UK government faces the challenge of incentivising the industry in order 
to achieve the new gas capacity required to drive the new energy policy. As the 
impetus to decarbonise the electricity sector gains momentum in the period to 2030, 
33 
 
 
the level of variable renewable energy resource deployment, particularly wind and 
solar could further expose the energy system to potential security of supply threats. 
The security of supply issues stemming from gas availability have been widely 
linked to equipment and infrastructural failures and extreme weather conditions as 
opposed to politically motivated or other deliberate external interventions (Skea et 
al., 2012). 
While the impact of these unforeseen incidences on the major national gas supply 
infrastructures pose a threat to security of supply, the prevailing depressed gas 
markets are likely to cause an even greater threat to the system’s ability to meet 
peak electricity demand. The unfavourable investment climate for new and old gas 
plants, coupled with the diminished running hours following the increase in 
renewable technology deployment could limit gas generation plant deployment 
capacities, and thus depriving the electricity generation supply system with one of 
the most reliable and flexible baseload generation sources. These threats to the 
rollout of more gas plants particularly in the period to 2030 are further exacerbated 
by the uncertain policy landscape especially on the future of the carbon floor price 
and the level of incentives likely to be introduced to drive investment in new gas 
plants.   
Nuclear power generation in the UK energy security discourse is viewed not only 
as a key determinant for the future of the country’s economy and society but also 
as a ‘clean’ technology that provides a response to increasingly pressing needs for 
energy independence (Teräväinen et al., 2011). Nuclear power generation is 
strategically important in meeting the UK government’s decarbonisation ambitions 
along with offshore wind and CCS. Its role in contributing towards alleviating 
global warming and energy security is indispensable, particularly at a time when a 
potential energy crunch is highly expected owing to the imminent plant closures 
and increased build-up of intermittent generation through the 2020s. Uncertainties 
over the investment climate for new-generation EPR, a preferred design for the UK 
future nuclear energy fleet, and the delivery prospects for the projected deployment 
capacity to 2030 have combined to increase the security of supply vulnerability 
from nuclear.  
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Nuclear power plants have higher capital cost compared to fossil fuel plants due to 
the use of special materials and sophisticated safety features to enhance the safety 
of the plants. The new-build nuclear energy plant first-of-a-kind (FOAK)’s 
overnight investment costs are estimated to range from US$4500 to US$6750/kW 
compared respectively to US$1600/kW and US$1050/kW for new-build coal and 
gas CCGT plants, (Mott MacDonald, 2010). The affordability of new advanced 
nuclear plants is likely to be hampered by additional safety measures after the 
accident at Fukushima, higher interest rates and the burden of more interest rates 
during long periods of construction (Hayashi & Hughes, 2013). The nuclear 
industry has projected about 16 GW capacity of new nuclear power plants to be 
deployed by 2030 (HM Government, 2013), but as of now, no investment decision 
has yet been finalised for the first plant at Hinkley Point C. The deployment 
capacity and timeline for the new fleet of UK nuclear power plants scheduled for 
2030 is highly unlikely due to the high capital costs, prolonged construction periods 
resulting from regulatory delays and design requirements, leading to even higher 
construction costs.   
The security of supply analogue advanced in this thesis focuses on the supply 
vulnerabilities resulting from the failure of the existing policy to create an enabling 
investment climate to promote the penetration of new gas plants in the generation 
mix. The scenario options that assess the impact of gas supply threats to energy 
security are developed based on the assumption that the investment climate for gas 
will remain unprofitable throughout the period to 2030. This supposition is drawn 
from the understanding that the capacity market prices likely to be achieved at the 
capacity market auctions through the 2020s will be unfavourable for gas 
generation. As a result, the anticipated rollout of new gas plants will not happen 
and worse still, some of the older plants could be mothballed or even 
decommissioned under these constrained economic conditions. The uncertainty 
over the future contribution of gas generation plants to meeting electricity demand 
and in providing back-up to intermittent renewable power sources will be explored 
through scenario assessment in Chapter 4 of this thesis. While gas generation is 
expected to have a limited role under system decarbonisation, its role in providing 
back-up to intermittent generation cannot be underestimated, and hence the need 
to build more gas plants in the new energy policy ‘reset’. Another set of scenarios 
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will seek to explore the security of supply challenges resulting from the failure by 
the government, investment community and the nuclear industry to develop and 
commission more than one nuclear power plant project by 2030. Scenarios are 
developed around these energy security threats in order to contextualise the wider 
policy implications, particularly in the light of the sectoral decarbonisation 
aspiration for 2030. The scenarios will also explore the potential role of coal plants 
with extended operational life in the generation mix and the implications on the 
security of supply and electricity sector decarbonisation objectives.      
2.3.3 Intermittent generation: system and policy adaptability  
The increased government support for the deployment of renewable energy 
technologies in the UK generation mix is to some extent driven by the need to 
contribute towards meeting the EU proposed 40 % GHG emissions and the 27 % 
renewable energy targets by 2030 (Erbach, 2014) and the UK’s 80 % GHG 
emission reduction by 2050. The high penetration of intermittent renewable energy 
generation, that is, generation that exhibit uncontrolled increases or decreases in 
output (POST, 2014) poses immense challenges to the maintenance of flexibility 
and reliability in the electricity supply system. Wind, solar, wave and tidal are the 
main variable renewable energy sources within the UK generation mix that are 
characterised by large-scale variations in the amount of electricity output they can 
provide at any given time. An increase in the volume of intermittent renewable 
energy source deployment is anticipated within the UK generation mix in the 
period to 2020, 2030 and 2050, principally due to the 30 % electricity output 
expected from renewable sources (DECC, 2012d) and the policy ambition seeking 
to increasingly decarbonise electricity generation infrastructure in these periods, 
respectively.   
The prospects of delivering the capacity estimates of 18 GW offshore wind, 13 GW 
onshore wind (DECC, 2011c) and 20 GW solar (DECC, 2013c) by 2020, could 
greatly impact on the costs of balancing the system as well as affect the system’s 
capacity to achieve a measure of reliability during peak energy demand periods. 
System reliability expresses the capacity of the electricity generation infrastructure 
to supply electricity to consumers at all times. For such systems to be deemed 
reliable, it has to have sufficient generation infrastructure to supply and meet 
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electricity demand, with a high degree of flexibility to allow a quick and controlled 
response to predicted and unpredicted fluctuations in demand (POST, 2014). The 
impact of weather conditions on the power output from intermittent renewable 
energy sources has a potential to compromise on their contribution to the system 
reliability, and hence the need for standby/reserve generation from fossil-fired 
generation, nuclear or storage to maintain flexibility and continuous system 
balance. 
Capacity credit or reliable capacity is a measure (percentage) of the contribution of 
intermittent sources to peak demand (Skea et al., 2007). Electricity systems are 
usually operated with an installed capacity greater than the peak demand (system 
margin), however, a high penetration of intermittent generation capacity in the mix 
could require a larger capacity margin to achieve a satisfactory level of system 
reliability. The capacity credit of intermittent sources is smaller than their installed 
capacity as illustrated in the example in Table 2.2. In that sense, a generation mix 
with a high proportion of intermittent sources would require adequate reserves 
(capacity margin) to mitigate fluctuations in demand and supply. In the context of 
the 2013 UK generation mix portrayed in Table 2.2, it is noticeable that out of the 
11 GW installed wind capacity, a range of between 0.77-2.75 GW capacity could 
contribute to the 52 GW peak demand for the 2013 winter period. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that increasing the diversity of intermittent supply source could 
contribute more to system reliability than the sum of the individual reliable 
capacities.  
Table 2.2. Contribution of technologies to system reliability at peak demand 
(POST, 2014). 
Technology Reliable capacity as % of 
maximum capacity 
2013 UK maximum 
capacity, GW 
Wind 7-25 11 
Solar 0 2.7 
Hydro 79-92 1.7 
Tidal 35 <0.001 
Wave 35 <0.001 
Fossil-fuelled and Nuclear 77-95 78 
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As the UK electricity generation infrastructure decarbonises, an increased portfolio 
of intermittent generation could dominate the system. The increase in low-carbon 
energy technologies in the system could hugely displace unabated conventional 
fossil fuel generation in the electricity supply mix, and thus impacting on the 
security of supply. Accommodating a large proportion of variable renewable 
energy capacity on the grid would require retaining adequate reserves of 
conventional plants that are likely to be run at very low capacity factors, and thus 
impacting on their economics and efficiency. Depending on the level of 
intermittent renewable penetration, the increased use of flexible conventional 
plants could impact on the amount of carbon emissions produced, and thus 
impacting on the emission targets set. 
2.3.4 UK shale gas development: Policy implications 
The shale gas resource potential across the UK has speculatively been focused 
around the Bowland-Hodder Unit and Midland Valley of Scotland as illustrated in 
Figure 2.6. These two regions are currently estimated to be endowed with 1409.3 
tcf in total (DECC, 2014c; Andrews, 2013). Using a 10 % recovery rate, this 
resource estimate could potentially supply up to 140.9 tcf of recoverable shale gas, 
that is, 50 times the UK’s 2.8 tcf annual domestic and industrial gas consumption 
(McAlinden, 2013). However, there is great uncertainty as to how much of this 
resource is commercially recoverable, and the timeline to which full scale 
production could commence. The favourable industrial, regulatory, geology and 
cultural factors which made the US shale gas revolution a reality do not prevail in 
the UK. Taking these variations into perspective, there is consensus that significant 
commercial production of shale gas in Europe is unlikely until the 2020s and 
possibly into the 2030s (Bradshaw & Watson, 2014) due to the physical and 
infrastructural constraints.  
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Figure 2.6. Potential shale gas resource areas in the UK (Andrews, 2013). 
While the debate on the economics, recoverability and desirability of the shale gas 
resource development for the UK energy context rages on, the UK government is 
currently putting in place a regulatory framework that could promote a safe and 
environmentally sound exploration that could determine its potential. The UK 
government’s motivation to remain steadfast in creating an enabling environment 
for shale gas development in the midst of fierce and unrelenting public opposition 
is borne out of the believe that it has the potential to provide the UK with greater 
energy security, growth and jobs (DECC, 2015i). Putting the shale gas potential 
into context, a study by Pöyry (2011) suggests that the upper limit quantity of gas 
in the current UK estimates has a market value of £40 billion at a gas price of 
70p/therm. It is further argued that the volume of shale gas likely to be extracted 
could provide in access of 10 % of the UK’s natural gas for a period of 15 years 
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(Pöyry 2011). Therefore, it is no surprise that the UK government has remained 
committed to developing this resources in the midst of a host of challenges ranging 
from fiscal, planning and environmental which militate against its successful 
development.  
The contribution of shale gas to the UK economy and subsequently in addressing 
energy-related challenges in the UK is still unknown. However, its extraction and 
use has raised concerns over its sustainability both on human health and the 
environment. Whilst the full life-cycle impact and the risks associated with shale 
gas extraction remain unresolved in the US, questions continue to be asked about 
the adequacy and robustness of the current UK regulatory framework to mitigate 
potential environmental impacts. The injection of fracturing additives underground 
for hydraulic fracturing purposes are feared to have a potential impact of 
contaminating land and water resources during shale gas extraction processes. 
Also, it is argued that potentially, there could be significant levels of intrusion onto 
the landscape coupled with an increase in noise and traffic movements resulting 
from shale gas extraction. Moreover, these social and environmental disruptions 
could be more pronounced during the construction phase of the shale gas 
development process. While some of these impacts are likely to be localised, with 
some almost difficult to alleviate, it is anticipated that the social and environmental 
impacts could be managed through regulation. Seismic activities in the UK around 
the Blackpool region in 2011 have been linked with hydraulic fracturing activities 
undertaken by Cuadrilla Resources (Broderick et al., 2011).   
Contrary to reports that the development of shale gas in the UK could result in the 
fall in gas prices, the modelling by Pöyry (2011) suggests that gas prices in the UK 
and Europe are likely to go up rather than down. It is also believed that prospects 
of domestic shale gas development in the UK may not by any means restore self-
sufficiency in gas supplies. However, in the event that significant volume of 
unconventional gas is produced, there is a likelihood that shale gas production 
could reduce import gas dependency as well as replace the dwindling North Sea 
gas reserves. While this domestic resource could be significant in addressing 
security of supply challenges, its role in electricity generation could be limited 
unless used in conjunction with CCS technologies which are yet to be proven 
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outside Canada. In any case, the unceremonious cancellation of CCS funding by 
the UK government could potentially imply the absence of CCS technology in the 
generation mix by the time shale gas production gets under way. This development 
could further limit the amount of shale gas that could be used in unabated gas plants 
due to stringent emissions targets commensurate with the aspirations to 
decarbonise the electricity supply sector in the period to 2030 and beyond. 
Whilst the decarbonisation of the electricity supply system remains a cost-effective 
route to achieving both domestic and regional climate change targets, it is argued 
that shale gas should be promoted as a transitional fuel which offers security of 
supply and low-carbon electricity when burned in efficient CCGT plants. However, 
in the event of a potential drop in gas prices triggered principally by the increased 
exploitation of UK and global shale gas reserves, gas-fired generation could 
substitute high cost renewables, and thus impacting on the decarbonisation 
objectives (Broderick et al., 2011). This development could militate against the 
UK’s 2 oC commitments on global climate change as well as on its Low Carbon 
Transition Plan. 
As the countdown to the 2030 decarbonisation milestone draws near for the 
electricity supply infrastructure, the prospective role of unabated shale gas 
becomes very complex. This is mainly because the CCC envisages unabated gas 
generation plants running below 10 % load factors, mainly for system balancing in 
the period to 2030 (CCC, 2014). Given this limited role of unabated gas generation 
in this period and beyond, the contribution of shale gas to the mix could be 
insignificant with little economic prospects to utility operators. As a result of this 
constrained gas operation regime, investment in new gas generation infrastructure 
could potentially be compromised, and thus leaving the existing capacity either to 
retrofit CCS, fall back into a peaking role or decommission if the alternative 
options are uneconomic (CCC, 2010). Thus, a transition to a low-carbon electricity 
future could literately shut the door for shale gas development, unless the UK 
government decides to make another U-turn on its policy on CCS which could lead 
to the resumption in its development and eventual commercialisation. 
41 
 
 
2.4 UK electricity sector transition pathways to 2050  
A scenario assessment approach has been adopted in this thesis to explore how the 
UK electricity supply system could move to low-carbon by 2050. The electricity 
generating infrastructure is predominantly built on fossil fuels, and hence the need 
for the system to evolve over the next thirty-five years or so to contribute towards 
the 80 % GHG emission reduction target by 2050 relative to 1990 levels. The 
evolution of the electricity supply sector through to 2050 requires radical changes 
in the current technology distribution within the generation mix to be achieved 
while maintaining security of supply, environmental and social sustainability 
objectives. The accelerated technology deployment through the 2020s in the form 
of CCS, nuclear, wind, solar and marine is likely to characterise the generation mix 
during this period as system decarbonisation by 2030 becomes an immediate policy 
milestone. The emphasis to have the electricity supply system decarbonised by 
2030 is borne out of the goal to achieve a cost-effective transition to 2050.  
While a low-carbon electricity generation infrastructure is catalytic for system-
wide decarbonisation, the system transition to 2050 is fraught with uncertainty. 
There are questions being raised concerning the resoluteness of the current energy 
policy and its capacity to attract and promote investment and technological 
innovation that could foster the kind of low-carbon energy transition envisaged by 
the Climate Change Act. The main features that will define the character of the UK 
electricity transition to 2050 revolve around technology availability and timeline 
for deployment, technology cost reductions and the speed at which the policy 
mechanisms can facilitate these developments. With the current direction of the 
UK energy policy hard to predict, the nature and the path that the electricity 
generation sector transition could follow is a matter of speculation. Therefore, it is 
through scenario assessments that the full extent of the dynamics that impact on 
the UK electricity supply sector can fully be conceptualised in the context of system 
decarbonisation.   
2.4.1 Transition theories: Conceptualising low-carbon energy transitions  
A transition as described by Geels (2005) denotes a shift from one sociotechnical 
system to another. Various analytical approaches derived from sustainability 
studies have been adopted and applied to energy systems in an attempt to gain 
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insight into the processes that influence the emergence and development of low-
carbon transitions. These analytical frameworks, namely multi-level perspective 
(MLP), co-evolutionary framework and innovative systems theory have featured 
in many studies seeking to explain transitions in society (Foxon and Hammond, 
2010). While these frameworks offer different perspectives to transition 
development, this thesis devotes attention on the MLP and co-evolutionary theories 
and uses their characterisation to analyse socio-technical scenarios that could 
enhanced understanding into the evolution of the UK electricity generation 
infrastructure to a low-carbon future. 
2.4.2  The multi-level perspective   
The MLP conceptualises transitions as nonlinear processes that results from the 
interplay of developments at niches, socio-technical regimes and exogenous socio-
technical landscape analytical levels (Geels, 2011) as illustrated in Figure 2.7. The 
MLP on transitions recognises the interactions across niches, regimes and 
landscape processes which assist in informing organisations on strategic, tactical 
and operational governance activities (Smith & Stirling, 2008). The interaction at 
these three developmental levels assumes a nested hierarchy where regimes are 
embedded within landscapes and niches within regimes (Geels, 2002) as depicted 
in Figure 2.7. In this analytical framework, niches represents ‘protected spaces’ 
where radical innovation takes place and are usually insulated from the ‘normal’ 
selection in the regime (Geels, 2002).  
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Figure 2.7. Sociotechnical attributes of a multi-level perspective (MLP) 
framework (Foxon et al., 2010). 
The limited susceptibility to prevailing outside pressures allows innovation and 
other designs within niches to be nurtured and sustained as new ways of doing 
things are valued; learning is encouraged and imbedded in future development 
(Smith & Stirling, 2008). In transition development, niches play an important role 
as they act as centres for learning processes as well as for building social networks 
which support innovations. However, the capacity of niches to induce change to 
existing system ‘regimes’ is constrained due to entrenched structures ‘lock-in’ 
mechanisms which strive to maintain the integrity of systems. It is through 
mapping and representation of functions and structure processes over time that 
insights in the dynamics of innovation system is created and applied to energy 
systems in transition.   
Socio-technical regimes are rules that enable and constrain activities within 
communities (Geels, 2002) and they represent ‘deep structures’ that account for the 
stability of an existing socio-technical system (Geels, 2011). This socio-technical 
system is composed of distinct semi-autonomous social groups whose sub-systems 
are interdependently linked (Geels, 2005) which allow them to co-evolve with each 
other and also with the external (environment) landscape. The continuity of these 
regimes and their ability to insulate themselves from outside influences is fostered 
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by a set of rules or routines that coordinate the activities of the social groups, and 
thus allowing the groups and their sub-systems to be aligned to each other.  
The rules and value systems that underpin socio-technical regimes create the ‘lock-
in’ phenomenon, and thus allowing innovation to occur incrementally. Therefore, 
a regime is perceived to be interlinked at three dimensional levels; (i) a network of 
actors and social groups  evolving over time; (ii) a set of formal and informal rules 
that coordinate and align activities of actors who produce and maintain the 
elements of a socio-technical system; and (iii) the material and technical elements 
(Geels, 2004). The development of stable regimes within a favourable landscape 
leads to the creation of a stronger alignment between different elements of the 
system in which it operates, thereby making the entire system path 
dependent/locked in (Raven & Verbong, 2009).  
The sociotechnical landscape refers to aspects of the wider exogenous environment 
which influence socio-technical development (Geels, 2005). It represents the 
material context of society which, according to Geels (2002), constitutes the 
material and spatial arrangement of cities, factories and electricity infrastructures. 
Also, it extends to embrace entities such as demographical trends, political 
ideologies societal values and macro-economic patterns (Geels, 2011). Changes in 
landscape occurs slowly but with significant impacts on the levels below, even to 
the extent of rearranging the place of regimes and niches within the system 
(Lachman, 2013). While this transition framework is important in understanding 
the dynamics that impact organisations, institutions and cultures as examined in 
this thesis, it has been criticised for being rather complex and ambiguous. It has 
been argued that “it uses metaphors and imprecise concepts, with the danger of 
creating ambiguity and being able to categorise phenomena too easily since the 
concepts have vague boundaries” (Lachman, 2013: 271).       
2.4.3 The co-evolutionary framework  
Co-evolution principles are drawn from biological evolution whose origins stem 
from the Darwinian hypothesis which argues that population entities evolve if they 
follow the processes of variation, inheritance and selection (Kallis & Norgaard, 
2010). Outside the biological sphere, an evolutionary framework described in 
Foxon (2011) suggests that key events in transition may occur through 
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technological changes, forming of institutions, revision to business strategies or 
changes to use practices  as highlighted in Figure 2.8. These systems co-evolve if 
they have a causal influence on each other’s evolution (Kallis, 2007). The co-
evolutionary thinking recognises that each socio-technical system evolves under its 
own dynamics but the causal effect from other entities or systems affect the pattern 
of change within the system as they interact. This implies that any transformation 
within or between entities cannot happen without triggering or being triggered by 
the influences of other systems undergoing separate changes of their own. Based 
on this observation, Norgaard (1994) concluded that the evolution of entities is 
influenced by the relationships between entities, implying that everything evolves 
in response to everything else within the system. The causal influences that creates 
interaction between technological and institutional systems provide a solid schema 
through which the forces and influence that promote transitions towards more 
sustainable and low-carbon future could be examined. Therefore, the co-
evolutionary framework is useful for undertaking analysis of dynamic processes 
(the evolution of relationships and causal interactions) that contribute at multiple 
levels to a transition to a low-carbon economy (Foxon, 2011).   
 
Figure 2.8 The Co-evolutionary framework (Foxon, 2011).   
The mutual causal influences between systems and their impacts on system 
dynamics have huge implications on characterising energy systems as they evolve 
towards low-carbon futures. The path-dependent nature of co-evolutionary change 
in systems has been known to induce a historical lock-in effect, particularly in 
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technological and institutional entities (Unruh, 2000; Unruh, 2002; Unruh & 
Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006), and thus increasing barriers to the development and 
uptake of low-carbon technologies. The lock-in phenomenon is deeply entrenched 
in global economies particularly in the power sector where fossil-fuelled electricity 
generation remains and will continue to dominate electricity supply systems. 
Insights from the co-evolutionary framework have been used in this thesis to 
analyse the causal influences of technologies and institutions in defining the 
evolution of the UK electricity generation infrastructure to a low-carbon future.   
2.4.4 Implications of the MLP and Co-evolutionary frameworks on the UK 
low-carbon electricity infrastructure development 
The application of ideas and concepts derived from these frameworks are important 
in enhancing an in-depth understanding of the dynamic interaction between 
constituencies and their impact on the transition of energy systems to low-carbon 
futures. The existence of interactive structures within systems allow for the 
adoption of an integrated approach to developing sustainable transitions to a low-
carbon futures. This is enhanced by understanding the functions, interdependences 
and co-evolutionary tendencies which exist within sociotechnical systems. The 
techno-institutional lock-in phenomenon expounded by Unruh (2002) has far 
reaching implications to the UK electricity supply infrastructure which is 
predominantly carbon based. 
Building on these frameworks for analysing sociotechnical change for a transition 
to a low-carbon economy, policy approaches would need to be tailored to overcome 
barriers created by techno-institutional lock-in. This is typically relevant in the 
context of the current UK electricity regime where a transition to low-carbon 
electricity generation future faces the challenge of a strong historical lock-in 
resulting from established technological, organisational, industrial, social and 
institutional evolutionary processes (Kallis, 2007; Unruh, 2002). The MLP and co-
evolutionary concepts have characterised system change as structured, uncertain, 
path-dependent and incremental. Thus, the adoption of this sociotechnical analysis 
framework in low-carbon policy development could assist in overcoming system 
lock-in, and thus assisting in transforming the electricity generation infrastructure 
to a low-carbon future.   
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2.5 The low-carbon future scenarios for the UK  
Scenario methodologies have been applied in a wide range of settings with the aim 
of improving the quality of decisions made on future developments. In the context 
of the UK low-carbon energy futures, scenario assessments have sought to capture 
decarbonisation trajectories in line with achieving the 80% GHG emissions by 
2050 against 1990 levels, as well as the decarbonisation of the electricity sector by 
2030 (HM Government, 2008; CCC, 2010). Low-carbon scenario building is 
usually fraught with uncertainties owing to the long time frames involved, 
technology speculations surrounding decarbonisation ambitions, as well as the 
difficulty of forecasting future impacts of decarbonisation on social change 
(Hughes & Strachan, 2010). As instruments of change used for strategic planning, 
scenario assessments in energy systems are largely centred on technically plausible 
futures and their likely impacts on costs and benefits based on modelling 
approaches that assume a high level of economic rationality of actors (Foxon et al., 
2010).  
Scenario analysis for the UK low-carbon futures have predominately taken a 
technical plausibility perspective driven by the need to demonstrate the technical 
feasibility of the energy system to meet energy demands and carbon reduction 
targets (Hughes & Strachan, 2010). Different modelling technics have been 
adopted to generate scenarios to inform the current UK policy. Examples of UK 
based techno-economic scenarios that explore the transition of the current carbon 
intensive energy system, to one that achieves the Government’s 80% carbon 
reduction target by 2050, are briefly discussed in the following subsections. 
Technology development and deployment up to 2030 is crucially important in 
facilitating a cost-effective achievement of the 2050 decarbonisation target. 
Scenarios outlined in the following subsections show the projected generation 
portfolio outlay to 2030 and 3050, from different modelling communities with a 
view to highlighting the penetration of the low-carbon energy technologies 
required to decarbonise the electricity supply sector.   
2.5.1 UKERC Energy 2050 Scenarios 
The UK Energy 2050 project, steered by the UK Energy Research Centre 
(UKERC), developed low-carbon scenarios dedicated towards exploring the 
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implications of adopting an array of low-carbon emission trajectories ranging from 
40-90 % to the UK energy system by 2050. The low-carbon trajectory pathways 
were developed using the MARKAL, a technology-rich optimisation model fully 
calibrated to data within 1 % of the actual resource supplies, energy consumption, 
electricity output, installed technology capacity and CO2 emissions (Anandarajah 
et al., 2009; Kannan, 2011). Rather than focusing too much upon an end-point in 
2050, the MARKAL modelling framework tracks the development and deployment 
of emerging technologies such as CCS and mitigation of electricity intermittence 
from renewable energy resources though its MARKAL Elastic Demand (MED) 
model function (Anandarajah et al., 2009).  
Scenarios depicted in Table 2.3 illustrate the outputs from the MARKAL model 
developed to achieve both the 2020 and 2050 CO2 emission reduction levels of 15-
32 % and 40-90 %, respectively. Based on the scenarios portrayed in Table 2.3, it 
is notable that the faint-heart (CFH) does not align with the UK government’s 
carbon emission reduction commitments. Its emission performance is about half 
the legislated target set for 2050. On the other hand, the low-carbon pathways 
presented in Table 2.3 achieve 26 to 32 % and 80 to 90 % emission reduction 
relative to the 1990 levels in 2020 and 2050, respectively, which is in conformity 
to the decarbonisation blueprint espoused by the Climate Change Act. It is of great 
concern that the challenges currently affecting the UK energy policy development 
could render the attainment of the technology diversity in the CLC, CAM and 
CSAM scenarios almost impossible. The stall in CCS and new nuclear energy plant 
development and the resurgence of a policy promoting gas generation could 
potentially drift the UK emission reduction commitments towards the CFH 
scenario.  
Table 2.3. UKERC Energy 2050 scenarios (Ekins et al., 2013).  
Scenario Scenario name Annual targets 
% reduction 
from 1990 level 
Cumulative 
Emission GtCO2 
(2000-2050) 
2050 
emissions 
MtCO2 
REF Base Reference - 30.03 583 
CFH Faint-heart 15 % by 2020 
40 % by 2050 
25.67 355 
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CLC Low Carbon 26 % by 2020 
80 % by 2050 
22.46 237 
CAM Ambition (‘low-
carbon core’) 
26 % by 2020 
80 % by 2050 
20.39 118 
CSAM Super Ambition 32 % by 2020 
90 % by 2050 
17.98 59 
The level of decarbonisation achieved in the scenarios presented in Table 2.3 is 
reflective of the electricity generation technology penetration projected in Figure 
2.9 for each scenario. The increased deployment of low-carbon and renewable 
energy technologies from the period 2035 to 2050 accounts for a significant 
reduction in emissions for the CLC, CAM and CSAM scenarios. These low-carbon 
pathways have no unabated coal generation in their technology portfolio, serve for 
the unabated gas which is significantly reduced in 2035. Unabated gas generation 
is completely absent from the mix by 2050 in all the low-carbon energy scenarios. 
The deep cut in emissions achieved by these three low-carbon energy pathways 
(see Table 2.3) is a result of the dominance of CCS and nuclear in the CLC and 
CAM scenarios while nuclear and offshore wind, which account for over two thirds 
of the generation capacity in CSAM are influential in driving the transition to the 
2050 emission reduction target. The 2035 and 2050 low-carbon electricity supply 
outlook presented by the scenarios in Figure 2.9 remains uncertain, particularly 
over the dominant player in any optimal technology portfolio of CCS vs nuclear vs 
offshore wind due to the close marginal cost and uncertainties in these technology 
classes (Ekins et al., 2013). The development of a stable and consistent UK energy 
policy, one that is shaped and driven by the fundamental principles of the Climate 
Change Act, could assist in defining the low-carbon technology landscape 
presented in Figure 2.9.  
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Figure 2.9. Energy generation mix in 2035 and 2050 for the Energy 2050 
scenarios (Ekins et al., 2013). 
2.5.2 FESA energy system modelling  
The future energy scenario assessment (FESA) was used by the ‘technical 
elaboration working group’ of the Transition Pathways research consortium to 
develop three Transition Pathways: Market Rules, a market-led, Central Co-
ordination, a government-led and Thousand Flowers, a civil society-led pathways 
(Foxon, 2013). The transition pathway scenario development is based on the multi-
level perspective framework (outlined in Section 2.4.2) and its ethos is to establish 
how a range of actor groups, including policymakers, incumbent market firms and 
civil society can shape transition pathways to low-carbon futures (Foxon, 2013).  
Based on the logic of each pathway, the electricity infrastructure requirements were 
modelled using FESA model to reflect on the energy service demand and the 
generation mixes required for each pathway. The technologies deployed to meet 
demand for each of the three pathways are similar, however, the level of technology 
penetration is influenced by the governing logic for each pathway. The installed 
generation mix from FESA model for each of the pathways is illustrated in Table 
2.4. Although these pathways have become out of date in terms of reflecting the 
current developments within the electricity supply sector, Barnacle et al. (2013) 
maintain that the pathway narrative still creates a plausible energy future for the 
UK. The scenarios developed from FESA were employed in this thesis because 
they provide an optimal generation mix that achieves a near zero carbon dioxide 
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emission reduction by 2050 as part of the legally binding target set to achieve 80 
% reduction in GHG emissions relative to 1990 levels.  
Table 2.4. The generation mix for the Transition Pathway Scenarios (Barnacle 
et al., 2013). 
                         Market rules                    Central co-ordination            Thousand flowers 
Generators 2020 2035 2050 2020 2035 2050 2020 2035 2050 
Coal 16.3 0.0 0.0 16.4 0.0 0.0 16.4 0.0 0.0 
Coal CCS 2.3 14.9 22.0 2.0 6.0 10.0 2.0 7.5 7.5 
Gas CCGT 34.8 25.7 14.1 29.0 17.7 6.6 29.0 15.7 0.0 
Gas CCS 0.0 16.0 22.0 0.0 17.0 20.3 0.0 11.6 14.2 
Gas OCGT 1.1 0.3 0.0 2.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 10.7 17.2 25.8 12.2 22.1 30.0 5.4 5.4 5.4 
CHP 9.0 9.0 8.9 9.3 9.4 9.6 24.4 46.6 52.5 
Onshore wind 9.4 16.4 22.5 10.2 15.4 20.5 10.2 15.4 20.5 
Offshore wind 7.0 18.7 30.2 8.4 12.6 16.8 4.9 6.3 8.4 
Hydro 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Biomass 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 
Wave 0.6 2.1 2.1 0.6 2.1 2.1 00.6 2.1 2.1 
Tidal 0.9 11.6 11.6 0.4 8.9 8.9 0.4 8.9 8.9 
Solar 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.0 2.1 4.1 4.1 8.1 16.2 
Pump storage 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Interconnector 4.3 6.1 6.1 4.3 6.8 6.8 4.3 6.8 6.8 
The government’s low-carbon futures were constructed using MARKAL and 
Energy System Modelling Environment (ESME), the cost-optimisation models 
employed to assess the level of ambition required to develop plausible low-carbon 
energy technology based scenarios to achieve the 2050 decarbonisation target. 
Central to these ‘2050 futures’ is the Higher Renewables, more energy efficiency, 
Higher CCS, more bioenergy and the Higher Nuclear, less energy efficiency, 
produced by the DECC’s 2050 Calculator (DECC, 2010). Since the DECC 2050 
Calculator is a non-optimisation model, and assumes no specific policy aspirations 
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beyond 2020, the three low-carbon futures are benchmarked against the core-
MARKAL pathway (HM Government, 2011) for comparison purposes. The 
electricity supply generation outlook in 2030 for the four DECC 2050 Calculator 
futures is shown in Figure 2.10, highlighting to a degree, the low-carbon landscape 
envisaged by the UK government.  
 
 Figure 2.10. The 2030 installed generation capacity for the DECC 2050 
'futures' (DECC, 2010). 
The potential impact on security of supply induced by the increased penetration of 
intermittent generation from wind is ameliorated by an abundant supply of 
baseload capacity from nuclear, CCS and unabated gas plants as illustrated in 
Figure 2.10. These scenarios capture the outlook of the electricity generation 
infrastructure landscape as portrayed under different technology development and 
deployment framings. The low-carbon pathways portrayed in Figure 2.10 give 
insight into the government’s ambitions and possible technology decarbonisation 
options that could be adopted to keep the UK economy on the path to achieving 80 
% emission target by 2050. Such policy oriented pathways are critically important 
for investigation in this thesis as they increase the resource base for analysing the 
appropriateness and flexibility of current policies that are designed to achieve the 
decarbonisation ambitions set by the UK government. 
As a body legally enacted to advise the government on energy and climate change 
issues, the CCC has outlined scenario alternatives required to decarbonise the 
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electricity generation infrastructure by 2030 in line with the carbon budget plans 
(HM Government, 2008). Taking into account the inherent uncertainty surrounding 
the development of emerging technologies, cost reductions and technology 
development and the current project pipelines, the CCC presented scenario 
ambitions involving a portfolio of low-carbon energy technologies built around 
either nuclear, renewables or CCS shown in Figure 2.11 with the scope to achieve 
a 50 gCO2/kWh grid intensity by 2030 (CCC, 2013b). These scenarios provide 
potential decarbonisation options assuming that each of the main options for low-
carbon electricity supply technologies prove to be timely, technically and 
economically viable for deployment through the 2020s.  
 
Figure 2.11. Power sector scenarios reaching 50 gCO2/kWh by 2030 (CCC, 
2013b).  
The ambitious technology penetration projected in each of the scenarios is 
dependent on the success of the EMR to drive investment in low-carbon energy 
technologies. Despite the current favourable market conditions for coal, its role in 
the generation mix in all the scenarios is severely limited without CCS technology, 
and thus boosting the potential to achieve a 50 g/kWh carbon grid emission target 
by 2030. The current new UK energy policy is proposing a complete phase-out of 
unabated coal generation by 2025, which makes the scenario projections outlined 
in Figure 2.11 feasible options for decarbonising the electricity supply sector. The 
scenario outlook presented proposes a radical transformation of the electricity 
generation infrastructure driven by record-breaking investment in low-carbon and 
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renewable energy technologies. The technology ambition and the level of 
deployment of low-carbon and renewable energy sources expressed in these 
scenarios has assisted in framing the decarbonisation scenarios developed through 
the EOC, the methodology framework adopted for this thesis. 
2.5.3 UK energy scenarios in perspective 
The UKERC energy 2050 scenarios highlight the level of emission reduction that 
can be achieved by the whole energy system under different policy ambitions. 
Scenario outputs for the electricity generation sector are developed under different 
constraint systems which include carbon emissions and technology cost 
assumptions. The electricity generation mix portrayed in these scenarios has a high 
level of renewable and low-carbon technologies which are central in meeting 
energy demand and emission reduction targets. 
The electricity generation technology representation in the UKERC energy 2050 
scenarios are developed based on an ambitious future energy supply outlooks, and 
thus does not reflect on the actual developments in the UK energy policy. The low-
carbon electricity supply outlook projected in the UKERC energy 2050 scenarios 
has a high proportion of CCS, nuclear and wind in the generation mix. The 
deployment of these technologies, particularly CCS and nuclear remain uncertainty 
due to technical and investment issues. Wind energy is variable, and hence its 
projected outlay in the scenarios presented does not take into account the potential 
impact of intermittency on its contribution in meeting demand and emission targets.    
The FESA scenarios present the low-carbon transition in the context of market, 
government and civic society perspectives. The electricity supply system 
transitions to 2050 has a diverse mix of low-carbon and renewable energy 
technologies to achieve energy demand and carbon emissions. While the 
technology mix in each scenario over the transition period is reflective of the 
scenario logic, the technology mix development is not constrained by cost. Hence, 
the generation mix portrayed in each scenario logic is not determined based on 
costs. Furthermore, the technology deployment in each scenario is either under or 
overestimated, which suggests that the scenarios do not reflect on the development 
of the UK energy policy. Renewable energy technologies, particularly wind, wave 
and tidal are an integral part of the generation mix in the FESA energy scenarios. 
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The impact of variability of these energy resources to system reliability is not 
addressed in these scenarios. As scenarios seeking to trace the evolution of the 
electricity supply sector to a low-carbon future, it is essentially important that the 
impact of intermittency of renewable energy resources is assessed so that the 
scenario outputs capture its effects on security of supply and decarbonisation.   
2.5.4 Research gap        
The UK energy modelling environments provide a diverse transition pathways 
seeking to highlight the evolution of the electricity supply sector under different 
constraints. While the energy scenarios have underscored the importance of a 
diversified generation mix with high proportion of low-carbon and renewable 
technologies, it can be concluded that the scenario analogue presented is limited in 
addressing the issue of intermittency of renewable energy technologies. The 
determination the level of intermittency of renewable energy resource in scenario 
assessments is vital in informing energy policy development. It has a huge 
influence on the deployment and operation of fossil fuel reserves in the electricity 
generation system. Since the deployment of renewable energy technologies 
underpin the security of supply and decarbonisation objectives of the UK energy 
policy, this research integrates wind data analysis in the model framework to assess 
the impact of variability, particularly on offshore wind. In this respect, the 
generation mix portrayed in the scenario outputs from this research reflect on the 
UK energy policy development as well as the key dynamics affecting the electricity 
sector such as the impact of intermittent renewable energy resources.  
2.5.5 Summary   
The UK energy and climate policy is driven by the 80 % GHG emission reduction 
target by 2050 against the 1990 levels. This legally binding target brought with it 
a system of five-year carbon budgets designed to assist in guiding the economy 
towards the earmarked low-carbon future by 2050. A 50 to 100 gCO2/kWh 
potential decarbonisation target projected for 2030 in the power sector is likely to 
intensify and accelerate the investment and deployment of renewable and low-
carbon energy technologies. Nuclear, CCS and offshore wind are considered to be 
the key energy technologies that could transform the carbon intensity of the 
electricity generation infrastructure to near-zero by 2050. A low-carbon electricity 
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generation infrastructure could mitigate climate change wile bolstering the nations’ 
energy security status.  
Energy scenarios have been developed to project the low-carbon electricity 
generation outlook for the UK future. The decarbonisation pathways highlight the 
least-cost technology mix required to contribute towards the 2050 emission 
reduction target. However, the energy scenarios developed are limited as they fail 
to address the issue of variability which affect renewable energy technologies. 
Since renewable energy technologies are anticipated to contribute significantly in 
decarbonising the power sector, it is vital that the impact of variability on 
renewable energy technologies is incorporated in modelling environment. This 
research gap is mitigated through the use of the EOC which develops scenarios that 
reflect the impact of intermittency on renewable energy resources such as offshore 
wind.   
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Chapter 3 Methodology  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a detailed account of the methodology framework adopted 
in this thesis to explore the transition of the United Kingdom electricity generation 
infrastructure to a low-carbon future. The analysis of energy system transitions to 
low-carbon economies have been undertaken using a wide range of modelling 
approaches with a view to inform policy development. In the midst of a multitude 
of approaches used to trace the evolution of the electricity generation infrastructure 
in the wake of decarbonisation policies, this chapter characterises and justifies the 
use of the EOC in exploring the dynamics that impact on the UK electricity 
generation sector as it strives to attain a near zero carbon grid intensity outlook by 
2050. The adoption of this method framework is strategic in that it provides a 
quantitative and least-cost approach which assist in defining the performance of the 
electricity generation sector as it responds to the environmental, technological and 
economic challenges of attaining a low-carbon status from now through to 2050. 
While the characterisation of the EOC is the prime priority of this chapter, attention 
will also shift to discuss other key modelling approaches that have been used in the 
energy policy discourse with the purpose of providing insights into future energy 
policy development. An integrative exposition of these key modelling tools seeks 
to offer a better understanding of the different approaches that have been devised 
to explore alternative decarbonisation pathways for the UK’s low-carbon energy 
future. Therefore, in justifying the preference of the EOC against other approaches, 
this chapter offers a background description of the model, operation, modifications 
and model testing in line with addressing key research questions as outlined in 
Section 1.4. 
3.2 Preview of energy transition modelling approaches  
3.2.1 UK MARKAL Elastic Demand (MED) Energy Model  
The MARKAL energy model framework is a bottom-up, dynamic, linear 
programming optimisation approach that has been instrumental in assisting the UK 
policymakers to access the costs, trade-offs and pathways related to achieving long-
term emission targets and energy security (Strachan, 2011). MARKAL is described 
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as a ‘perfect foresight’ (assumed to have perfect inter-temporal knowledge of future 
policy and economic developments) partial equilibrium optimisation model, which 
minimises the discounted total system cost by considering the investment and 
operational levels of all the interconnected system elements as displayed in Figure 
3.1 (Anandarajah et al., 2009). Figure 3.1 gives a description of the energy flows 
through a network of technologies involved in the production, transformation and 
use of different forms of energy. The model portrays the entire energy system (see 
Figure 3.1) from fuel source production, through processing and supply with a 
comprehensive representation of infrastructures, energy conversion processes, end-
use technologies and energy service demands of the entire economy (Kannan, 
2009). Based on this integrated energy system analysis, the model has the aptitude 
to allow wider system interactions of electricity resources and usages to be 
considered, thereby facilitating a sectoral approach to tracking the evolution of the 
energy system. The model optimises (minimises) the total energy system cost based 
on the investment and operational levels of all the interconnected energy system 
elements (Usher & Strachan, 2010).   
Structurally, the model has a network of modules which act as centres of 
information, and thus enabling each component of the energy system to be 
modelled. The base module contains all energy carriers such as natural gas, coal, 
oil, uranium and emission carriers. The different elements within the base module 
are interlinked with sub-modules to facilitate the adoption and application of a 
whole system approach in simulating the energy system as shown in Figure 3.2. 
Modelling in MARKAL means that each module has its own set of data inputs and 
assumptions, and thus making the modelling environment complex and data 
intensive. The costs accrued in any particular scenario development are presented 
in terms of the energy system and the welfare costs. Scenario assessments with 
increasingly constraint emission reduction targets tend to follow similar emission 
reduction pathways, with diverse low-carbon and policy measures being required 
to keep up with even tighter carbon targets and rapidly spiralling costs. The 
hallmark of the energy system evolution in MARKAL is captured through the 
inclusion of a range of policies, physical constraints and the application of all taxes 
and subsidies, and thus, enabling the development of plausible energy scenarios 
(Anandarajah et al., 2009).  
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Figure 3.1. MARKAL Reference Energy System Model (Kannan et al., 2007).  
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The structural complexity of the MARKAL model has been flagged as one of the main 
limitations associated with its supposedly data intensiveness, which subjects the key 
datasets to a wide range of uncertainties (Kannan, 2009). The technology cost data 
computed in the MARKAL does not take into account uncertainties associated with 
investment decisions such as market risks, financing and policy implications (Kannan, 
2009). Due to the extensive nature of the model, technological plant data such as technical 
availability, technical lifetime of plants and the geographical constraints on electricity 
resources and infrastructures are not fully modelled within the MARKAL modelling 
environment (Kannan, 2009). The cost optimisation characteristic of the model has being 
criticised for over estimating the deployment of cost-effective energy technologies by 
assuming perfect energy markets with no due regard to barriers and other non-economic 
factors that influence decisions.  
 
Figure 3.2. Structure of the UK MARKAL Modules (Kannan et al., 2007). 
3.2.2 The Energy System Modelling Environment (ESME) 
Energy System Modelling Environment (ESME) is a least-cost optimisation, policy 
neutral model developed by the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) to examine the 
underlying cost and engineering challenges of designing energy systems (Heaton, 2014). 
As a long-term energy forecasting model, ESME uses linear programming to assess cost-
optimal technology portfolios. The model uses a mathematical programme similar to that 
used in other bottom-up, optimisation models such as MARKAL, where the objective 
function is to minimise total economic surplus subject to constraints (Pye et al., 2014). In 
designing and guiding priorities for diversified technology programmes, ESME considers 
the impact of uncertainty particularly in future energy prices, fuel and technology cost as 
well as the performance of energy technologies in a policy neutral modelling 
environment. At the backdrop of this modelling prowess, ESME has been used to support 
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work by the CCC on carbon budgets and its renewable energy review as well as work by 
the Department for Energy & Climate Change (DECC) on the Carbon Plan (Heaton, 
2014). 
The model adopts a whole system approach in analysing energy system design. The 
technology framework used includes all major flows of energy, that is, fossil fuel 
production, electricity generation, and end-use energy services as depicted in Figure 3.3. 
The sectoral approach used by the model facilitates a high-level cost optimisation process 
that analyses the different combinations of technologies which together minimises the 
total cost while meeting desired sustainability indicators framed under different scenario 
development and constraint systems.   
 
Figure 3.3. Schematic diagram of the ESME Model; Input assumptions for the 2010 - 
2030 energy pathway (Heaton, 2014). 
The model is policy neutral, and thus implying that its modelling approach does not 
incorporate taxes, subsidies and other policy related incentives which affect technology 
and fuel costs. The exclusion of these policy influences in developing plausible future 
energy system designs is meant to provide a workable framework upon which 
policymakers could use to determine ideal policies, markets and incentives that could be 
harnessed to deliver energy systems for the future (Heaton, 2014). This aspect of the 
model makes it an ideal tool for developing insights with relevance to wider national low-
carbon energy futures. As in MARKAL, ESME adopts a bottom-up approach to energy 
system analysis which allows for specific technical opportunities and their energy cost 
and emission implications to be considered within the modelling environment. The 
‘whole system’ approach assumed by the model implies the use of a very large dataset 
(Heaton, 2014) which somehow limits the individual technology detail within the system.  
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3.2.3 The DECC 2050 Calculator 
The DECC 2050 Calculator is an excel-based online interactive model framework 
developed by DECC to allow users to explore a range of potential energy pathways from 
now through to 2050 in line with the 80 % emission reduction relative to 1990 levels (HM 
Government, 2010). The calculator is user-friendly which allows users to select their 
choice of technologies to decarbonise the UK energy system. As a non-optimisation tool, 
the model’s outputs highlight the implications of the user’s chosen parameters on the 
energy mix, emissions and the indicative costs. The sectoral analysis approach adopted 
by the model shows the level and type of innovative change that would need to be 
implemented in order to transform the energy system to achieve the demand and emission 
targets set. The performance of the energy system is determined based on a ‘four level 
system’ (1-4), with each level representing the potential roll-out of energy supply 
infrastructure or technology development projected for each sector, which denotes the 
levels of effort as illustrated in Figure 3.4. The energy infrastructure development levels 
as used in Figure 3.4 are described as follows (HM Government, 2010): 
i. Level 1: assumes little or no attempt to decarbonise the energy supply 
infrastructure. It is characterised by lack of or unavailability of unproven 
technologies being development or deployed  
ii. Level 2: represents a future energy outlook likely to be achieved through the 
application of measures or level of effort that could be viewed as ambitious but 
reasonable in the context of the UK energy supply development  
iii. Level 3: describes a future energy outlook driven by a very ambitious level of 
effort involving significant changes from the current system as well technological 
breakthroughs  
iv. Level 4: presents a level of change that could be achieved through extreme 
measures likely to be perceived as physically plausible. It is an optimistic level 
that pushes towards the physical limits of what can be achieved. 
The evolution of the energy system, observed under these level point systems, assist users 
in building their preferential scenarios that achieve perceived energy futures. The levels 
of energy system development represented is indicative of the lead times and build rates 
of new infrastructure as determined by physical, investment, international developments 
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and public acceptance possibilities and decisions (HM Government, 2010). Although the 
results obtained from the calculator are purely determined by user perspective, with little 
impact in influencing energy system policy development, the tool does demonstrate the 
complexities and synergies that exist between technologies and policy. Also, it considers 
the difficult choices and trade-offs that would have to be made in order to develop a 
sustainable energy systems for the future (HM Government, 2010). The 2050 Calculator 
was designed primarily to foster public engagement by allowing users to explore 
alternative pathways to decarbonise the energy system, and thus helping to gain insight 
into various approaches for climate change mitigation.  
The major limitation of the model is that it doesn’t identify the least-cost way of meeting 
the 2050 target. Instead, the model’s focus is directed at establishing the physical limits 
that can be attained in each sector to achieve the decarbonisation targets explored under 
different user based assumptions. The sectoral levels of infrastructure development 
proposed by the model are rather ambitious, and hence the level of infrastructural 
development proposed is not financially feasible from an investment perspective. Levels 
3 and 4, for example, are not likely to be attained by the current UK energy policy 
instruments given the difficulties encountered in the financing and development of CCS 
and new nuclear plant technology. The suitability of the DECC 2050 Calculator for 
simulating the transition of the UK electricity supply infrastructure is limited due to the 
lack of constraint systems that control the level of deployment of the technologies 
included in each pathway. Therefore, in order to build confidence in the value of the 
scenario outputs from the model for the purpose of informing energy policy and 
technological development, it is expedient that the results are used in conjunction with 
other scenarios derived from reputable modelling approaches such as MARKAL and 
ESME.   
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Figure 3.4 Schematic framework of the DECC 2050 Calculator for developing sectorial trajectories (HM Government, 2010).
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3.3 The ‘Energy Optimisation Calculator’  
3.3.1 Background overview  
The EOC as described in Shah et al. ( 2013), is a model built on a Visual Basic 
Programming system which uses macros (a sequence of instructions) to accomplish tasks 
in Microsoft Excel. The Visual Basic framework used in the model is made up of 
programs consisting of small, discrete units of code (procedure) each which acts 
independently to accomplish a particular task (Doyle and Mattenson, 1995). Written 
codes used in the EOC are programmed into procedures, modules and workbooks. The 
modules as applied in the EOC represent workbook sheets that contain codes and each of 
the modules contains declarations followed by procedures. On the other hand, procedures 
are units of code enclosed between Sub and Sub End or Function and Function End 
statements (Doyle and Mattenson, 1995). Thus, the application of the Visual Basic 
program in the EOC facilitates data storage and exchange across modules and workbooks 
which can be accessed by procedures through arguments.  
Outputs from the EOC were used to inform a study entitled: Halving global CO2 by 2050: 
technologies and costs undertaken by the Energy Futures Laboratory and Grantham 
Institute for Climate Change at Imperial College London in 2013 (Shah et al., 2013). The 
study sought to access the future global energy demand from the building, transport and 
industrial sectors and its impacts on emissions against the objective of limiting global 
warming to about 2 oC below pre-industrial levels. According to this study, this level of 
decarbonisation was thought to represent about 15 GtCO2 per annum by 2050 (Shah et 
al., 2013). In developing a methodology approach to address the study objectives, the 
global community was divided into ten geographical regions to allow for the assessment 
of the impacts of economic and population growth on sectorial emission performance. 
The influence of economic and demographic growth on primary energy use in electricity 
generation in each region has profound implications on overall emissions. Therefore, it 
became apparent that a quantitative modelling approach in the form of the ‘Energy 
Optimisation Calculator’ was needed to assemble an array of technologies both existing 
and emerging which could combine in cutting energy and industrial process carbon 
dioxide emissions to a level consistent with a 2 oC temperature rise by 2050.  
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The model framework has two scenario constructions adopted to characterise the global 
sectorial emission performance on the path to a 2 oC warming limit. The reference 
scenario or the Low Mitigation Scenario (LMS) was adopted for each region to represent 
a policy discourse demonstrating a limited scope to mitigate climate change. On the other 
hand, the low-carbon scenario (LCS) ascribed for each region represents a deliberate 
climate change policy mitigation approach seeking to transform the emission 
performance landscape of the different sectors of the global economies in the context of 
avoiding dangerous climate change. The model has three interactive spreadsheets: 
i. Input Data Sheet 
ii. Master Control Sheet  
iii. Output Data Sheet 
The input parameters of the LMS and LCS are determined in the first two spreadsheets 
of the calculator while the least-cost and emission abatement technology mix developed 
is shown in the output data sheet as shown in Appendices A1; A2; A3 and A4. The input 
data sheet and master control sheet have cells that have both a pale green and yellow 
colour coding. The pale green coloured cells contain the input variables which can be 
modified at the user’s discretion. On the other hand, the yellow coloured cells are updated 
automatically during the model’s calculations. These two colour codes can be seen 
exclusively in the input data sheet and the master control sheet, while the entirety of the 
output data sheet is yellow coded to represent the model calculations (outputs), see 
Appendices A1, A2, and A4.      
In each scenario, the cost of operating the energy system (capital, operational expenditure 
and fuel costs) is determined based on the cost input data derived from current UK 
government based energy policy documents. The deep cuts in GHG emissions espoused 
by the LCS adopts a generation mix of both existing mature and emerging technologies 
including those that are currently undergoing demonstration and awaiting full scale 
commercialisation and deployment such as CCS, wave and tidal. The optimal generation 
mix that achieves a decarbonisation target commensurate with 80% emission reduction 
by 2050 is determined by the optimisation function of the calculator which deploys the 
available generation plant according to a cost and emission-minimisation algorithm. 
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3.3.2 Model Modifications: Adapting the calculator to the UK electricity 
generation infrastructure context  
Since the model was originally developed to simulate the global energy system transition 
towards a 15GtCO2/yr emission target by 2050, there was a need to modify and adapt it 
to a national level so that it could be used to investigate the dynamics that impact on the 
UK electricity generation sector in the context of the research questions outlined in 
Section 1.4. To start with, one of the ten regions (European) was changed to United 
Kingdom and the rest were turned off to avoid interfering with the mathematics and the 
intricate workings of the model. The process of developing a UK focused optimisation 
model involved changing the technology mix to reflect the existing and anticipated 
emerging technologies likely to contribute in meeting the energy demand as well as 
decarbonising the economy in line with the 80 % GHG emission target by 2050 against 
1990 levels.   
The two scenario constructions, that is, the Baseline Scenario and Low-Carbon Scenario, 
were retained as was the case in the original structure of the model. However, the Baseline 
Scenario was adapted to the UK electricity generation framework by computing the 
generation mix influenced by the imbedded policies existing in 2007 (see Appendix A1). 
This reflects a period in which the electricity generating infrastructure was in perpetual 
lock-in to high carbon intensive fossil fuels. This scenario also reflects on the electricity 
demand and emission target influenced by policies with no aptitude to mitigate climate 
change. The predominantly fossil fuel based generation mix of the baseline scenario has 
the electricity demand set at 379.2 TWh with a cumulative emission output of about 185.8 
MtCO2e (DUKES, 2008). On the other hand, the LCS commands a high proportion of 
renewable and low-carbon energy technologies in the generation mix. It constitutes an 
ambitious technology mix whose composition includes emerging technologies which are 
at an early stage of development or application. The low-carbon scenario development is 
modelled respectively under emission and electricity demand constraints outlined in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in line with the scope of the research questions being investigated in 
this thesis.  
The electricity generation mix variations portrayed in the scenario developments in this 
thesis are influenced by the different emission target ambitions that have been proposed 
or expressed as potential options for decarbonising the electricity sector. The ‘path to 50 
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g and 100 g’ emission reduction trajectory by 2030 represent the CCC’s cost-effective 
emission reduction framework seeking to achieve the 80 % target by 2050 relative to the 
1990 levels (CCC, 2010). While there is consensus on the need to decarbonisation the 
electricity sector by 2030, the government’s ambition appears to be focused on the 100 
and 200 g/kWh grid carbon intensity targets as the potential preferential options to cut 
power sector emissions by 2030. The electricity generation sector transition outlined in 
this thesis endeavours to capture the divergence in policy ambitions to depict the future 
outlook of the sector both in 2030 and 2050. The current emission projections for the UK 
electricity generation sector for the 50 g and 100 g decarbonisation milestones are 
estimated up to 2030. The emission reduction trajectory from 2035 to 2050 (see Table 
3.1) for the two pathways is extrapolated exponentially based on Equations 3.1 and 3.2, 
respectively, (Sithole et al., 2016):  
𝑦 = (5 × 1076)𝑒−0.085𝑥          (3.1) 
Where y is carbon emissions (MtCO2e), x is the year and e is the exponential notation. 
𝑦 = (2 × 1067)𝑒−0.075𝑥        (3.2) 
Where y is the total carbon emissions (MtCO2e), x is the year and e is the exponential 
notation.  
Table 3.1. The 2030 decarbonisation trajectory for the electricity generation sector in 
MtCO2e (CCC, 2010). 
Year 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
‘Path to 50g’ 157 131.4 63.5 26.9 20.7 10.3 5.9 3.4 1.9 
‘Path to 100g’ 157 131.4 63.5 43.9 41.6 10.3 7 4.9 3.4 
The electricity demand target over the transition period 2010 – 2050 is drawn from the 
DECC’s updated energy and emission projections (DECC, 2014c). The primary energy 
demand outlook currently informing UK energy policy is projected to 2035 and the trend 
to 2050 is lineally extrapolated using equation 3.3 (Sithole et al., 2016): 
𝑦 = 0.4127𝑥2 − 1667.7𝑥 + (2 + 106)       (3.3) 
Where y is energy demand in TWh and x is the year. 
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Table 3.2: Projected primary electricity demand (DCC, 2014). 
Year 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Electricity demand 
(TWh) 
345 324 303 301 344 388 436 519 620 
The carbon life-cycle of all the electricity generation technologies computed in the 
calculator is updated in accordance with peer-reviewed estimates, and thus, providing a 
comprehensive picture of the emissions caused at the point of electricity generation as 
well as during construction, maintenance, decommissioning and disposal. The original 
fuel cost input used in the model was based on global price, but for the purpose of this 
thesis, the cost input element was changed to a local price index to reflect the actual UK 
expenditure on fuel used in electricity generation. As with electricity demand, the fossil 
fuel (coal and gas) prices have been projected to 2035 (DECC, 2014), however, the fuel 
cost outlook from 2040 to 2050 is respectively extrapolated using equations 3.4 and 3.5 
(Sithole et al., 2016): 
𝑦 = (1.3502 − 109)𝑒(1.2343−10
2)𝑥        (3.4) 
Where y is the coal price ($/t), x is the year and e is the exponential notation. 
𝑦 = (4.2433 − 1011)𝑒(1.3882−10
2)𝑥       (3.5)  
Where y is the gas price (p/therm), x represent the year and e id the exponential notation. 
The above equations (3.4 and 3.5) have been used to project the fuel cost trend highlighted 
in Table 3.3. The fuel price for nuclear is based on the £6/MWh with an additional 
£2/MWh waste disposal charge (Mott MacDonald, 2010). Also, the wood fuel price is 
calculated based on the 4.4p/kWh (Biomass Energy Centre, 2011) and both nuclear and 
wood pallet costs are fixed throughout the transition period.  
Table 3.3: Local fuel prices–£/GWh fuel (Sithole et al., 2016). 
Year 2010 2015 2020 2015 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Coal  62434 51995 60093 63178 66391 69797 74953 79103 83253 
Gas 3914 5652 5488 6526 6953 6953 7717 8191 8666 
Wood  23292 23292 23292 23292 23292 23292 23292 23292 23292 
Nuclear 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 
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The investment outlay used in the model to determine the cost of construction and 
operation of the electricity generation infrastructure is also adapted to the UK energy 
context. This implies that the economics of the model was revised to reflect the currency 
in British pound sterling as opposed to the US$ as originally structured in the model.  
Technology and system operation cost data used in the model is based on the up-to-date 
cost assumptions used in various modelling work reported in key government reports 
(Mott MacDonald, 2010; ECC, 2011a; 2012; Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2011; 2012) as shown 
in Table 3.4. Most government projections on the future technology development and 
deployment outlook of the electricity generation mix have tended to focus on the 
medium/central cost estimate. As this research sheds light into the development of the 
UK energy policy, the central cost estimate is used in the analysis of the electricity supply 
sector transition towards a low-carbon future. The cost estimates used in this thesis is 
drawn from reports produced from 2010 to 2013 (Mott MacDonald, 2010; DECC, 2011c; 
DECC, 2012; Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2011; Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2012). In this respect, 
the data has been updated/harmonised to 2013 prices using the UK rate of inflation from 
2010 to 2013.   
Table 3.4. The capital and operational cost inputs for the different technologies in the 
UK electricity generation mix (Sithole et al., 2016). 
Technologies Medium 
Capex £/kW 
Medium Opex 
£/MW/y 
Data source 
Onshore wind (NOAK) 1,596 75,396  
Offshore wind (NOAK) 2,851 181,773  
Renewable (Biomass) CHP 4,272 222,371 DECC, 2011 
Hydroelectricity 2,417 88,462  
Biomass 2,532 252,289  
Pumped storage 1,958 12,570 Parsons Brinckerhoff, 
2011 
Nuclear (FOAK)  4,428 94,688  
Biomass CCS 4,118 131,092  
Gas CCGT (NOAK) 599 22,655  
Gas CCGT–CCS 1,369 39,674 Parsons Brinckerhoff, 
2013 
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Conventional CCGT CHP 618 47,214  
Coal (Pulv fuel, ASC-FGD 1,954 60,602  
Coal CCS (Pulv, ASC, CCS 3,354 120,383 Mott McDonald 2010 
Wave 3,610 200,000  
Tidal 2,750 37,200 DECC, 2011 
Solar 780 20,400 DECC, 2012 
The technology build-up rate is another component of the model that was changed to align 
the modelling framework to the UK electricity generation landscape. The data on the 
annual technology build-up rates is drawn from the technical input data of the Levelised 
Cost Model (Mott MacDonald, 2010; Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2012) developed to aid 
policy development as well as enhance the feasibility of the low-carbon deployment 
projections envisaged over long time frames. Most modelling work on the future UK 
electricity infrastructure assume a 10 % discount rate to annualise the investment costs. 
This thesis adopts the same discount rate assumption as opposed to the 3.5 % originally 
used in the calculator.   
3.3.3 Scenario development for different transition pathways 
The process of developing pathways to a low-carbon electricity supply system requires 
radical changes to the technologies, institutions and business strategies (Foxon et al., 
2010). The impact of these elements have been considered and integrated within the 
modelling environment of the EOC to produce electricity generation pathways that seek 
to project decarbonisation ambitions aspired by various institutions with a stake in the 
evolution of the UK energy system to a sustainable future. Depending on the 
decarbonisation ambition being advanced and the assumptions made, the methodology 
framework used in this thesis has the capacity to assemble a diversified and optimal 
generation mix that can contribute in achieving the 2050 low-carbon future.   
The input parameters outlined in Section 1.3.2 form part of the key variables computed 
in the EOC. The penetration of individual technologies within the model is constrained 
in two stages (physical installation limit and installation constraint) to allow the model to 
predict plausible scenarios reflective of both policy and technological developments. The 
deployment outlay for each technology represented in the model is drawn from industrial, 
academic and government policy estimates developed from rigorous modelling 
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frameworks with a view to explore alternative options to decarbonise the power sector. 
The physical installation limit is one of the key structural components of the model which 
allows the maximum capacity of each technology to be computed within the model (see 
Appendix A1). This physical installation limit provides sufficient capacity from which 
the model can build or shut down plants depending on the level of electricity demand and 
emissions target that is set to be achieved in each model simulation. 
The installation constraint sets the maximum deployment capacity that each technology 
can achieve in the optimisation process. This installation constraint limit for each 
technology is set in line with the potential deployment prediction expressed within the 
prevailing policy and industrial technology development estimates. This constraint 
category also determines the diversity of the generation mix that the model can achieve 
given the emission and energy demand constraints set within the modelling framework. 
The model sets a 1 GW minimum capacity for each technology to allow each technology 
to contribute to generation mix in line with the model assumptions defined. However, this 
minimum capacity level can be modified to suit the modelling requirements specific to 
the decarbonisation pathway ambition under review. It is through this minimum capacity 
component of the model that developments in emerging technologies such tidal and wave 
at demonstration stage, with capacities usually below the 1 GW capacity level, to which 
the model operates, can easily be represented. Also, it allows plant closures, for example 
coal in 2030 to have a zero input both in the physical installation limit and installation 
constraint input without compromising the model calculations (constraints set in input 
data sheet – Appendix A1).  
The load factor for the baseload generation that is, coal, gas CCGT and nuclear from 2010 
to 2015 has been framed based on the actual data from the Digest of United Kingdom 
Energy Statistics (DUKES). However, beyond this, the load factors for these technologies 
have been influenced by the emission target, electricity demand constraints and the 
proportion of other generation technologies available in the model at a given time. As for 
the emerging technologies such as CCS, wave and tidal which are yet to attain commercial 
status within the generation mix, their load factors are determined based on forecasts from 
industry and research analysis. Load factors for variable renewable technologies such as 
onshore wind, offshore wind, solar PV have been based on annual averages reflecting the 
general weather patterns across the British Isles (see Appendix A1).       
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3.3.4 Determining the modelling assumptions  
The main modelling assumptions considered in developing the low-carbon pathways in 
this thesis have been centred on the main uncertainties facing the electricity generation 
sector. While there is consensus on the role of the power sector in decarbonising the UK 
economy to 2050, there is currently no legislated target to which the sector should 
decarbonise. The radical reduction in emission for the power sector hinges on the roll-out 
of nuclear, offshore wind and fossil fuel plants fitted with CCS. The growth of offshore 
wind to achieve the ambitious deployment levels projected by policy and industry for 
sector decarbonisation is dependent on the cost reduction to reach £100/MWh by 2020 
(DECC, 2012d). On the other hand, the outlook for a 16 GW new nuclear target by 2030 
(HM Government, 2013) could be difficult to achieve considering the on-going delays 
and investment uncertainty currently experienced by EDF’s Hinkley Pont C new nuclear 
power project that is yet to reach FID. The timeline for CCS deployment is still a matter 
of speculation as the technology is currently at demonstration stages and its 
commercialisation is dependent on the technical and economic viability of the 
technology.  
The future role of unabated fossil fuel generation in the mix is also unknown, even the 
current developments in the UK shale gas and its prospective role in the generation mix 
is subject to speculation. There is still uncertainty regarding the capacity of coal fired 
generation that could be upgraded to meet the EU’s tough emission standards. The coal 
plants that manage to comply with EU pollution regulations, could have their future in 
the generation mix severely limited owing to the potential economic impact of the ‘carbon 
price floor’ a high carbon tax that could make operating coal facilities economically 
unviable. Furthermore, the continual operation of coal-fired utilities in the generation mix 
is also dependent on the availability of capital resources to extend the life of the plants 
beyond their technical operational life. Therefore, there is no doubt that the evolution of 
the electricity generation infrastructure to a low-carbon future is beset with a multitude 
of challenges which form the basis of the research questions developed for this thesis. 
The dynamics that impact on the electricity generation sector as it transitions to a low-
carbon future are modelled based on the following assumptions: 
i. Decarbonisation targets of 50, 100 and 200 gCO2/kWh are adopted for different 
policy ambitions by 2030.  
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ii. The electricity supply sector achieves a near-zero carbon grid intensity by 2050.      
iii. Commercialisation of CCS, wave and tidal to start in 2025.  
iv. Coal generation phased-out in 2025 for the 50 and 100 gCO2/kWh energy 
transition pathways. 
v. Full scale shale gas production and utilisation in the power sector to commence 
in 2025 with the wholesale price pegged at 30% lower than conventional gas.  
vi. Majority of the UK nuclear fleet retired by 2023 with 1050 MW and 1198 MW 
capacity respectively retired in 2028 and 2035. Any additional nuclear capacity 
beyond 2023 constitutes a fleet of new nuclear power plants. 
vii. With respect to 200 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target by 2030, some coal fired 
generation plants had a ten year operational life extensions as from 2023.  
viii. The cost of biomass and nuclear fuel resource is constant throughout the 
transition period.   
3.3.5 Optimisation: Determining an optimal generation mix 
The optimisation process aims to develop a least-cost and polluting generation mix that 
meets the electricity demand and carbon emissions for the scenario under study. 
Optimisation starts with the generation technologies defined in the baseline scenario as 
shown in Figure 3.5 which are modified to develop a desired transition pathway based on 
the input parameters and the various constraints applied. The model develops the optimal 
generation mix in a two-stage sequential process based on the cost of electricity and 
emission target set. This implies that for the electricity demand set, the model builds the 
cheapest technology first, at a cumulative rate of 1 TWh at a time until the installation 
constraint limit set in the model is reached before moving to the next cheaper technology. 
The process of building the technology mix is based on the least-cost hierarchy and is 
repeated for all the technologies in the mix until the electricity demand is achieved. In the 
event that the generation portfolio developed in each model run fails to meet electricity 
demand, the model continues its optimisation process by closing down the most 
expensive technologies and replacing them by building/adding cheaper sources to the mix 
until demand is met by the least-cost generation mix possible (see Figure 3.5 and 
Appendix A3).  
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Figure 3.5. Simplified flow chart of the ‘Energy Optimisation Calculator’ (Sithole et 
al., 2015; Sithole et al., 2016). 
The next stage in the optimisation process assesses the capacity of the assembled least-
cost generation mix to meet the emission target. If the assembled generation mix achieves 
the emission target set, the process ends, but if not, the optimisation procedure would 
continue. At this stage the model replaces high carbon intensive technologies with low 
carbon technologies until the carbon target is just met, as depicted in the model flow chart 
in Figure 3.5 and in the Master Control Sheet (Appendix A2). The ideal generation mix 
that achieves the conditions set in the model is presented in the output data sheet of the 
model (Appendix A3 and 4). During the optimisation process, the model keeps track of 
the total investment accrued in developing the generation mix that meets the conditions 
set for both the baseline and the low-carbon scenarios as highlighted in Appendices A2 
and A4. The model calculations also account for the extra investment resulting from the 
capacity added to the mix during the optimisation process. Also, the model calculates the 
overall cost of electricity from the optimal generation mix assembled to meet both 
emission and electricity demand targets set (see Appendices A2 and A4). Once the 
optimisation process is completed, the output module then displays the proportion of 
generation capacity (GW) required to meet the demand from the assembled technologies 
and the corresponding generation achieved in TWh/yr, as highlighted in Appendices A3 
and A4.  
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3.3.6 Levelised Cost of Electricity     
The levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) has been defined by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) as the average price that consumers would have to pay the 
investor/operator so that the capital, operation and maintenance and fuel expenses is 
repaid exactly with a rate of return equal to the discount rate (IEA, 2005). This cost 
methodology has widely been used as a ranking tool to assess the cost-effectiveness of 
different energy generating technologies (Short & Packey, 1995). This technology 
accounting approach has been used by policymakers to determine the relative investment 
options available for different technologies. As outlined in this thesis, the LCOE 
considers the lifetime generated energy and costs to determine the price of electricity per 
unit energy generated (£/MWh). The assessment of the levelised cost of electricity 
(LCOE) for any given technologies is framed by a set of assumptions on a wide range of 
parameters, such as capital cost, construction times, the expected plant life, operational 
and maintenance costs, fuel costs, plant availability, capacity factor and the discount rate 
(Gross et al., 2010).  
The LCOE data reported in most of UK energy policy documents has been based on the 
central cost estimate which focuses on the central estimate of economic growth and fossil 
prices. The central cost estimate level incorporates all agreed policies drafted to promote 
economic development, and hence its adoption in the energy scenario development 
pursued in this thesis. In assessing the LCOE structure of the technologies considered in 
this thesis, the stream of future costs and generation outputs are discounted by 10 % to 
the present value taking into account the time value of money. The electricity generation 
infrastructure cost models used by DECC, Mott MacDonald and Parsons Brinckerhoff to 
determine the UK technology costs incorporates a 10 % discount rate reflecting the return 
on capital for an investor in the absence of specific market or technology risks (IEA, 
2010). For conformity purposes, this thesis has adopted the same discount rate in all 
scenario assessments. The competitiveness of each of the technologies considered takes 
into account the likely impact of the sensitivity on the various input parameters adopted 
in the model. The model formula used to calculate the COE is expressed in equation 3.6 
as follows (Sithole et al., 2015; Sithole et al., 2016):  
𝐶𝑂𝐸 =
𝐼
[
(1+𝑟)𝑛
𝑟(1+𝑟)𝑛
]×𝐸
+
𝑇𝑂𝑀
𝐸
          (3.6) 
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Where I is the capital investment (cost per kW multiplied by the total installed capacity), 
r is the discount rate at 10 %, E is the annual electricity generation (TWh), n is the lifetime 
of the plant, and TOM is the total operation and maintenance costs. It is through this 
levelied cost analysis framework that the overall unit cost of the generation mix is 
determined as well as the cost of generating electricity from each technology.  
3.3.7 Simulating intermittency: offshore wind generation by 2030  
The 31.2 GW total installed capacity for offshore wind modelled for the ‘path to 100 g’ 
carbon grid intensity by 2030 is presumed to come from the Crown Estate leased zones 
1, 2 and 3 that are illustrated in Figure 3.6. The UK Met Office Meteorological 
observation map was used to identify weather stations located in proximity to the 
proposed offshore wind site development zones as shown in Figure 3.6. The wind data is 
downloaded from the MERRA (Modern Era Retrospective-Analysis for Research and 
Applications) based on the grid points (latitude and longitude) for the selected site. The 
MERRA meteorological dataset model was preferred for sourcing wind data for this 
thesis since it has a relatively high temporal and spatial resolution (hourly average) and 
has data available from 1979 complete with wind speed at different heights/pressures 
levels, wind direction, temperature, moisture content available for download free of 
charge (NASA, 2016). Hourly datasets for wind speed at 50 and 80 m heights over a thirty 
year period are downloaded from the MERRA. For the purpose of this research, hourly 
wind speed data for five years for each of the wind sites is analysed to determine the 
electrical power output from the proposed wind farm sites (Figure 3.6) based on the V164-
8.0 and the SeaTitan 10 MW wind turbines (MHI Vestas Offshore Wind, 2014; AMSC, 
2012).  
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Figure 3.6. UK offshore wind development rounds (BWEA/RenewableUK, 2010). 
3.3.7.1 The Weibull density distribution: wind data analysis  
The wind power density is a key indicator in wind energy assessments that determines 
the potential amount of wind energy that can be captured or harnessed from a wind 
resource at a given site (Mohammadi et al., 2016). The characterisation of the wind 
resource through a power density distribution function of wind speed is vitally important 
as it provides insight into the proportion of the wind resource that can be converted into 
electricity using wind turbines. The Weibull density distribution function provides a 
statistical model through which the wind speed distribution frequency can be described 
(Lun & Lam, 2000). It is perceived to be an ideal approach that gives a good 
representation of the variation in hourly mean wind speed over a year at many typical 
sites (Burton et al., 2011). As a prominent and broadly utilised approach in wind energy 
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investigations (Arslan et al., 2014), the Weibull density distribution is characterised by 
two important parameters known as shape (k) and scale (c) parameters.  
Shape k parameter indicates the width of the wind speed distribution, which represents 
the wind distribution peak at any given site (Carrasco-Díaz et al., 2015). On the other 
hand the scale c parameter denotes the abscissa scale of the wind distribution, which 
characterises the wind availability and nature at a given location (Shu et al., 2015). These 
parameters are sufficient to provide a quantitative assessment of the available wind 
resource and the potential electrical power output likely to be converted by a wind turbine 
at any given site. These key attributes of the Weibull distribution function are determined 
using a wide range of statistical analysis among which the graphical, maximum 
likelihood, empirical, power density methods have widely been adopted (Bilir et al., 2015; 
Mohammadi et al., 2016). The adoption and application of the Weibull distribution 
function in the calculation and analysis of wind power density in this thesis is influenced 
by its simplicity, flexibility, adaptability and favourable capability to fit wind data for the 
different sites being assessed (Arslan et al., 2014).  
The Weibull distribution function (pdf) can be expressed mathematically in two 
parameter model as illustrated in equation 3.7 (Liu et al., 2011);  
𝑓(𝑣) =
𝑑𝐹(𝑉)
𝑑𝑣
= (
𝑘
𝑐
) (
𝑣
𝑐
)
𝑘−1
× 𝑒(
𝑣
𝑐
)
𝑘
                                                                             (3.7)  
Where, v is the wind speed in m/s, k>0 is the dimensionless shape parameter, and c>0 is 
the scale parameter with the same unit as wind speed (m/s).  
On the other hand, the Weibull cumulative distribution function (cdf) can be expressed 
using equation 3.8 (Ahmed Shata & Hanitsch, 2006);  
𝐹(𝑣) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ((
𝑣
𝑐
)
𝑘
)                                                                                               (3.8)   
For the purpose of this thesis, the values of k and c have been estimated based on the 
Maximum likelihood method (ML) and are estimated based on equation 3.9 and 3.10 
(Chang et al., 2015); 
𝑘 = (
∑ 𝑉𝑖
𝑘In𝑛𝑖=1 (V𝑖)
∑ V𝐼
𝐾𝑛
𝑖=1
−
∑ Inn𝑖=1 (Vi)
𝑛
)
−1
 ,         (3.9)  
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𝑐 = (
1
n
∑ Vi
kn
i=1 )
1
k
         (3.10) 
Where Vi is the wind speed in time stage, i and n is the number of non-zero wind speed 
data points. 
The actual wind power density estimated on the basis of the Weibull density function is 
calculated using the equation 3.11 (Olaofe & Folly, 2013); 
 𝑃𝐴 =
1
2
𝜌(ℎ) ∫ 𝑣3𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
∞
0
        (3.11)  
Where PA is the actual wind power density in terms of its wind distribution, v is the wind 
speed of moving air (m/s), f (v) is the wind distribution derived from the Weibull 
distribution function.  
3.3.7.2 Wind energy estimation 
Equations 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16 have been adopted in this thesis to evaluate the 
electrical power output from the offshore wind sites shown in Figure 3.6 based on the 8 
and 10 MW rated wind turbines.  
The wind power (W) that is available for extraction is expressed using equation 3.12 
(Olaofe & Folly, 2013); 
p(𝑣) =
1
2
𝜌(ℎ)𝐴𝑣3         (3.12)  
Where A is the turbine swept area (m2) and p(v) is the wind power available for extraction 
in moving air. 
Also incorporated within the wind energy estimation is the rotor efficiency/power 
coefficient (Cp), which is the ratio between the maximum power obtained from the wind 
and the total power available from the wind (Wenehenubun et al., 2015). It represents a 
fraction of the available power that can be harnessed from the wind flowing across the 
wind turbine rotor blades. The Betz’s Law sets the theoretical maximum wind energy 
extraction by the rotor blades at 59 % of the total wind flow at any given time. Research 
by Ntoko (2009) concluded that the maximum operational coefficient of a horizontal-axis 
wind turbine is about 50 %. Since the power coefficient of wind turbine is not constant 
(Verma, 2013), this thesis adopts the 50 % value for Cp in calculating the energy output 
from wind turbines chosen for this analysis. The estimated mechanical efficiency of the 
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turbine represented by 𝜂 in the turbine power curve equation (3.13) is specified by 
manufacturers and these estimates (90 and 94 %) are used for the 8 and 10 MW turbines 
to assess the power output from the wind farm sites selected for this study (MHI Vestas 
Offshore Wind, 2014; AMSC, 2012). The power output of the wind turbines (WTs) based 
on the turbine power curve is expressed in equation 3.13 (Olaofe & Folly, 2013): 
𝑃(𝑣) =
1
2
𝜌𝐴𝐶𝑝𝜂𝑣
3           3.13 
Where P(v) is the electrical power output of the WTs, 𝜌 is the constant air density 
(1.225kg/m3) and 𝜼 is the estimate efficiency of the WTs.  
The rated power of the wind turbines selected for this analysis is based on the assumption 
that the future technological progress of wind energy in the 2020 and 2030 could be 
defined by a 8 and 10 MW power rated turbines, respectively (EEA, 2009). The electrical 
power output from wind turbines is estimated based on either the site power curve 
(statistical technique) or the turbine power curve (direct method) (Olaofe & Folly, 2013) 
which is expressed in equation 3.13. In the absence of data to assess the time varying air 
density, one of the key inputs in the statistical technique for calculating turbine power 
output, this thesis adopts the turbine power curve method which uses the site wind speed, 
constant air density and the turbine parameters to calculate the electrical energy output 
from a wind turbine as projected in equation 3.14 (Olaofe & Folly 2013); 
𝑃(𝑣) =
1
2
𝜌𝐴𝐶𝑝𝜂 ∫ 𝑣3
∞
0
𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣       (3.14) 
Where P(v) is the electrical output of the WTs, 𝜌 is the constant air density (1.225kg/m3, 
A is the turbine swept area (m2), Cp is the rotor efficiency, 𝜂 is the estimated technical 
efficiency of the WTs determined by turbine manufacturers, f(v) is the wind distribution 
derived from the actual Weibull distribution function.  
Also, the capacity factor of wind turbines, which is the ratio of the average power output 
of the turbine over a period of time to its power output at its rated capacity (Olaofe & 
Folly, 2013) is considered in the energy analysis outlined in this thesis. The annual full-
load hours, which represent the number of hours during which a wind turbine would have 
to run at full power to produce its energy yield (Salvacao & Guedes Soares, 2015) is 
applied in calculating the capacity factor. The full load hours for offshore wind adopted 
in this thesis is 3267.5 hours a year based on the offshore wind performance in 2015 
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(DECC, 2015e). A 10 % downtime (Salvacao & Guedes Soares, 2015) is deducted from 
the projected full load hours to account for the time required time for maintenance and 
other factors that can reduce the wind turbine availability. Ultimately, the capacity factor 
for offshore wind derived from equation 3.15 or 3.16 is used to assess the electricity 
generation outlay from wind vis-à-vis dispatchable generation from gas. Based on the 
patterns of electricity generation from wind, the contribution from standby gas generation 
can be ascertained in order to assess the impact of intermittent wind generation on 
cumulative carbon emissions and the cost implications of using standby gas generation 
plants. 
𝐶𝑓 =
𝑃𝑎𝑣
𝑃𝑟
 ×100%         (3.15)  
𝐶𝑓 =
𝐸0
𝑃𝑟∗𝑁𝑑∗𝑁ℎ
 ×100%         (3.16) 
Where Pav is average electrical output over a period of time t, and Pr is the electrical 
power output at rated capacity, E0 is the energy output of wind turbine over time t, Nd is 
the number of working days of wind turbine, Nh is the number of hours a day (hrs/day) in 
equations 3.15 and 3.16. 
3.3.8 Dealing with uncertainty in the energy scenario discourse 
The range of assumptions used in this modelling environment are designed to develop a 
diversified least-cost and emission abatement electricity generating portfolio for the UK 
2050 future. However, the construction of such futures is usually fraught with uncertainty, 
particularly with regards to the development and deployment of emerging technologies, 
fuel resource availability and prices as well as the dynamics of energy and climate change 
related policies. In order to enhance the credibility of the scenario outputs from the EOC, 
a sensitivity study is performed focused mainly on the technology, carbon and fuel cost 
inputs which have a potential to impact on the quality of scenario outcomes projected 
over long-term periods. The uncertainty over future primary energy prices is likely to 
impact on technologies that use fossil fuel, and hence the sensitivity analysis in this case 
would tend to focus on increasing or decreasing the future cost so that the future energy 
outlook developed by the model mirrors the volatility of fuel prices anticipated based on 
the different assumptions made. Therefore, the sensitivity study on coal and gas used in 
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unabated and CCS retrofitted plants would allow the model to determine the proportion 
of generation capacity that could be added in the mix relative to the costs. 
Fluctuations in the price of carbon for both the EU ETS and CPS could pose a significant 
impact on the reliability of long-term energy projections, especially from predictive 
models like the EOC. The current UK carbon price floor (CPF) has been projected to 
2030 (DECC, 2014c) with a central estimate expected to be £76.66/tCO2e. However, the 
government has capped the carbon price at £18/tCO2e from 2016 to 2020 (HM Treasury, 
2014), which is a significant reduction from the original £30/tCO2e target set for 2020. 
The outlook for the future carbon price post 2020 is both contentious and uncertain, and 
hence the need for a sensitivity study to assess alternative scenario outcomes that take 
into account the uncertainty over future carbon prices. This source of uncertainty has a 
greater potential to impact on the proportion of unabated fossil fuel generation in the mix 
in the period after 2020.  
Likewise, the future technology cost and characteristics of both mature and emerging 
technologies present another area of uncertainty in the development of low-carbon energy 
pathways. A high penetration of nuclear, offshore wind and CCS is a prerequisite in 
effecting deep cuts in carbon emission for low-carbon energy future development. The 
impact of cost variations on these technologies can affect their rollout within the 
generation mix. It is of great significance that a sensitivity study targeting the investment 
cost is performed in order to ascertain the validity of the model outcomes at the backdrop 
of unforeseeable events in the investment climate. Thus, an independent technology cost 
variation by +/-30 % provides the scope through which the impact of investment 
uncertainty over a given period can be assessed.  
3.3.9 Model test: Part 1  
Apart from being used to generate results for the report: ‘Halving global CO2 by 2050’ 
the EOC has never been tested or audited to determine its robustness in modelling energy 
systems. While the model has so far produced outputs that have been used to produce two 
journal publications (Sithole et al., 2015; Sithole et al., 2016), it is imperative for the 
purpose of this thesis that model test analysis is carried out to establish whether the model 
can develop a least cost electricity generation scenarios that can abate GHG emissions 
and meet energy demand.  
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The model is built on a Visual Basic program that allows for the development of a least-
cost electricity generation mix based on a set of input parameters, and thus reflecting on 
the current developments impacting the electricity supply sector. The model assessment 
is carried out based on the 1998 data. There is no specific significance attached to the 
period selected for this assessment as the main aim is to assess whether the model can 
develop an optimal generation mix based on both costs and emissions. The data used 
includes the technology costs, electricity demand, emissions achieved by the electricity 
sector and fuel cost among other things. An optimised baseline mix is generated for the 
1998 period. The technology cost data, that is, the capital, operation and maintenance was 
derived from the MARKAL “List of Electricity and Heat Generation Technologies – 
2010” (Kannan et al., 2010) which was modified to provide theoretical inputs for the 
purpose of this testing process. The fuel cost for the different technologies is also based 
on real data (DECC, 2014a) and is also modified in order to fulfil the testing requirements 
set. The carbon emissions and electricity demand targets used represent the real data for 
the 1998 period based on (National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory, 2014; DUKES, 
2014). Also, it is worth noting that other input variables such as capacity factors and the 
technology mix used mirrors the actual electricity generation performance in 1998. Thus, 
the baseline mix mirrors these input characteristics and it represents an optimal generation 
mix that achieves the emission target and electricity demand set. 
Having established the baseline mix, the next stage of the model testing process involves 
increasing the capital investment, operation and maintenance and fuel costs of one 
technology at a time while the cost and other input variables for the rest of the other 
technologies are kept constant to the baseline level. The model simulations are carried 
out repeatedly until all the nine technologies within the mix are completed. The model 
test analysis seeks to:  
i. Establish the level of decrease in installed capacity for the technology affected by 
cost increase and then explain why the model reduced the capacity to a given level  
ii. Assess the pattern at which the model assembles the generation mix based on cost 
and emissions abatement approach to compensate for the loss in capacity. Given 
the level of capacity variations for the technologies developed by the model to 
meet the targets set, the focus turns to the evaluation of the role of emission 
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factors, costs, constraint system and build-up rates in influencing the operation of 
the model.  
Thus, the generation mix developed after each simulation is analysed in order to identify 
and justify any changes in the technology mix in the new scenario resulting from cost 
variations applied. The correlation between the LCOE and the percentage installed 
capacity for each scenario is established.  
3.3.9.1 Expensive Gas CCGT 
After increasing the generation cost of gas CCGT, the LCOE reaches 9p/kWh and thereby 
reducing its installed capacity by 7.6 GW. The installed capacity is reduced from a 
baseline capacity of 24.9 GW to 17.3 GW in response to an increase in costs for gas 
plants. Any increase in cost for gas generation plants can only reduce capacity to the level 
shown in Figure 3.7 and this is mainly because of the minimum capacity that has been 
fixed within the model as a safeguard to security of electricity supply purposes. However, 
in response to a 7.6 GW reduction in gas capacity, there is an increase in capacity in all 
other technologies with coal increasing by 9.7 GW as highlighted in Figure 3.7. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the other cheaper (1-2p/kWh) technologies such as 
hydroelectricity, nuclear, biomass, and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) with lower 
emission factors have been built to their maximum capacity (installation limit) set in the 
model. 
Furthermore, the higher emission target set, allows more coal uptake in the mix despite 
its high emission intensity. In order to meet the electricity demand, the model also builds 
more capacity from technologies with slightly higher LCOE (3p/kWh and 5p/kWh), such 
as onshore wind, oil and pumped storage, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.7. The way 
the generation mix changes after gas plant costs are increased highlight the fundamental 
character of the model which allows its optimisation function to select the generation mix 
based on a least-cost and emission abatement criterion. Furthermore, the analysis 
highlights the role of the constraint system set in the model which determines the level of 
capacity that can be built from each technology in line with the electricity demand and 
emission target set.  
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Figure 3.7. The generation mix developed after increasing gas CCGT costs. 
3.3.9.2 Expensive Coal generation  
At 10p/kWh, coal plant installation is reduced from a baseline capacity of 18.6 GW to 
12.1 GW, a decline of the order of 6.5 GW. The high cost of electricity generation 
contributes in reducing the coal capacity built by the model. Under normal circumstances, 
the prohibitive costs and higher emission intensity could have seen even lower penetration 
of coal in the mix, but the annual build rate of 1.2GW/y, a 316.9 TWh electricity demand 
and a considerably higher emission target of 156 MtCO2e allow the model to build 12.1 
GW in response to an increase in costs. Gas plants have the least LCOE at 1p/kWh, hence, 
the model builds gas CCGT up to the maximum installation limit of 25 GW set as 
indicated in Figure 3.8. The combined capacity of coal and gas of 37 GW contribute 
significantly in achieving the energy demand set and as a result, there is less capacities 
being added to the baseline mix to achieve the electricity demand target set. This is 
demonstrated by the electricity generation from hydroelectricity plants which have the 
cheapest LCOE (1p/kWh), but yet their capacity is only increased by just 0.3 GW. A 
capacity increase ranging from 1 to 3.3 GW is added to technologies with the highest 
LCOE (onshore wind, pumped storage and oil) and this is down to the build-up rates 
apportioned to the respective technologies.  
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Figure 3.8. The generation mix developed after increasing coal generation cost. 
3.3.9.3 Expensive nuclear power  
Increasing the cost of nuclear electricity generation by 9p/kWh results in its installed 
capacity dropping from 11.7 GW to 7.2 GW, which is 38 % decline from the baseline 
capacity. As the nuclear energy capacity is reduced, gas and hydroelectricity plants’ 
installed capacity is built to maximum installation limit, that is, the possible maximum 
capacity that the model can build as they offer the cheapest LCOE of 1p/kWh as depicted 
in Figure 3.9. The LCOE of biomass and CHP is 2p/kWh and the model builds biomass 
plant up to the installation limit while CHP doesn’t reach the maximum installed limit 
due to the its relatively higher emission factor compared to biomass plants. Coal plants 
also generate electricity at 2p/kWh, but capacity is increased by 1.8 GW following the 
fall in nuclear energy installed capacity. The model could only achieve this increase in 
capacity due to the high emission intensity associated with coal fuel resources. The high 
cost of generation in onshore wind accounts for 1.8 GW increase in capacity added by the 
model to the generation mix. A capacity of 2.6 GW of pumped storage is added to the 
mix compared to the 0.9 GW added to oil despite the marked difference in the LCOE as 
highlighted in Figure 3.9. The model opts for lower emission pump storage at the expense 
of cheaper, but polluting oil in its optimisation operation. This is a classic feature of the 
model where a low-carbon characteristic of a technology supersedes the costs. Again the 
model has demonstrated its capacity to assemble technologies based on the cost and 
emission intensity characteristics. 
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Figure 3.9. The generation mix developed after nuclear plant costs are increased. 
3.3.9.4 Expensive pumped storage  
Before the cost of generating electricity from pumped storage was increased, its LCOE 
was pegged at 5p/kWh which was relatively higher than that of the other technologies 
within the generation mix. When the generation cost for pumped storage is increased to 
8p/kWh the model avoids building any capacity from this technology. To this end, the 
model retains a 1 GW capacity for pumped storage, which is the minimum installed 
capacity that is set in the model for all the technologies within the mix. An increase in 
LCOE of pumped storage has no impact to generation mix as the baseline capacities are 
retained by the model for each of the technologies as depicted in Figure 3.10. The 
electricity generation output remains dominated by gas CCGT, coal and nuclear energy 
to meet the 316 TWh electricity demand under the 156 MtCO2e emission target set in the 
model.  
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Figure 3.10. The generation mix developed after increasing pumped storage costs. 
3.3.9.5 Expensive onshore wind  
Onshore wind capacity drops from 4.5 GW to 1 GW when the generation cost is increased 
to 7p/kWh as displayed in Figure 3.11. Due to the higher LCOE, pumped storage retains 
the minimum baseline capacity of 1 GW as the model chooses the generation mix based 
on the least-cost algorithm. Gas CCGT capacity is built to the maximum installation limit 
as one of the cheapest technologies available. Hydroelectricity and biomass retains their 
baseline installed capacity which is built to achieve the maximum installed capacity as 
shown in Figure 3.11. Following the decrease in onshore wind capacity, coal fired 
generation capacity increases by 2.I GW as it is relatively cheaper at 2p/kWh. The high 
build-up rate of 1.2GW/y and emission target of 156 MtCO2e set in the model necessitates 
this capacity to be added from high emission coal as gas has reached its maximum 
installed capacity of 25 GW set in the model. Nuclear energy is only built to 11.4 GW, 
which is about 0.3 GW capacity decline from the baseline scenario. This is influenced by 
its lower build-up rate of 0.5GW/y which allows the model to add more capacity from 
other technologies with a higher build-up rate instead. Based on this model operation, 
generation capacity from oil increases by 1 GW owing to its 1.2 GW penetration rate 
despite its higher emission factor and LCOE (3p/kWh). Conventional CHP increases 
capacity by 0.4 GW to reach 3.1, GW which is the maximum capacity that the model can 
add to the mix to ameliorate the capacity deficit created after the build-up capacity of 
onshore wind into the mix is reduced. Once gain the penetration of pumped storage into 
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the mix is curtailed due to its higher LCOE, which is set at 5p/kWh relative to the other 
technologies.  
 
Figure 3.11. The generation mix developed after increasing onshore wind costs. 
3.3.9.6 Expensive biomass  
Biomass installed capacity is reduced to 1 GW when its generation cost is increased 
relative to the other technologies. An increase in biomass LCOE to 7p/kWh result in the 
model building gas CCGT and hydroelectricity plants to the maximum installation 
capacity limit possible as they have the least LCOE (1p/kWh) as shown in Figure 3.12. 
Hydroelectricity increases its installed capacity to 3.2 GW while gas CCGT retains the 
baseline capacity of 25 GW, which is the maximum the model can build. Coal, onshore 
wind and oil respectively experience the highest capacity increase comparative to other 
technologies, that is, 1, 1.1 and 1.5 GW in response to the constrained biomass capacity. 
Oil and onshore wind have a higher build-up rate of 1.2GW/y and based on this, the model 
builds more capacity compared to other technologies that may be cheaper and with very 
low carbon emission factors. The difference in capacity added to the generation mix 
between onshore wind and oil is influenced by a higher emission factor of 650 gCO2/kWh 
for oil which allows the model to add more onshore wind than oil in the mix. Coal is 
cheaper (2p/kWh) and has a high build-up rate (1.2GW/y, and this combined with a higher 
emission and electricity demand target set, explains the increase in capacity relative to 
the other technologies. Nuclear energy and CHP capacities increase by 0.3 to 0.4 GW, 
respectively. Despite its lower emission factor and cost, the level of nuclear energy 
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capacity added to the mix remains very low and this is mainly due to its low build rate 
while CHP has been built to a level close to the installation constraint limit.  Generation 
capacity for pumped storage is retained at a minimum level due to the higher LCOE which 
was set at 5p/kWh which results in it being avoided during the selection process. Again, 
the optimisation process demonstrated by the model displays a pattern where technologies 
are selected based on costs, emission factors and model constraints which comes into 
force to influence the manner in which the generation mix is assembled. 
 
 
Figure 3.12. The generation mix developed after increasing biomass costs. 
3.3.9.7 Expensive Conventional CHP 
Increasing the LCOE for CHP to 11p/kWh results in capacity being retained to the 
minimum level as the model avoids it in its technology selection process. As a result of 
the increase in CHP cost of generation, a total of 1.7 GW is lost from the generation mix. 
Biomass, gas and hydroelectricity plants are built to the maximum installation limit as 
highlighted in Figure 3.13. Coal capacity is increased by 1 GW as it is relatively cheaper 
and has a higher build-up rate. The build-up rate of 1.2GW/y allocated for oil and onshore 
wind accounts for the 0.5 GW increase in installed capacity added to each technology. 
On the other hand, nuclear power generation capacity is built and retained to the baseline 
level which is the maximum capacity that the model could add to the generation mix 
considering its lower build-up rate of 0.5GW/y. As is in other scenarios, the build-up 
capacity in pumped storage is maintained at the minimum level due to the higher 
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generation cost which makes it an unfavourable option in developing a minimum cost 
generation mix. 
 
Figure 3.13. The generation mix developed after increasing Conventional CHP costs.  
3.3.9.8 Expensive hydroelectricity generation 
Increasing the cost of operating hydroelectricity plants by about 10p/kWh reduces the 
installed capacity to a minimum of 1 GW that the model can add to the mix. Similarly, 
the high levelised cost of generation in pumped storage of 5p/kWh reduces its 
contribution to the generation mix to about 1 GW as shown in Figure 3.14. The model 
builds gas CCGT plants to maximum installation limit as they have the cheapest LCOE 
at 1p/kWh. At 2p/kWh and 1.3 GW/y build rate, biomass is built to the maximum 
installation constraint limit. On the other hand, nuclear power capacity is retained to its 
baseline level of 11.7 GW which is the maximum capacity that the model could build at 
a build rate of 0.5GW/y. Despite its higher emission intensity, a LCOE of 2p/kWh and a 
build rate of 1.2GW/y, the coal installed capacity is increased by 1 GW to reach a total 
capacity of 19.6 GW. Oil and onshore wind have relatively higher cost of electricity 
generation which is set at 3p/kWh, hence the model only allows a 0.5 GW capacity uptake 
from these technologies owing to their 1.2GW/y build rates. The uptake of the generation 
capacity from higher cost technologies such as oil and onshore wind is necessitated by 
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the requirement to meet the electricity demand and the emission constraint targets set in 
the model.   
 
Figure 3.14. The generation mix developed after incresing hydroelectricity plant 
costs. 
3.3.9.9 Expensive oil-fired generation 
When the LCOE generated from oil fired plants is increased to 10p/kWh, the model only 
builds the minimum possible capacity of 1 GW from this technology due to the high cost. 
Initially, oil generation was limited to a minimum capacity owing to its higher emission 
factor of 650 gCO2kWh and a relatively higher LCOE which is set at 3p/kWh. Since the 
installed capacity for oil generation is retained at I GW baseline level, it implies that 
contribution from the rest of the generation technologies within the mix remain 
unchanged as illustrated in Figure 3.15. The baseline technology mix retained by the 
model following the increase in the cost of electricity from oil achieves the 156 MtCO2e 
emissions target and the 316 TWh electricity demand set.  
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Figure 3.15. The generation mix developed after increasing oil fired plant costs.  
3.3.10 Model test: Part 2  
The low-carbon electricity generation mix for the 2050 future developed by the EOC is 
compared against the Central Coordination transition pathway developed by the FESA 
model (Barnacle et al., 2013). The energy scenario outputs from the EOC reflects on the 
development of the UK energy policy while the Central Coordination pathway envisions 
increased government control and regulation in developing a low-carbon, secure and 
affordable energy system (Barnacle et al., 2013). The electricity generation mix for the 
Central Coordination pathway is projected to reflect the 2020, 2035 and 2050 outlook, 
and hence the technology mix output from the EOC is developed to mirror the same 
period. 
Figure 3.16 portrays the technology mix for the two energy scenarios in 2020. Central 
Coordination pathway has a higher deployment outlay of unabated coal and low-carbon 
(nuclear and coal CCS) generation capacity compared to the scenario output from the 
EOC. Unabated coal and CHP in Central coordination installed capacity is 6.4 and 3.5 
GW higher than the deployment outlay in the EOC as shown in Figure 3.16. The 
respective installed capacity for nuclear and coal CCS in Central Coordination is 12.2 and 
2 GW compared to 10 and 0.4 GW in the EOC scenario. There is a 0.6 GW difference in 
installed capacity in unabated gas generation between the two scenarios as shown in 
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Figure 3.16. There is a higher penetration of renewable energy technologies in the EOC 
scenario compared to the Central Coordination pathway (see Figure 3.16). The level of 
deployment of offshore wind, solar PV and biomass the EOC scenario respectively 
increase by 7, 2 and 8 GW against the projections in Central Coordination pathway as 
illustrated in Figure 3.16. 
 
Figure 3.16. Comparison of the generation mix of the two pathways in 2020  
The generation mix portrayed in the EOC scenario presents a least cost and emission 
abatement pathway. A low deployment outlay of carbon intensive unabated coal in the 
generation mix is commensurate with emission abatement target set in the model. Both 
scenarios have a high penetration of unabated gas in the mix, however, the projection in 
the EOC scenario is developed on the basis of it being the cheapest technology as well as 
less carbon intensive compared to unabated coal. Also, the technology selection based on 
cost is demonstrated by the constrained deployment of pumped storage, hydro and 
interconnection in EOC scenario compared to Central Coordination. Similarly, a high 
penetration of renewable energy technologies (see Figure 3.16) is developed in line with 
the objective of meeting the emission target set in the model. Low-carbon technologies 
such as nuclear, and CCS as well as other emerging technologies such as wave and tidal 
have lower deployment projections in the EOC scenario compared to the Central 
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Coordination due to the constraint limit set in the model to reflect the technology 
development within the electricity generation system.  
The UK energy policy, which is reflected by these two scenarios is driven by the objective 
of developing a low-carbon, secure and affordable electricity system. To this end, costs 
and technology diversity are important in determining the direction of the energy system 
development. A modelling framework underpinned by a system of constraints on 
technology deployment as well as a least-cost and emission abatement approach has a 
great significance in developing insights for low-carbon electricity generation futures. 
These factors justifies the adoption of the EOC as the modelling tool for this research. 
3.3.11 Summary 
Different modelling approaches have been developed to characterise the evolution of the 
electricity supply infrastructure to a low-carbon future against the energy security and 
climate change policy objectives. These models have generated an array of scenarios, 
particularly in the power sector with a view to assessing the costs, trade-offs and pathways 
related to achieving long-term emission targets and energy security (Strachan et al., 
2009). The current modelling frameworks for the electricity generation sector such 
MARKAL, ESME and the EOC have sought to explore a least-cost technology mix that 
could be developed and deployed to achieve the emissions and energy security targets. 
Compared to other energy models, the EOC is less data intensive and it integrates up-to-
date policy developments to produce scenarios that reflects on the dynamics affecting the 
UK electricity generation sector.  
The energy models which underpin the current UK energy policy take a whole system 
approach in assessing the transition of the economy to a low-carbon future. However, 
scenario developments are limited in addressing the impact of variability of renewable 
energy technologies on decarbonisation and energy security. Renewable energy 
technologies along with CCS and nuclear are vital in driving the UK electricity supply 
sector to a low-carbon future. Given its focus on the electricity generation sector, the EOC 
addresses this research gap on intermittency by incorporating wind resource analysis in 
its modelling framework. By so doing the actual contribution of renewable energy 
technologies, particularly offshore wind to decarbonising the power sector and promotion 
of energy security is ascertained. 
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Chapter 4 Security of the UK electricity supply 
4.1  Introduction 
The security of electricity supply challenge is generally conceptualised on a wide range 
of timescales focussing mainly on the short, medium and long term risks. The risks to 
security of electricity supply portrayed in this chapter seek to explore the long-term 
policy, market and infrastructural influences likely to impact on the UK electricity supply 
infrastructure, with particular emphasis to 2030. The 2030 milestone is significantly 
important to the UK electricity supply development as it is considered to be the watershed 
mark by which the sector is expected to be decarbonised in order to guide the economy 
to a cost-effective path to the 2050 emission reduction target (CCC, 2013a; CCC, 2015; 
DECC, 2012g). Also, it is a crucial landmark period for the UK energy economy as it 
tests the resilience and dynamism of the UK energy systems and policy frameworks to 
respond and adapt to the challenges of severe capacity erosion due to plant closures as 
well as the need to link the low-carbon agenda with security of supply. 
The security of supply vulnerabilities linked to the UK electricity supply system have 
long been envisaged in the context of its predominantly fossil fuel based generation. The 
share of coal and gas electricity generation in 2014 accounted for 60% of the total supply 
output (DECC, 2015d), which underscores the country’s dependency on foreign fossil 
fuel supply sources. The dominance of the imported fossil fuel in the UK electricity 
generation system increases the potential for supply disruptions due to strategic risks 
associated with geopolitical instabilities or lack of investment in overseas supply 
infrastructure. However, the medium-term risk to the UK security of electricity supply in 
the period to 2030 is likely to be influenced by domestic system risks induced by the 
erosion of capacity margins following the anticipated closure of aging coal and nuclear 
power generation infrastructure as well as the increasing environmental concerns linked 
to climate change. The UK energy policy has been described as ‘inconsistent, incoherent 
and ineffectual’ following the UK government’s proposed ‘dash for gas’ to mitigate the 
potential energy crunch as aging nuclear and coal plants face closure (The Scottish 
Governmnet, 2015). The seemingly ‘start and stop’ approach which apparently 
characterises the current UK energy policy poses the greatest threat to security of supply 
as it breeds uncertainty, a development which only succeeds in driving away the 
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investment required to build the low-carbon electricity generation infrastructure that 
mitigates climate change and security of supply challenges.    
The constrained investment climate has made the operation of the existing UK gas 
generation fleet and the prospective investment in new gas plants uneconomic. As a 
flexible fuel that adapts well under a wide range of future policy directions, natural gas is 
likely to play an important role in the global energy mix. While the long-term future of 
the global gas prices remain highly uncertain, the prospects for new investment in new 
gas generation infrastructure in the UK electricity generation portfolio remains unknown. 
The increase in the amount of intermittent renewable energy resources in the generation 
mix in the period to 2030 is likely to weaken the investment appetite for new gas plants 
due to the reduction in gas plant operational hours as output from renewables increases. 
Thus, a new energy policy landscape set to be driven by new gas plants (DECC, 2015a) 
carries a high risk to security of electricity supply unless the UK government intervenes 
by incentivising gas generation heavily in order to promote investment. 
The phase-out of coal-fired electricity generation earmarked for 2025 could also 
strengthen the business case for the development of new gas plants as the prospects for 
profitability in the gas electricity generation sector could be heightened if coal is 
completely eliminated from the generation mix. A coal phase-out by 2025 could widen 
the gap between supply and demand if a quick response by government to promote gas, 
biomass and other fuels is not prioritised within the existing policy. Therefore, clarity and 
stability in the direction of the energy policy framework is vitally important, least the 
uncertainty over the future of the existing coal fleet could become another source of risk 
for the security of energy supply for the UK. 
The challenge of guaranteeing security of supply in the UK electricity supply system is 
becoming more complex as the de-rated capacity margins continue to shrink as a result 
of continued plant closures. New nuclear power development through the 2020s is 
projected to increase and combine with the new gas generation fleet to ameliorate any 
potential energy security risks following the capacity crunch created by the closure of 
aging coal and nuclear plants. While nuclear energy deployment could certainly provide 
a secure, baseload source of low-carbon electricity, progress in the development of a fleet 
of new nuclear plants remains worryingly slow due to the limited number of possible 
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developers as well as the financial and commercial challenges of delivering new nuclear 
reactor designs. Taking into account the long technical and investment timescales for 
nuclear plant development, no new plant has yet received a final investment decision. 
This implies that there is a potential that no new nuclear plant could be commissioned by 
2030, thereby putting the electricity delivery system at serious risk. At the backdrop of 
these security of supply risks, this chapter introduces alternative scenarios to explore the 
UK security of electricity supply phenomenon in the context of the recently unveiled new 
UK energy policy (DECC, 2015a) as well as on the assumption that the future dynamics 
in the energy markets could remain unfavourable for investment in modern gas plants by 
2030. Also, attention is focused on how the new UK energy policy could potentially be 
reframed in order to align the sector and the economy in its entirety with the 2050 
emission reduction target.  The following sections explore the implications of the 
technology, investment and decarbonisation uncertainties on the security of electricity 
supply challenge by 2030.  
4.2 The UK new energy policy ‘reset’ 
Concerns over the security of electricity supplies in the UK have prompted the policy-
makers to redefine the UK energy policy objectives. As the buffer between supply and 
demand is projected to continue to ebb away in the midst of plant closures, the UK 
government is planning an accelerated rollout of new modern gas and nuclear plants 
through the 2020s to replace the dwindling capacity levels as well as bolster security of 
supply (DECC, 2015a). The new campaign to fast track the rollout of a fleet of modern 
gas generation infrastructure is proposed at a time when the investment climate for gas-
fired generation remains uneconomic to attract any potential investors due to rising 
distribution, transmission and operating costs and environmental levies. However, this 
new gas plant development initiative, which is central to the UK security of supply 
challenge coincides with the prolonged slump in oil and gas prices which could 
potentially act as one of incentives that could attract investment to bring forward the new 
gas plant development aspired by the new UK energy policy. While the UK government 
remains committed to the 80% greenhouse gas emission reduction target by 2050, the 
announcement for the potential phase-out schedule for coal by 2025 is set to improve the 
investment climate for new gas plants. The removal of coal as a competing fossil fuel in 
the generation mix and the creation of a favourable capacity market mechanisms for gas 
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could reduce the delivery cost for new gas plants, and thus assist in achieving the delivery 
of between 15 and 30 GW of new gas generation capacity by 2030 as envisaged by the 
UK government (Aldridge, 2015).  
While the phase-out timeline for the current fleet of old coal plants has been determined, 
there is growing concern that the new fleet of nuclear power plants is not likely to be built 
to schedule. Contrary to the UK Nuclear Industry’s ambition to deploy 16 GW of new 
nuclear capacity by 2030 (HM Government, 2013b), no FID has been received for the 
new nuclear capacity which is required to address the capacity crunch created by plant 
closures through the 2020s. In addition to this, the long planning and building times, 
coupled with the extremely high capital costs associated with new nuclear projects (Royal 
Academy of Engineering, 2015) could make it highly unlikely that more than one new 
nuclear plant is added to the UK generation mix by 2030. The potential stall in new 
nuclear build through the 2020s could put a dent on the UK decarbonisation aspirations 
for both its carbon budgetary requirements as well as the 2050 decarbonisation target. 
The growing concern over the potential delay in the development and deployment of new 
nuclear power plants by 2030 is further worsened by a report warning that the closure of 
all existing coal and aging nuclear plants without immediate replacement capacity could 
leave Britain with a supply gap of 40-55 per cent by 2025 (Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers, 2016).   
Also linked to the new energy policy is the UK government’s decision to cancel the £1 
billion funding for CCS commercialisation programme (DECC, 2015e). This policy 
decision effectively implies that the development and deployment of the CCS capability 
in the UK industry and the electricity sector in particular could be delayed well beyond 
the initial 2020–2030 projected commercialisation timeline (CCC, 2015; DECC, 2012a; 
Pöyry, 2013). The absence of CCS in the generation mix by 2030 could compromise the 
UK decarbonisation aspirations, especially in a scenario where the deployment prospects 
for new nuclear could be as low as 3.2 GW, the only capacity representing the approved 
Hinkley Point C nuclear project (DECC, 2014g). The opportunity to use CCS applications 
in new coal and gas plants by 2030 to boost capacity levels is set to be missed as funding 
for CCS projects is prematurely withdrawn. The opportunity to ameliorate security of 
supply threats through the provision of baseload generation from coal, gas and biomass 
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plants retrofitted with CCS capability could be compromised following the UK 
government decision to cancel funding for CCS programmes. 
The future development of renewable energy under the new energy policy landscape 
remains uncertain, especially with the UK government’s decision to end the green 
subsidies for onshore wind and solar (DECC, 2015f; DECC, 2014d). The tendency by the 
UK government to frequently change or defer key policy decisions, particularly on low-
carbon and renewable energy sources, has become a worrying occurrence within the UK 
energy policy. This trend has had the impact of weakening investor confidence on a policy 
framework which could be perceived as inconsistent and lacking the edge to promote a 
supportive environment for the development and deployment of renewable energy 
technologies. The UK government’s commitment to the development and deployment of 
offshore wind, which is one of the key technologies expected to drive the security of 
supply and decarbonisation agenda of the new energy policy (DECC, 2015a), comes with 
financial strings attached. In unveiling the new direction of the energy policy, the UK 
government maintained that offshore wind would need to move quickly to cost-
competitiveness as no subsidies will be offered to the industry (DECC, 2015a). Thus, the 
role of offshore wind in the new UK energy policy is dependent on the rate at which it 
can compete with other renewable technologies within the CfD renewable energy 
auctions. In the event that the cost of offshore wind falls below the £100/MWh threshold, 
the UK government envisages that a potential capacity of 10 GW of offshore wind could 
be deployed through the 2020s (DECC, 2015a). The implications of the new UK energy 
policy on both security of electricity supply and on electricity sector decarbonisation are 
analysed in great detail in the following sections.  
4.2.1 Energy security and low-carbon electricity sector by 2030; the new UK 
energy policy  
In the context of the new UK energy policy framework described in Section 4.2, an 
electricity generation mix is developed using the EOC to assess the extent to which it 
addresses security of supply and decarbonisation objectives by 2030. The input 
parameters for the technology mix developed in this scenario are determined based on the 
deployment ambition projected in the new energy policy (DECC, 2015a) for key 
technologies such as coal, gas, nuclear and offshore wind. As for the other technologies 
within the mix, the deployment trajectories are drawn from UK energy policy projections. 
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The capex and opex outlined in Table 3.4 form part of the inputs computed in the model 
to develop this scenario. Electricity demand for 2030 is set at 344 TWh and as outlined 
in Table 3.2. In the absence of CCS technology in the generation portifolio coupled with 
severely constrained new nuclear power plant deployment by 2030, it is unlikely that the 
the electricity generation could achieve a 100 or 200 g/kWh carbon grid target This 
unabated gas dominated new UK energy policy generation mix is assessed based on a 
81.4 MtCO2e emission target. 
The level of deployment for the technology mix projected in this new energy policy 
shown in Figure 4.1 is assessed in the context of the investment, policy and other 
challenges facing the electricity generation sector. Therefore, the penetration of each 
technology in the generation mix is constrained by cost, emission factors and the 
technology build up rates set in the model as described in Section 3.3.2. Furthermore, the 
maximum deployable capacity for each technology is constrained using the physical 
installation limit and the installation constraint as described in Section 3.3.3 (see also 
Appendix A1).is determined. As a result, Figure 4.1 presents a least-cost and emission 
electricity generation mix that meets the targets and conditions that reflect on the outlook 
of the new UK energy policy by 2030.  
 
Figure 4.1. The potential installed generation capacity in the context of the new UK 
energy policy by 2030. 
The scenario portrayed in Figure 4.1 shows a generation mix by 2030 following the 
successful closure of coal and the majority of the aging nuclear plants. The technology 
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diversity assembled in Figure 4.1 is reminiscent of the UK government’s planned 
investment drive to encourage the construction of more gas-fired power plants. According 
to the Green Alliance (2011), the dash for gas generation of the 1990 was in the UK’s 
national interest, but a second dash for gas portrayed in Figure 4.1, would not be in the 
UK’s long-term interest  as it could raise the cost of meeting the nations carbon budgets. 
It is highly unlikely that a second dash for gas could afford the UK to meet its fourth and 
fifth carbon budgets earmarked for the 2023-27 and 2028-32 periods. The gas-fired 
generation deployment illustrated in Figure 4.1 could either lock the UK into higher 
carbon levels, or result in gas power stations investments of up to £10 billion being retired 
early or needing costly CCS retrofit if the plants are to be a source of baseload generation 
(Green Alliance, 2011). 
The technology outlay portrayed in Figure 4.1 underscores the first priority given to the 
security of supply as demonstrated by the dominance of CCGT plant generating capacity 
in the mix. Assuming that 10 of the current 28.9 GW total CCGT plant installed capacity 
in the UK electricity generation sector is retired by 2030 (CCC, 2015), 17.8 GW capacity 
of a fleet of new gas plants is added to the existing generation mix to achieve the 36.7 
GW of installed CCGT capacity shown in Figure 4.1. The build-up of the new CCGT 
plant capacity to the gas generation sector is in line with the 26 GW new gas capacity 
investment by 2030 which was projected in the Gas Generation Strategy (DECC, 2012c).  
The complete phase-out of coal, which is conspicuous by its absence from the generation 
mix in Figure 4.1, and the stall in the rollout of a fleet of new nuclear power plants could 
possibly have created ideal conditions for the renaissance in the new gas plant deployment 
by 2030. The uptake of renewable energy technologies, particularly wind and solar PV 
portrayed in Figure 4.1 is reflective of industries trying to cope with the reality of thriving 
in a competitive renewable market as expected by the UK government. The 19.7 GW 
capacity outlay for offshore wind by 2030, which is illustrated in Figure 4.1, is suggestive 
of the success of the CfD auctions in driving down the cost of renewable energy. 
According to the results of the CfDs allocation rounds respectively held in February and 
December 2015, the final auction price of £119 and £114 per MWh was achieved for 
offshore wind, which was well below the previously published strike price of £140/MWh 
(DECC, 2015c; DECC, 2013b), and thus confirming a significant fall in offshore wind 
costs. The era of increased price competition and the resultant fall in renewable costs is 
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likely to drive diversity in low-carbon energy technologies which are vitally needed to 
drive down emissions in the electricity generation sector in line with the 80 % emission 
reduction target by 2050.  
The decarbonisation capability of a generation mix dominated by unabated gas as shown 
in Figure 4.1 is quite debatable regardless of the view that gas is considered to be a cleaner 
source of energy than coal (DECC, 2012d). In the absence of ‘dirty’ coal, the combined 
emissions from gas CCGT plants and diesel generators could make it difficult for this gas 
driven energy policy to meet the fifth carbon budgetary requirements as prescribed by the 
CCC. A comparison of the emission performance of the new UK energy policy against 
the fifth carbon budget emission projections for the electricity generation sector shown in 
Table 4.1 shows the magnitude of the environmental penalty likely to be incurred as the 
UK electricity sector is revamped in order to attain the security of supply status. The 
cumulative carbon grid emissions for the new UK energy policy is 81.4 MtCO2e which 
is more than double the 2030 decarbonisation threshold of 31 MtCO2e projected by the 
fifth carbon budget assessment (see Table 4.1). The 31 MtCO2e emission output from the 
power sector provides an indicative target that could succeed in keeping the UK economy 
on the cost-effective path to the 2050 target (CCC, 2015). 
Table 4.1. The 2030 decarbonisation trajectory of the new UK energy policy mirrored against 
the fifth carbon budget scenarios (CCC, 2015). 
Scenario description   Grid CO2 intensity 
(g/kWh) 
Emission target by 
2030 (MtCO2e) 
Fifth Carbon Budget (Central scenario) 100 31 
Fifth Carbon Budget (‘Barriers’ scenario) 116 40 
New UK energy policy 236 81.4 
The quest for energy sovereignty sought by the new UK energy policy could lead to the 
development of an electricity supply system with a grid emission intensity of 236 
gCO2/kWh, which is comparative to the low deployment scenario developed by the Royal 
Academy of Engineering with an emission intensity of 234 gCO2/kWh by 2030 (Royal 
Academy of Engineering, 2015). The probability that this new UK energy policy could 
come short on the decarbonisation target is inevitable, especially in a case where CCS 
technology is not integrated into the generation mix to mitigate excessive emissions 
following an increase in the penetration of gas CCGT in the electricity supply system. 
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Although the diesel reciprocating engines ‘gensets’ could potentially act as peaking plant 
or augment the potential capacity deficit through the 2020s, the technology is known to 
be dirtier than coal with a carbon intensity of 1010 gCO2/kWh (Aldridge, 2015), which 
is far higher than the 488 gCO2/kWh (POST, 2011) for unabated CCGT plants. With just 
4.3 GW capacity of baseload generation from nuclear (see Figure 4.1), coupled with a 
considerable high intermittent renewable capacity within the generation mix, diesel 
‘gensets’ are operated at 13 % load factors, and thus the new energy policy emission 
contribution is pegged at 81.4 MtCO2e, which translates to a grid intensity of 236 
gCO2/kWh by 2030 based on the technology mix shown in Figure 4.1. 
While the existing domestic and regional policies, such as the EPS and IED, designed to 
penalise heavy polluters apply on installations above 50 MW (European Council, 2010; 
DECC, 2012c), this means that this threshold would not apply or affect diesel generator 
units. Therefore, the implications of a non-regulated diesel generator industry on 
electricity sector decarbonisation is catastrophic, especially if the economic environment 
for gas generation becomes constrained in any way or time in 2030. Under these 
circumstances, the proliferation of diesel ‘gensets’ which to some extent could be spurred 
by the low capital cost (Aldridge, 2015), could increase the risk of failure to achieve any 
decarbonisation target, even the 80 % economy-wide greenhouse gas emission target by 
2050. In any case, a carbon intensive electricity supply sector by 2030 is diametrically 
opposed to the decarbonisation rhetoric espoused by the Climate Change Act. The 
proliferation of these dirty ‘gensets’ and unabated gas CCGT plants would not be 
supported by the CCC who have consistently advocated for all forms of fossil fuel-fired 
generation to be fitted with CCS technology with the remainder of the unabated gas-fired 
plants providing back-up to intermittent energy sources. The presence and frequent 
operation of unabated coal and diesel fired generation in the mix by 2030 could 
undoubtedly increase carbon emissions, and thus endangering the carbon budgets.  
The closure of the aging coal and nuclear generating plants across the UK through the 
2020s would require the development of an electricity system that can respond to changes 
in the generating output. The UK government plans to provide secure and affordable 
electricity supplies for the future through the construction of new nuclear, gas and 
offshore wind. In bringing this plan to fruition, the UK government would need to take 
advantage of an integrated European Union energy markets through interconnectors to 
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supplement and balance intermittent electricity from renewable sources. Currently the 
UK interconnector capacity stands at 4 GW, which is about 4% of the installed capacity 
(Ofgem, 2014). The interconnector capacity outlay of 10.9 GW shown in Figure 4.1 
demonstrates the UK government’s commitment to access sustainable sources of 
electricity generation across EU energy markets, and thus assisting in mitigating and 
improving security of supply challenges. 
The increase in interconnectors in the electricity supply mix by 2030 as shown in Figures 
4.1 and Table 4.2 could be driven by the UK government’s decision to allow the supply 
system to participate in the capacity market auctions. Furthermore, the UK policymakers 
are keen to develop the country’s interconnector network in line with the EU target of 10 
% and 15 % of generation capacity to constitute interconnection by 2020 and 2030, 
respectively, (DECC, 2015e; European Comission, 2015). The interconnector 
development portrayed in Figure 4.1 equates to about 9.8 % of installed capacity by 2030, 
assuming that most of the planned interconnector projects tabulated in Table 4.2 are 
carried through to commissioning dates planned by developers.  
Table 4.2. Existing and future UK interconnectors to be integrated in the electricity 
supply mix by 2030 (Ofgem, 2014). 
Project Name Connecting Country Capacity (MW) Delivery/Estimated delivery 
date 
IFA France  2000 1986 
Moyle  Ireland 500 2002 
BritNed Netherlands 1000 2011 
EWIC Ireland 500 2012 
ElecLink France 1000 2019 
NEMO Belgium 1000 2019 
NSN Norway 1400 2020 
FAB Link France 1400 2022 
IFA2 France 1000 2020 
Viking Denmark 1000 2022 
Greenlink Ireland 500 2021 
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While UK electricity demand is projected to increase to reach between 30% and 100% 
by 2050 (DECC, 2012b), the electricity generation mix developed through the new UK 
energy policy could meet the 2030 electricity demand based on the generation distribution 
displayed in Figure 4.2. The bulk of the 344 TWh electricity demand projected for 2030 
(DECC, 2014i) is met by unabated gas which contributes 37% of the demand. An increase 
in the generation output of 16 %, 14 % and 9 % from offshore wind, interconnectors and 
nuclear power (see Figure 4.2) implies that the operational regime of gas generation sector 
is maintained at 41 % capacity factor to produce 130.5 TWh towards the electricity 
demand target. With over 48 % of the total CCGT installed capacity comprising of new 
gas plants, it is uncertain whether the implied 41 % capacity factor at which the gas plants 
are operated in this scenario could be profitable enough to allow investors to recoup the 
investment laid out for the new gas generation capacity without significant capacity 
payments.  
 
Figure 4.2. Electricity generation output from the new UK energy policy technology 
outlay by 2030.  
The marginal electricity generation contributions from other technology sources such as 
hydroelectricity and other emerging renewable energy technologies shown in Figure 4.2 
could be a welcome development in security of supply terms especially with constrained 
deployment in nuclear power plants in the generation mix by 2030. However, any increase 
in electricity supply from other technologies shown in Figure 4.2 could have the effect of 
reducing the operation regime of unabated gas generation, and thus impacting on the 
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profitability of the gas CCGT plants. The potential profit margins likely to be realised by 
the gas generation operators through capacity market incentives and the low gas prices 
could be eroded by the projected carbon price which is likely to be in the region of about 
£78/tCO2 by 2030 (DECC,2015j). However, since gas generation is at the centre of the 
new UK energy policy, the carbon floor price freeze of £18/tCO2 currently in place till 
the 2019/20 period (HM Treasury, 2014) could be extended up to 2030 in a bid to lower 
operational cost for CCGT operators. A policy initiative that uses carbon prices like some 
form of bait to entice and keep gas operators motivated to invest and support unabated 
gas generation in the generation mix runs the risk of compromising on some of the major 
policy objectives. Any attempt to keep carbon prices low in favour of gas generation 
without policies in place to effect a legal phase-out of coal generation could prove 
disastrous. This is because such policy could create favourable economic conditions for 
the continual operation of carbon intensive coal. Such a development would militate 
against the nation’s carbon reduction commitments embodied in the carbon budgets. 
4.2.2 New gas plant deployment fails to meet the 2030 target; implications to 
energy security and low-carbon supply system  
This section assesses the impact of the potential failure of the new UK energy policy to 
achieve the new gas and nuclear power deployment ambitions within the timeline at 
which aging coal and nuclear power plants are expected to close. At the backdrop of this 
severely constrained nuclear power and gas capacity penetration in the mix by 2030, the 
electricity generation mix likely to be assembled to resolve the electricity supply crisis 
could have far reaching implications on the key decarbonisation targets. The potential 
growth in the UK population, and the surge in the electrification of heating and 
transportation by 2030, is set to increase the demand for electricity. It appears that the 
new energy policy strategy is highly optimistic if not unrealistic to expect about 26-30 
GW capacity of a fleet of new gas plants to be built within a ten year period which happens 
to coincide with the anticipated plant closures (DECC, 2012e; Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers, 2016). In the midst of the current uneconomic market environment for gas 
generation sector, the future of the UK existing 28.9 GW gas installed capacity by 2030 
remains uncertain despite the indications that only 10 GW de-rated capacity could be 
closed by 2030 (CCC, 2015).  
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The scenario assessment developed in this section suggests that the ‘dash’ for new gas-
fired generation proposed by the new UK energy policy may not materialise by the time 
most of the aging coal and nuclear power plants are expected to close. The UK 
government has already run out of time to bring forth the ambitious new gas, nuclear 
power and offshore wind by 2030. A study by Gross (2015) on approaches to cost 
reduction in CCS and offshore wind pointed out that it takes about five years for a new 
wind farm or gas-fired power station to go through consenting and construction, and 
closer to a decade for new nuclear power stations or large offshore wind farms. The time 
needed to develop and deploy the technologies to meet the security of supply objectives 
of the new UK energy policy could prove to be a major stumbling block against this policy 
initiative. The deployment of gas-fired capacity to the tune of 26-30 GW by 2030 may be 
impossible in the context of the assessment made by the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers (2016) which suggests that in the past 10 years, the UK has built just four 
CCGT plants. The significance of timelines in the development of energy supply 
infrastructure cannot be understated. Therefore, at the backdrop of this assessment, it is 
almost certain that no more than one new nuclear plant will be commissioned by 2030, 
and that the large scale deployment of gas-fired generation may not happen in the period 
projected by the new UK energy policy. The analysis undertaken in this section adopts an 
alternative approach to the ambitious new energy policy to address the security of 
electricity supply concerns, but with severe implications on the UK decarbonisation 
targets.  
With the coal generation sector expected to close by 2025 (DECC, 2015a), the UK 
government is anticipating that the capacity market mechanisms could drive investment 
in new gas generation infrastructure to replace the capacity shortfall created during the 
2020s plant closures. However, the second capacity market auction held in December 
2015 failed to attract any investment in new gas-fired plant development required for the 
scope of the new energy policy. While commenting on the outcome of the December 
2015 capacity market auction, the environmental think-tank Sandbag (2015), noted that 
over 5 GW capacity of existing coal plants were awarded contracts, despite the UK 
government’s plans to phase out all coal generation by 2025. The first capacity market 
auction conducted in 2014 resulted in about 9.2 GW of existing coal securing capacity 
contracts to operate during the 2018-19 winter period (Littlecott, 2015). The apparent 
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inconsistencies within the capacity market mechanisms has simultaneously granted coal 
plant operators the means not only to comply with the EU emissions limits, but also to 
consider the prospects for plant life extensions for the existing coal fleet. At the backdrop 
of this financial enabling climate for the existing coal plants, it is reported that seven 
stations have elected to sign-up to the EU’s IED limits rather than apply to opt-out 
(Stacey, 2016). This is a demonstration of confidence by the coal utility operators that the 
level of uncertainty inherent in the UK short and medium-term energy policy could bring 
financial dividends to a sectors which could potentially be destined for extinction within 
the UK electricity supply landscape.    
An investment outlay to the tune of £293 and £80 million was awarded to the existing 
fleet of coal plants during the 2014 and 2015 capacity market auctions (Sandbag, 2014, 
2015). The revenue generated through the capacity market auctions could contribute 
significantly towards the generation of the capital investment required to purchase and 
retrofit the abatement technology necessary to comply with the IED regulations as well 
as to undertake plant life extensions work. The IED requires industrial plants, including 
the existing UK coal plants to limit the emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen 
oxides (NOx) and particulate emissions (pm10) based on the total rated thermal output of 
the plant and the type of fuel used as outlined in Table 4.3. The existing UK coal-fired 
stations have a generation capacity of over 300 MW with NOx levels currently pegged at 
around 500 mg/Nm3.  
Table 4.3. The emission limit values (mg/Nm3) for coal-fired plants as set out in 
Annex v of the IED (European Council, 2010). 
Total rated thermal 
output (MW) 
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) Nitrogen (NOx) Dust (pm10) 
50 - 100 400 300 30 
100 - 300 250 200 25 
>300 200 200 20 
Compliance with the IED emission values shown in Table 4.3 would require secondary 
post combustion abatement techniques in the form of selective catalytic reduction (SCR) 
or selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) or hybrid (SNCR and SCR). These 
abatement approaches are arguably the only methods by which coal plants can reduce the 
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emission limit values (ELV) from 500 to 200 mg/Nm3 (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2014). The 
SCR and SNCR abatement technologies have a NOx removal rate of about 40 % and 80 
%, respectively relative to the 56 % required to achieve the IED’s stipulated ELV of 200 
mg/Nm3 illustrated in Table 4.3 (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2014; European Council, 2010). 
Therefore, since SCR alone is incapable of achieving the IED mandatory ELV post 2016, 
this implies that an integrated hybrid SCR/SNCR retrofit configurations would have to 
be considered for the existing UK coal fleet in order to achieve ELV beyond the 
mandatory limits highlighted in Table 4.3.  
The coal utility operators that choose to comply with the IED would have to consider 
investing in the abatement technology with a scope to achieve ELV of about 200 mg/Nm3 
as from January 2016 (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2014). The cost estimate in Table 4.4 
reflects both the abatement technology and life extension cost for the coal plants that 
could allow the existing fleet of coal plants to continue supplying energy needs for the 
UK economy. It is envisaged that these plant upgrades could be partly financed using the 
funds generated from the operational contracts acquired through the capacity market 
mechanisms. Since the cost estimate shown in Table 4.4 is by no means prohibitive to 
further investment in existing coal fleet, the prospects for the continual operation of coal 
plants beyond the UK government’s 2025 closure timeline could compromise on the 
development of new gas generation infrastructure which is at the centre of the new UK 
energy policy. 
Table 4.4. The estimated cost of complying with the IED regulations and a ten year 
life extension of the existing UK coal power plants (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2014). 
Existing coal plant upgrades Medium Capex 
(£/kW) 
Medium Opex 
(£MW/y) 
Coal(Pulverised Fuel, ASC with FGD) Non-IED 1954 60602 
Coal (Pulverised fuel, ASC with FGD) with 
IED/SCR + Extension 
2101 65013 
Coal (Pulverised fuel, ASC with FGD) with 
IED/Hybrid SCR/SNCR + Extension 
2069 69119 
In the absence of explicit policies obliging coal generation to close, the ‘High CPS’, ‘Pro-
coal’ and No CPS’, scenarios developed to explore the potential future for coal generation 
by 2030 have respectively showed that a 5,9 and 11 GW unabated coal generation 
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capacity could be retained in the generation mix by 2030, (Gross et al., 2014). While the 
introduction of the carbon price support (CPS) could have made coal generation 
proportionally more expensive, the capping of the price escalator at 2015 levels to 2019 
has further thrown a lifeline to the future of coal generation at the expense of investment 
in new gas plants. The complete removal of the CPS could potential improve the 
attractiveness of gas generation, and thus assisting in luring the investment required to 
support the rollout of a new fleet of gas plants by 2025. The potential option to remove 
the CSP from the list of the EMR decarbonisation instruments to promote increased 
investment in new gas plants could further enhance and prolong the continuation of 
unabated coal generation in the mix unless coal closures are mandated by legislation. 
While the future of the CPS remains uncertain beyond 2020, the potential of this policy 
instrument being removed or further reduced from the £18/tCO2 capped level (HM 
Treasury, 2014) is highly unlikely as it risk bringing the UK government’s commitment 
to developing a low-carbon electricity sector under intense scrutiny. 
The electricity generation installed capacity portrayed in Figure 4.3 is representative of 
the electricity sector outlook in 2030, where the policy ambitions for new gas and new 
nuclear power plant deployment fails to achieve the milestone anticipated by the new UK 
government energy policy. It represents an electricity sector transition reflecting a 
catalogue of failures and miscalculations in framing the new direction of the new energy 
policy. The scenario narrative advanced by Figure 4.3 assumes that the UK government’s 
policy will fail to restrict funding on emission intensive coal and reciprocating diesel 
engines at the expense of low-carbon technologies such as gas, interconnectors and 
nuclear energy. As a result of these policy incoherencies, unabated gas installed capacity 
is mainly dominated by old gas plants with few new plants added to the mix. The 
technology deployment outlay demonstrated in Figure 4.3 is a departure from the new 
energy policy ambition which sought to see gas, nuclear and offshore wind energy as the 
key drivers in mitigating the security of supply challenge.  
Despite the stall in the development of new gas plants, progress in the development and 
deployment of offshore wind is evidently clear in Figure 4.3 where 22.2 GW is achieved 
by 2030. With about 5 GW offshore wind installed capacity currently in the UK 
generation supply system (RenewableUK, 2016), the industry has managed to build a 
total of about 17.2 GW capacity between now and 2030 as illustrated in Figure 4.3. This 
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implies that the offshore wind technology did manage to achieve cost-competitiveness at 
renewable CfD auctions, a stipulation which was emphasised during the unveiling of this 
new UK energy policy. The deployment outlay for offshore wind portrayed in Figure 4.3 
meets the UK government policy indicative estimates suggesting a total installed capacity 
of 10 GW by 2020 followed by another 10 GW deployment through the 2020s as the costs 
fall below the £100/MWh threshold (DECC, 2015a; The Crown Estate, 2012).  
 
Figure 4.3. The UK electricity generation mix outlook in 2030 for the alternative 
scenario to the new UK energy policy ambition.   
The withdrawal of financial support for onshore wind and solar PV during this transition 
period is assumed to have led to a 10.8 and 12.5 GW installed capacity by 2030, 
respectively. Given the delay in the development of new nuclear power generation plants, 
the contribution from onshore wind and solar PV is significantly vital to the collective 
goal of alleviating the potential security of supply challenges following unprecedented 
plant closures through the 2020s. In the context of onshore wind, the deployment 
trajectory by 2030 shown in Figure 4.3 implies that a capacity build of 2.3 GW was 
achieved relative to the current 8.5 GW installed capacity (RenewableUK, 2016a). The 
constrained growth in the onshore wind sector could be attributed to the withdrawal of 
green subsidies which is assumed to have had the effect of polarising investor attitudes 
towards investing in onshore wind projects. In the same vein, an 8.3 GW deployment 
capacity for solar PV recorded by the end of December 2015 (DECC, 2016) indicates a 
4.3 GW growth in the period to 2030 as shown in Figure 4.3. Based on the latest figures 
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and trends from DECC, the financial support mechanisms for solar PV from the beginning 
of 2014 to the end of 2015 resulted in staggering 152 % increase in the deployment of 
solar PV, that is from 3.3 GW to 8.3 GW (DECC, 2016). The UK government’s rationale 
for withdrawing solar PV subsidies was based on the understanding that the industry had 
achieved a competitive edge for it not to require any financial support from government 
in order to compete with other renewable technologies. However, based on the 
deployment estimate for solar PV shown in Figure 4.3, the withdrawal of financial aid for 
solar PV projects appears to have had undesired effects as only 4 GW is estimated to have 
been achieved in 14 years compared to 5 GW capacity growth in one year with subsidies 
in place.        
As the existing nuclear power plants decommission through the 2020s, the installed 
capacity shown in Figure 4.3 indicates the likely contribution from nuclear energy which 
is expected to comprise of 3.2 GW from Hinkley Point C new nuclear generation plant 
and 1.2 GW, a remnant generation capacity from the old nuclear fleet. The new CCGT 
renaissance referenced in the new UK energy policy and the UK nuclear industry’s 
estimated 16 GW new build programme by 2030 (DECC, 2015a; HM Government, 
2013b) is not likely to be achieved, as demonstrated in Figure 4.3. Assuming that new 
nuclear and gas plant capacity is not delivered as expected by 2030, the capacity deficit 
created could be resolved through the continual operation of the existing life-extended 
coal plants combined with the contribution from reciprocating diesel generators and 
interconnectors. The resurgence in the use of existing old coal plants could see about 6.7 
GW capacity operating by 2030, as highlighted in Figure 4.3. The availability of coal 
generation by 2030 in this scenario is assumed to have been necessitated by the failure of 
the new UK energy policy to deliver new nuclear and gas generation capacities to close 
the widening gap between supply and demand resulting from plant closures in the period 
to 2030.  
A glimmer of hope for the coal plant operators on the potential future use of a proportion 
of the existing coal capacity beyond 2025 was glaringly evident from the statement 
expressed in the new UK energy policy. In unveiling the new energy policy, the UK 
government indicated that it would proceed with the proposed 2025 closure timeline for 
coal plants if it is confident that the shift to new gas can be achieved within the proposed 
timescale (DECC, 2015a). The viability of coal generation capacity shown in Figure 4.3 
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is likely to have been facilitated by the assumed extension of the CPS cap of £18/tCO2 
applied during the 2015 to 2020 period (HM Treasury, 2014) to 2030. This policy shift is 
assumed to have originally been intended to encourage investment in the development of 
new gas infrastructure to ameliorate the energy security crunch created by increased plant 
closures through the 2020s. Assuming that the £18/tCO2 CPS level is retained through to 
2030 and the eligibility of coal plants to participate in capacity market auctions is 
maintained, this could still make the operation of existing coal plants economic during 
this period, and hence the deployment outlay portrayed in Figure 4.3.  
In the event that the deployment capacity for new nuclear and gas power plants is not 
delivered as expected by 2030, there is significant technology diversity within the 
generation mix to compensate for the capacity gap created (see Figure 4.3). Based on the 
technology mix portrayed in Figure 4.3, the lack of progress in the new nuclear and gas 
plant developments would not pose an immediate threat to security of supply. However, 
a mixed energy portfolio with a total installed capacity of 116 GW, with 32 % of that 
capacity comprising of unabated fossil generation could have huge implications on the 
UK carbon targets. The emission performance of the fossil fuel-fired technologies in 
Figure 4.3 is displayed in Table 4.5 and has huge implications on the electricity supply 
sector decarbonisation ambitions.   
Table 4.5. The emission performance of an alternative energy pathway to the new UK 
energy policy by 2030. 
Unabated fossil 
generation 
Installed 
capacity GW 
Load Factor % Emission 
gCO2/kWh 
Emissions 
MtCO2e 
Coal 6.7 0.37 990 16.2 
CCGT 19.9 0.5 488 42.1 
Diesel generators 7.2 0.13 1010 8.2 
Conventional CHP 2.9 0.33 488 3.7 
The shift in the new UK energy policy to a gas renaissance without the benefit of CCS 
signals a difficult future for the UK low-carbon economy. The potential failure of the new 
energy policy to bring forth the new gas and nuclear power plants and the advent adoption 
of the generation portfolio outlay indicated in Figure 4.3 by 2030 would make it difficult 
to comply with the emission budgetary requirements proposed by the fifth carbon budget 
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for the power sector. The emission output from the unabated fossil fuel sources shown in 
Table 4.5, account for 70.2 MtCO2e by 2030, which is 126 % of the  fifth carbon budget 
Central Scenario emission target of 31 MtCO2e of total emissions to be achieved by the 
power sector by 2030 (CCC, 2015). The emission output from CCGT operation alone is 
11.1 MtCO2e more than the entire budgetary requirement for the power sector. 
The operation of coal and reciprocating diesel engines at 37 % and 13 % capacity factors 
(see Table 4.5) produce a combined electricity output of 27 TWh, as illustrated in Figure 
4.4, but yet the total emission from these two technologies is over 50 % of the fifth carbon 
budget target for the power sector by 2030. The high carbon intensity of coal and diesel 
generators shown in Table 4.5 leads to an increase in the amount of carbon emissions 
from this scenario even though the electricity generation contribution towards the total 
demand is significantly low within the generation mix. In adopting a scenario with coal 
and diesel generators (see Figure 4.3) in the mix, it appears as if the UK government has 
limited options to present any sustainable generation mix to meet demand following the 
failure to achieve new gas and nuclear power deployment ambitions by 2030. This implies 
that the policymakers would have to face the long-term costs of meeting carbon targets 
and provision of affordable energy to consumers.     
 
Figure 4.4. The UK electricity generation output in 2030 for the alternative scenario 
to the new UK energy policy ambition. 
The proliferation of diesel generators is set to increase in the period to 2030 due to the 
limited policy mechanisms currently in place to constrain their operation. The diesel 
generation units in the UK generation mix are operated outside the capacity criteria for 
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regulating conventional electricity generating plants in the UK. The limited operational 
capacity and the annual average run times ensure that diesel generators fall below the EU 
ETS which is subject to installations with a total rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW 
(Environment Agency, 2013). In the context of the IED which seeks to limit air pollutants 
other than carbon emissions, diesel generators are not affected by this directive as they 
are operated far below the 500 hours derogation annual operational threshold which 
covers solid, liquid and gas-fired plants (Environment Agency et al., 2013). Also the 
regulatory immunity of diesel gensets extends to the EPS which limits the emission output 
of installations of over 50 MW to 450 gCO2/kWh (DECC, 2012c).  
With the exception of the CPS, the existing favourable regulatory and the financial 
arrangements through the capacity markets implies that diesel generators could contribute 
in mitigating security of electricity supply challenges despite being a greater source of 
carbon emissions. Despite the high penetration of diesel generator capacity in the system 
(see Figure 4.3) the electricity generation output of 8 TWh, shown in Figure 4.4, is 
consistent with their expected role of ‘peaking plant’. It is highly likely that the capacity 
factor for diesel generators indicated in Table 4.3 is indicative of a very serious capacity 
deficit in 2030 which could allow the generation units to run well beyond the normal 
peaking periods. With little regulatory constraints in place to restrict the operation of 
diesel generators, their role in the generation mix could be vital, especially where flexible 
technologies such as nuclear power and new gas CCGT plants encounter huddles in their 
deployment by 2030.   
The electricity generation from interconnectors reach 52 TWh from the 11.2 GW installed 
capacity in 2030 as shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. The potential 
interconnector capacity portrayed in Figure 4.3 is based on the assumption that the project 
pipeline outlay projected in Table 4.2 is achieved by 2030. Assessments made by the 
environmental think-tank, Sandbag (2015), on the last capacity market auction in 
December 2015 show that only 1.862 GW of de-rated capacity of old interconnector was 
awarded a 1 year contract to supply electricity. No new interconnector projects (see Table 
4.2) were awarded any contracts during this auction as the prices were not high enough 
to attract any bids from developers. However, the interconnector capacity portrayed in 
Figure 4.3 implies that the future capacity market auction prices would need to improve 
significantly if the 15 % of total electricity generation shown in Figure 4.4 is to be 
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realised. The development and improvement of a market for the interconnector electricity 
networks should be prioritised by the UK government, especially if the role of coal in the 
generation mix is to be significantly reduced. The interconnection capacity indicated in 
Figure 4.3 is in line with the view that greater levels of interconnection are generally 
associated with better security of supply. Hence, the electricity generation output from 
interconnectors demonstrated in Figure 4.4 would imply that all the new projects 
earmarked for development in the next 15 years (Table 4.2) would need to be supported 
in order to reduce security of supply risks as flexible gas and nuclear power fail to achieve 
deployment targets by 2030.  
The failure of the new UK energy policy to deploy significant new gas and nuclear power 
capacity by 2030 suggests a grim future on the decarbonisation stance that the United 
Kingdom harbours. Although the new nuclear power capacity is likely to increase after 
2030, the capacity of the sector to steer the UK economy on track to the 2050 emission 
reduction target by 2050 could be challenging. This is mainly because of the high 
deployment prospects of unabated gas following the eventual total phase out coal from 
the system after 2030. The prospects for a CCS era after 2030 depends on the 
government’s capacity and willingness to unveil comprehensive new CCS investment 
policies that could convince utility operators and other potential investors of their total 
commitment to decarbonisation. Following the UK government’s unceremonious 
abandonment of the CCS commercialisation programme, the indications are that the UK 
government is likely to find it extremely difficult to regain confidence and support from 
the industry and the investor community on future CCS related clean energy projects. 
The decarbonisation analogue projected by the two new energy policy pathways (Figures 
4.1 and 4.3) does not reflect any commitment to developing a clean electricity sector, a 
view which the UK government still harbours. However, a comparison of the emission 
performance of the new energy policy scenarios against the 2030 decarbonisation 
pathways in Figure 4.5 suggests a worrying future of the high probability of the electricity 
generation sector and potentially the entire UK economy missing both the 2050 emission 
reduction target and other international decarbonisation commitments. Based on Figure 
4.5, the total emissions from the two scenarios linked to the new UK energy policy 
account for over 80 MtCO2e compared to 34 MtCO2e for the ‘path to 100 g’ scenario 
which is highly recommended to keep the UK economy on track to the 2050 emission 
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reduction target. The total emission from the UK electricity generation sector was about 
203.5 MtCO2e in 1990 (DECC, 2014a). In the context of the 100 gCO2/kWh grid intensity 
for the electricity generation sector by 2030 which is being advocated by the fifth carbon 
budget (CCC, 2015) implies that the sector would have to reduce its emissions by 85 % 
of the 1990 level.   
 
Figure 4.5. A comparison of the emissions from the new energy policy scenarios 
against the decarbonisation pathways by 2030. 
The total emission output from the two new energy policy related scenarios portrayed in 
Figure 4.5 indicate that the electricity generation sector can only achieve an average of 
40% emission reduction against the 1990 level by 2030. The radical shift in the policy 
direction from a clean energy strategy seeking to achieve a 50 to 100 gCO2/kWh grid 
intensity to one which achieves about 236 g/kWh grid carbon intensity by 2030 is 
extraordinarily detrimental to the UK’s low-carbon energy future prospects. It is clear 
that the new UK energy policy focus on unabated gas as a driver of the UK electricity 
generation is at odds with the vision of developing a low-carbon economy. A ‘dash’ for 
new gas as proposed by the new policy framework could make it absolutely impossible 
to meet national emission targets affordably as this decarbonisation ambition by 2030 is 
dependent on the rollout of a diversified generation mix of nuclear, CCS and renewables 
with gas generation reserved for system balancing (Clarke, 2016). 
The fossil fuel dependency in the electricity sector is dominant in the ‘path to 200 g’ and 
the two new energy policy related scenarios as demonstrated by the high levels of 
emissions in Figure 4.5. The total emission outlay in Figure 4.5 is a result of the extent to 
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which unabated fossil fuel generation technologies shown in Figure 4.6 are employed to 
address electricity demand challenges against the aspirations for the low-carbon future 
energy systems. The level of CCGT emissions for the new energy policy scenario shown 
in Figure 4.6 is a result of the failure of new nuclear power plants to achieve the 
deployment capacity levels expected. However, assuming that 8.7 GW of new nuclear 
capacity was to be deployment by 2030, the gas renaissance pursued by the new UK 
energy policy would still achieve 66 MtCO2e with interconnector capacity reduced to 8 
GW. As the new UK energy policy stands, it is inconceivable that the emission 
performance of CCGT in Figure 4.6 could be aligned with the goal of achieving a new 
zero carbon emission electricity supply sector by 2050. 
An alternative scenario to the new energy policy has similar decarbonisation 
shortcomings despite the constrained penetration of CCGT by 2030. While the level of 
emissions in the alternative scenario is 22 MtCO2e less than in the new UK energy policy 
scenario, the difference is neutralised by the emission contribution from coal and diesel 
generators. As a result, the increased use of unabated fossil-fired generation plants in the 
alternative scenario to the new UK energy policy, and ‘path to 200 g’ scenario shown in 
Figure 4.6 is not compatible with the objective of developing a cost effective path to the 
2050 emission reduction target. 
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Figure 4.6. Comparison of the emission output from unabated fossil fuel generation 
across different scenarios by 2030. 
4.2.3 The new UK energy policy: the feasibility of a near zero emission power 
sector by 2050 
The evolution of the UK electricity generation sector under the new UK energy policy 
framework (DECC, 2015a) is set to miss the decarbonisation target of below 100 
gCO2/kWh by a very wide margin as shown in Figure 4.5. The focus of this section is to 
examine the changes that the UK government would have to adopt in its energy policy 
framework in order to realign it with the vision of developing an almost carbon neutral 
electricity sector by 2050. While the 2030 decarbonisation target is now beyond reach in 
the context of the protracted delays in new nuclear power deployment, abandonment of 
the CCS commercialisation programme and the cancellation of renewable energy 
subsidies, there is a need to reframe the current UK energy policy to urgently develop a 
new approach to CCS in order to maintain the momentum to meeting the long-term goal 
of reaching net zero emissions by 2050 (CCC, 2016). While CCS has been hailed as one 
of the key drivers in achieving cost-effective decarbonisation to 2050, analysis by the ETI 
estimate that a ten year delay in developing the CCS capability could add £4-5 billion per 
year to the cost of decarbonising the UK economy (Clarke, 2016). In reframing the new 
UK energy policy, a new approach to the development and rollout of the CCS 
infrastructure and capture projects in power, gasification and industry in the 2030s and 
the 2040s would have to be fast tracked in order to avoid substantially higher costs of 
meeting carbon targets beyond 2030 (CCC, 2016; Clarke, 2016).  
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Progress in the development and deployment of new nuclear energy plants is set to 
intensify through the 2030s. While the total deployment outlay to 2050 remains uncertain, 
the proportion of nuclear power projects outlined in Table 4.6 could provide an indication 
of the potential capacity estimate likely to be rolled out through the 2030s to bolster both 
security of electricity supply and decarbonisation objectives. The urgency to use new 
nuclear power to decarbonise the electricity sector and to enhance security and diversity 
of energy supply is clearly elaborated in the national policy statement (NPS) where the 
UK government identified eight suitable sites (see Table 4.6) for the significant 
development of new nuclear power plants earlier than the end of 2025 (DECC, 2011b). 
The ambition to  achieve a significant deployment capacity for new nuclear power before 
2025 was driven by the need to avoid the risk of the UK electricity supply sector being 
locked into a higher carbon energy mix as well as the associated difficulty and expense 
of meeting the decarbonisation carbon budgets (DECC, 2011b). Even though the target 
to develop more new nuclear power stations before the end of 2025 and 2030 has slipped, 
the mandate to work towards the 2050 emission target remains a legal obligation for the 
UK government to achieve. 
However, once the current financial hurdles affecting the first new nuclear power plant 
development (Hinkley Point C) are overcome, the prospects of an accelerated 
development and deployment of new nuclear power generation infrastructure on the sites 
already identified could be instrumental in tackling the emission legacy caused by the 
delay in achieving the low-carbon deployment targets by 2030. The prospects of higher 
electricity demand driven partly by population growth and the electrification of transport 
and heat from 2030 to 2050 could provide the impetus for the growth in the nuclear 
electricity sector. While the projected new nuclear power development considered in this 
thesis has been limited to the sites and capacity shown in Table 4.6, scenarios that 
informed the UK Government’s Carbon Plan in 2011 and the Fourth Carbon Budget 
indicated that a range of 23 to 55 GW of new nuclear power capacity could be required 
by 2050 under different cost and policy assumptions (Carbon Connect, 2014). A clear and 
stable policy framework is urgently required to promote a balanced approach in the 
deployment of nuclear, CCS and renewable energy technologies. This policy framework 
could facilitate a rapid reduction in emissions from 2030 through to 2050 to achieve an 
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almost carbon neutral sector commensurate with the 80 % emission reduction target 
relative to the 1990 levels.  
Table 4.6. Planned and proposed UK new nuclear power development (World Nuclear 
Association, 2015b). 
Proponent Site Reactor model Megawatts 
EDF Energy Hinkley Point C-1 EPR 1680 
 Hinkley Point C-2 EPR 1670 
 Sizewell C-1 EPR 1670 
 Sizewell C-2 EPR 1670 
Horizon Wylfa Newdd 1 ABWR 1380 
 Wylfa Newdd 2 ABWR 1380 
 Oldbury B-1 ABWR 1380 
 Oldbury B-2 ABWR 1380 
NuGeneration Moorside 1 AP1000 1135 
 Moorside 2 AP1000 1135 
 Moorside 3 AP1000 1135 
China Generation Nuclear Bradwell B-1 Hualong One 1150 
 Bradwell B-2 Hualong One 1150 
An enabling financial, planning and regulatory environment could successfully promote 
the delivery of 17.9 GW capacity of new nuclear power plants as shown in Table 4.6. 
This deployment outlay of new nuclear power infrastructure through the 2030s and early 
2040s is now dependant on the investors’ capacity to unlock the required investment on 
time for the nuclear projects to start. As the urgency to decarbonise the UK economy and 
the electricity supply sector deepens, the deployment trajectory for conventional large 
nuclear reactors portrayed in in Table 4.6 may not be sufficient to drive down emissions 
to near zero level by 2050. As a result, a renewed focus on new infrastructure 
development could extend to include new emerging technologies such as the small 
modular nuclear reactors (SMR). By virtue of being low-carbon technologies, these 
unconventional nuclear power plants could be harnessed to provide baseload electricity 
supply as well as contribute in narrowing the emission gap when used in combination 
with other low-carbon technologies.  
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In contrast to the conventional large nuclear power reactors, SMR have designs with a 
maximum capacity of 300 MW, and thus allowing for the components to be assembled 
in offsite factories and for the deployment of multiple reactors at the same site to form 
larger power plants (ETI, 2015). By virtue of their smaller physical size in comparison to 
conventional large nuclear reactors, SMR are believed to be quicker to build, a feature 
which could make them an attractive alternative solution to mitigate the UK potential 
supply deficiencies in the midst of plant closures through the 2020s. These characteristic 
hold the key for the prospective rapid development and rollout of this technology to 
mitigate the key electricity supply challenges facing the UK. However, the potential for 
SMR to achieve commercial readiness and rapidly move to full swing deployment is 
dependent on investor attitudes, the pace of the supply chain developments as well as on 
the extent to which the UK energy policy view the technology as an integral part of the 
UK’s nuclear energy and low-carbon agenda.    
The case for integrating SMR in the UK electricity sector is growing stronger, particularly 
at a time when key decarbonising technologies are either facing investment or political 
uncertainty. Analysis by the ETI suggests that the first commercial deployment of SMR 
power plants could be operating in the UK in the early 2030s, assuming that substantial 
challenges relating to supply chain development, investment and public acceptance are 
carefully addressed (ETI, 2015). The National Nuclear Laboratory (2014) feasibility 
study on SMR concluded that there is an opportunity for SMR to be integral to the UK’s 
nuclear energy and low-carbon agenda. One of the key benefits of the SMR technology 
is its ability to provide reliable baseload electricity, cogeneration of heat and electricity 
as well as energy storage capacity (ETI, 2015). It is envisaged that once the supply chain 
development hurdles are resolved and the SMR capability achieves commercial 
readiness, an annual build rate of 0.2 and 0.4 GW capacity could be achieved from 2032 
based on the ‘low’ and ‘mid’ deployment scenarios, respectively (ETI, 2015).  
The development of nuclear technology through this transition period could result in 36.8 
GW installed capacity by 2050 comprising of conventional nuclear and SMR plants as 
shown in Figure 4.7. The deployment outlay for the nuclear technologies shown in Figure 
4.7 is likely to be driven by the fall in the deployment cost for the technologies which by 
2050 would have reached maturity. By this period the levelised cost of electricity for 
SMR plants could reach £91/MWh based on the results from the EOC. This electricity 
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cost indicator for the SMRs is competitive to the £92.50/MWh awarded to the Hinkley 
Point C plant (DECC, 2014i) although the cost projections for these unconventional 
nuclear plants are still subject to change. The accelerated and sustained deployment of 
both conventional and SMR nuclear technology post 2030 is consistent with the ambition 
to decarbonise the electricity generation sector to a near zero carbon status by 2050. 
Again, the extent to which this ground-breaking technology can be fast tracked into the 
UK electricity generation mainstream is dependent on a consistent policy framework with 
a capacity to convince investors to invest in the development of the technology. Also, the 
UK government would need to maintain its appetite for the SMR technology by 
channelling financial resources towards further research and development for the SMR in 
order to bring down capital costs.     
 
Figure 4.7. The 2050 UK electricity generation mix developed following the 
reframing of the new UK energy policy leading to the accelerated low-carbon energy 
technology development after 2030. 
A surge in the deployment of offshore wind to achieve 32.8 GW by 2050 (see Figure 4.7) 
is a result of the technology having become competitive among the renewable energy 
sources. A reinvigorated UK energy policy racing to align economy-wide emissions to 
the legislated carbon budgets could promote the rapid growth of the offshore wind 
industry to achieve the £78/MWh LCOE by 2050 as the deployment outlay surpasses the 
30 GW mark as shown in Figure 4.7. The progress in the deployment of onshore wind 
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and solar PV shown in Figure 4.7 demonstrates a policy framework that accommodates 
and supports a diversity of technologies to accelerate emission reduction in the power 
sector and the economy as a whole. An increase in the deployment capacity of onshore 
wind in this renewed campaign to decarbonise the electricity sector (see Figure 4.7) 
compared to new UK energy policy (see Figure 4.1) could be a result of increased public 
acceptance in pro-onshore wind communities which could promote the development of 
wind. New legislative changes to be brought in by the Energy Bill 2015/16 targeting 
onshore wind could see the transfer of the existing consenting powers on large onshore 
wind projects of over 50 MW from the Secretary of State to the local planning authority 
(HM Government, 2015). As the final decision on the future development of onshore 
wind in England and Wales is distanced from the political influences and powers of 
Whitehall, this could increase the support and deployment of onshore wind, especially in 
communities that promote all forms of renewable technologies in the UK electricity 
generation system. 
The CCS capture readiness of the CCGT plants rollout by the new UK energy policy 
‘reset’ has the strategic advantage of facilitating the rapid deployment of CCGT fitted 
with CCS up to 2050 as depicted in Figure 4.7. A total of 23 GW capacity of CCGT plants 
are retrofitted with CCS infrastructure which by this time would have developed to 
significant economic scale to realise the economic as well as radical decarbonisation 
benefits. The development of the full CCS infrastructure cycle in its entirety by adopting 
the whole system approach (capture, transport and storage) could support the deployment 
capability demonstrated in Figure 4.7. The integration of CCS in biomass-fired plants to 
about 4 GW capacity could induce negative emissions in the whole abatement process, 
and thus further deepening the cuts in emissions to achieve a grid carbon emission target 
of 5 g/kWh based on the low-carbon technology portfolio depicted in Figure 4.7.  
The absence of unabated CCGT in the generation mix in 2050 (see Figure 4.7) could be 
a result of uneconomic operation environment, especially where much of the fossil fuel 
capacity could be operated below 10 % capacity factor threshold which could be unlikely 
to earn sufficient return in an electricity-only market to justify investment (CCC, 2014). 
The proliferation of interconnector networks by 2050 could result in 12 GW installed 
capacity (see Figure 4.7) which could be combined with the output from CCS generation 
plants to mitigate issues of intermittence and any demand uncertainty. Increased 
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investment in CCS technology following the reframing of the new UK energy policy 
means that 23 GW of the new gas capacity promoted by the policy is successfully 
retrofitted with CCS capability to bolster energy security needs as well as deep cuts in 
emissions.  
With the UK demand for electricity set to increase by 30 to 100 % by 2050 (DECC, 
2012d), the electricity generation outlay presented in Figure 4.8 has  the capacity and 
diversity to address any demand uncertainties that could arise as the system decarbonises. 
Based on an estimated 620 TWh electricity demand by 2050 following significant 
developments in the electrification of transport and heating, the bulk of this demand is 
likely to be supplied by gas CCS, nuclear generation systems, offshore wind and 
interconnectors. Conventional nuclear and SMR have a combined generation output of 
36 % of total demand while CCGT fitted with CCS and offshore wind contribute 23 and 
14 % of the total electricity generation by 2050, as shown by the electricity generation 
proportions in Figure 4.8, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.8. The 2050 UK electricity generation from the accelerated deployment of 
low-carbon energy technologies from the 2030s to 2050. 
The UK electricity generation portfolio in Figure 4.8 is solidly buttressed by a potential 
75 GW baseload capacity depicted in Figure 4.7 which could go a long way in meeting 
the power supply needs for economic development. The interconnector networks across 
the Europe that are integrated into the UK electricity supply network (see Table 4.2) could 
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potentially supply 8 % of the total electricity generation. The interconnector capacity in 
the mix could bring the much required flexibility to address the intermittent supply 
challenges likely to be induced by 86 GW capacity from renewable energy sources in the 
generation mix such as wind, solar and marine technologies. This contribution from 
interconnectors is assumed to come mainly from low-carbon sources which could be a 
timely contribution to system decarbonisation as it ameliorates the challenges of 
intermittent generation, especially with no unabated fossil fuel generation in the mix by 
2050. While the contribution from mature and third generation technologies, such a wave 
and tidal, appears to be insignificant compared to CCS, offshore and nuclear (see Figure 
4.8), their role in enhancing diversity in supply cannot be underestimated.      
4.2.4 The economic implications of a revised new UK energy policy on technology 
deployment post 2030 
The challenge to decarbonise the UK economy, and to keep it on track to the 2050 
emission reduction target, is highly dependent on the speed at which emissions are 
reduced in the electricity supply sector. The timely development and deployment of low-
carbon energy technologies in the generation mix is fundamentally important if a cost-
effective decarbonisation process is to be achieved in the power sector and in other sectors 
of the economy. The cost of developing a low-carbon electricity sector is influenced by a 
wide range of factors, but continuity in the energy policy framework is essentially vital 
in attracting investors as well as de-risking investments in the energy sector. The lack of 
coherence, stability and clarity in any energy policy framework seeking to balance the 
challenges of sustainability, security and affordability has a potential to increase the cost 
of attaining these policy priorities. As the timelines for achieving the deployment of 
essential low-carbon energy technologies, electricity supply sector decarbonisation 
targets and the carbon budgets by 2030 are set to be missed by a wider margin, a revised 
energy policy strategy to steer the UK economy, and indeed the electricity supply sector 
back on track to the 2050 emission reduction target could have huge economic 
implications.  
An accelerated low-carbon energy technology transition from 2030 to 2050 could 
culminate in the installed generation portfolio shown in Figure 4.7 with the capability to 
align with the carbon budgets and the 80 % emission reduction target by 2050. Since the 
results of the electricity generation infrastructure evolution by 2050 depicted in Figure 
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4.7 is a product of a delayed and fast tracked decarbonisation process, the low-carbon 
investment implications are assessed in the context of the total capital investment outlined 
in Figure 4.9. Before the UK government revised its energy policy framework, it was 
suggested that an estimated £200 billion investment was required to deploy 45 GW of 
low-carbon energy capacity between 2014 to 2030 to achieve a carbon intensity of 50 
gCO2/kWh by 2030 (CCC, 2013a). A policy departure from the target of decarbonising 
the electricity supply sector from 2014 to 2030, to one seeking to pursue an accelerated 
alternative to achieve a near zero grid carbon intensity by 2050 would require an 
investment outlay of £237 billion for the generation portfolio assembled in Figure 4.7. 
Through this radical emission reduction campaign after 2030, investment in conventional 
large-scale nuclear reactors could potentially reach £56 billion for the estimated 19 GW 
deployable capacity by 2050. Similarly, a total rollout of 19 GW of SMR could be 
achieved through an investment portfolio of £73 billion taking the total nuclear power 
investment to £130 as shown in Figure 4.9. 
  
Figure 4.9. The low-carbon and renewable energy investment portfolio for an 
accelerated electricity supply sector decarbonisation from 2030 to 2050. 
A delay in the deployment of CCS in the electricity generation beyond 2030 is estimated 
to have the potential to increase the cost of carbon abatement to the UK economy. There 
are suggestions that stronger and comprehensive regulatory frameworks and schemes, 
such as the a carbon price should be sufficient to incentivise and accelerate CCS 
deployment in the power sector (Lipponen et al., 2011). According to the analysis 
performed by the ETI, a delay in CCS development and deployment could increase the 
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longer term decarbonisation cost by about £4-5 billion per year, especially if CCS is rolled 
out after the 2030s (Clarke, 2016). The CCS installed capacity outlay projected in Figure 
4.7 could require a total of £33 billion reflecting all retrofitted applications on gas and 
biomass plants (see Figure 4.9). The rapid development of the renewable energy sources, 
particularly offshore is critically important in contributing towards a rapid decline in 
emissions in the period to 2050.  
Based on the simulations undertaken to develop scenarios for this thesis, the rapid 
development of offshore wind could trigger a fall in the deployment cost to £78/MWh by 
2050, making it significantly cost competitive among mature renewable energy 
technologies at the CfD auctions. The decline in the industrial costs for offshore wind 
projected in 2050 is in line with the high offshore wind scenario which predicts a fall in 
costs to around £95/MWh through the 2020s based on the central demand and a 
decarbonisation assumption of 100 gCO2/kWh by 2030 (HM Government, 2013b). Based 
on this indicative LCOE trajectory of £78/MWh, the deployment outlay for offshore wind 
(see Figure 4.7) could amount to £23 billion, and thus taking the total renewable 
technology capital input resource to about £74 billion as shown in Figure 4.9. 
Developments in onshore wind and solar are slightly constrained in this scenario, and thus 
their capital costs respectively amount to 8 and 11% of the overall renewable energy 
capital investment compared to 32 % for offshore wind.  
4.3 Summary  
The UK requires a balanced energy policy framework that meets security of supply and 
environmental sustainability particularly in the period to 2030. The imminent closure of 
coal and aging nuclear power plants through the 2020s could potentially create a supply 
gap of 45–55 % (Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 2016). The new UK energy policy 
(DECC, 2015a) which is set to be driven by gas and nuclear power plants may not achieve 
the deployment targets anticipated to meet security of supply and decarbonisation 
objectives. The potential failure by the new UK energy policy to address the capacity 
crunch through the 2020s could prolong coal generation in the mix beyond the 2025 
phase-out date (DECC, 2015a). This could compromise on the decarbonisation agenda 
especially in the absence of CCS in the generation mix.  
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The scenarios developed in this research show that the new UK energy policy may not 
achieve the 4th and 5th carbon budget requirements (CCC, 2013a; CCC, 2015). An 
alternative scenario which retains coal and diesel generators could meet the electricity 
demand at the expense of 81.4 MtCO2 cumulative emissions by 2030. Therefore, the UK 
new energy policy would need to be revised in order to reconnect with the ethos of the 
Climate Change Act which seeks to build a strong link between security of supply and a 
low-carbon electricity supply system. A revised energy policy framework which 
promotes an accelerated deployment of CCS, conventional and SMR nuclear plants and 
renewable energy technologies after 2030 could assist in developing a near zero carbon 
grid intensity electricity generation sector by 2050. This twenty year decarbonisation 
campaign could be achieved through a £237 billion investment.               
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Chapter 5 The UK Shale gas development and its implications 
on the electricity supply system  
5.1  Introduction  
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the potential impact of the UK shale gas 
development on the electricity sector as it transitions towards a low-carbon future by 
2050. This assessment is performed in the context of three decarbonisation frameworks 
that are likely to be adopted by the UK government by 2030 as it seeks to drive down 
GHG emissions within the electricity generation sector. The shale gas phenomenon and 
its likely impact on electricity generation, and indeed on the UK energy policy is explored 
under the 50, 100 and 200 gCO2/kWh potential decarbonisation targets likely to be 
legislated by 2030. The scenarios developed under these decarbonisation frameworks 
incorporate both conventional and unconventional gas in electricity generation with the 
view of exploring the potential role of shale gas in the generation mix and its wider 
implications on policy, technology and the economics of steering the electricity sector on 
the path to the 2050 target as well as in supporting emission reductions in other sectors 
of the economy.  
The shale gas ‘revolution’ in the United States has resulted in a coal-to-gas fuel electricity 
switching facilitated by high volumes of gas produced from shales and other 
unconventional reserves (Rogers, 2011). Following the boom in unconventional gas 
production in the US, the proportion of electricity generated from gas has increased from 
18.8 % to 24.8 % whilst that from coal declined from 49.6 % to 42.2 % in the period 2005 
to 2012 (Broderick & Anderson, 2012). Although the US experience in the 
unconventional gas development and its implications on the energy system are not likely 
to be replicated in the UK, comparative analysis presented in this chapter seek to explore 
the role of conventional and unconventional gas in electricity generation under the three 
decarbonisation frameworks. In the absence of coal in the generation mix by 2030, the 
focus of this chapter is devoted to assessing the impact of conventional and 
unconventional gas on the development and deployment of low-carbon energy 
technologies required to steer the UK economy on the path to the 80 % emission reduction 
target by 2050. A detailed assessment of the implications of using either conventional or 
unconventional gas on low-carbon energy technology uptake under the different 
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decarbonisation ambitions is explored in the following subsections. The extent to which 
gas fossil resources are utilised in electricity generation under the three decarbonisation 
pathways could have significant impacts on renewable energy and low-carbon technology 
investments. The focus of this chapter is to quantify the level of low-carbon and 
renewable energy technology development and the investment that could potentially be 
realised under scenario assessments constructed based on the 50, 100 and 200 gCO2/kWh 
grid intensity targets with natural and shale in the generation mix. It is through these 
scenarios that the impact of the shale gas development on the electricity supply system 
and the future direction of the UK energy policy can be characterised in the context of the 
decarbonisation rhetoric set for 2030.   
5.2 Conventional and unconventional gas use in electricity 
generation  
The CCC suggested that any path to an 80 % emission reduction target by 2050 requires 
that the electricity generation is almost entirely decarbonized by 2030 (CCC, 2013a). 
Therefore, the ‘path to 50 g’ decarbonisation framework seeks to reduce the carbon grid 
intensity from the current 500 g/kWh to 50 g/kWh by 2030 (CCC, 2010). Decarbonising 
the electricity sector is viewed as the most effective way of rapidly reducing emissions as 
it reduces pressure on other sectors of the economy to decarbonise. On the other hand, 
the ‘path to 100 g’ decarbonisation target is perceived by government as ‘Plan B’, a 
pathway likely to be adopted if low-carbon energy technology costs fall less quickly than 
anticipated or achievable technology build rates are lower than expected (CCC 2013c). 
A 200 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target by 2030 is another emission reduction path that 
has been used by the government to inform the energy policy, particularly on the future 
role of gas in the generation mix (DECC, 2012c). The recent shift in the energy policy 
sets energy security at the top tier of the UK energy policy objectives, and thus presents 
gas as a technology that could define the energy supply landscape for the UK future 
because of its assumed capacity to mitigate electricity demand and climate change 
challenges (DECC, 2015). The official position of the UK government with regards to 
the direction of the new energy policy is that of building more gas and nuclear plants and 
maybe offshore wind provided deployment cost comes down (DECC, 2015). In the 
context of this new energy policy paradigm, the case for including a 200 gCO2/kWh 
pathway by 2030 within the decarbonisation frameworks can be contemplated. However, 
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the prospects of steering the power sector on a cost-effective path to 2050 is inconceivable 
under the 200 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target.   
At the backdrop of the anticipated nuclear and coal power plant closures by 2023 and 
2025 (World Nuclear Association 2015a; DECC 2015a), the prospects of adopting a 200 
gCO2/kWh grid intensity by 2030 is becoming highly likely, especially in the absence of 
an immediate replacement capacity in the form of new nuclear power, gas, offshore wind 
and CCS development. However, the 200 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target by 2030 
could hardly come as a surprise to the UK energy policy discourse as it was used to inform 
and support the UK government’s position in projecting the importance of gas in the UK 
future electricity supply system (DECC, 2012c). 
Also, it can be argued that with the increased phase-out of renewable energy subsidies on 
onshore wind and solar PV (DECC, 2015c; DECC, 2015b), the prospects of achieving 
deep cuts in emissions by either 50 or 100 gCO2/kWh by 2030 could be highly ambitious, 
and hence the inclusion of a 200 gCO2/kWh grid intensity as a potential decarbonisation 
target likely to be adopted in the power sector by 2030. All the scenario assessments 
presented in this thesis incorporate the impact of the cost of carbon as projected in the 
carbon price floor (CPF) up to 2030. As a mechanism designed to drive investment in 
low-carbon and renewable energy technologies, the inclusion of the CPF as one of the 
key input parameters in the scenario assessments could assist in determining the level of 
low-carbon technology penetration in the UK electricity generation mix. Also, the high 
carbon cost projected to 2030 could play a vital role in assessing the attractiveness of gas 
use in unabated gas plants for electricity generation.     
5.2.1 Electricity generation transition under the 50 gCO2/kWh trajectory 
For the purpose of this thesis, scenarios used in this assessment are named based on the 
nature or type of gas resource used in electricity generation and the decarbonisation 
trajectory pursued. Hence scenarios seeking to achieve a carbon grid intensity of 50 
g/kWh using natural or shale gas are referred to as Natural Gas 50 (N/Gas50) or Shale 
Gas 50 (S/Gas50). On the other hand, scenario assessments adopting a 100 or 200 
gCO2/kWh grid intensity using natural or shale gas are identified as Natural Gas 100 or 
200 (N/Gas100, N/Gas200) and Shale Gas 100 or 200 (S/Gas100, S/Gas200), 
respectively. These scenarios are used to define the evolution of the UK electricity 
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generation landscape under the influence of a policy framework that incorporates shale 
gas use in the electricity supply systems.   
Transition pathways under the 50 g/kWh decarbonisation framework are projected from 
2010 to 2050 with a view to explore the level of technology development, investment and 
emission reduction trends resulting from the use of shale gas in electricity generation. The 
transition of the UK energy generation sector is examined based on the 2020, 2030 and 
2050 milestones which are important landmarks defining the UK energy policy. These 
milestones respectively represent the EU renewable energy target, the decarbonisation of 
the electricity supply sector and the 2050 emission reduction target. Therefore, it is 
important to trace the evolution of the UK electricity supply sector based on these 
important landmarks. In the context of this transition framework, Figure 5.1 shows the 
development of the UK electricity generation sector under the ‘path to 50 g/kWh’ carbon 
grid intensity by 2030 with unabated natural gas in the generation mix. The low-carbon 
and renewable energy deployment in the N/Gas50 scenario respectively account for 9.9 
and 46.4 GW in 2020. The penetration of renewable energy technologies reach 42 % of 
the total installed capacity, which surpasses the 15 % renewable energy target set by the 
EU to be achieved by the UK energy supply sector. The low-carbon technology capacity 
outlay during this period remains low as CCS is still at demonstration stage. 
 
Figure 5.1. The installed electricity generation capacity–N/Gas50 scenario. 
However, as the countdown to sector decarbonisation and a near zero emission target by 
2030 and 2050 is respectively approached, the level of low-carbon and renewable energy 
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deployment increases to reach 103.5 and 158.9 GW, as shown in Figure 5.1. The 
deployment outlay for low-carbon and renewable electricity generation technologies 
achieved in this scenario is a result of the 17 GW and 86.5 GW, 43.8 and 115.2 GW 
capacity deployment in 2030 and 2050, respectively as highlighted in Figure 5.1. In 
response to this ground-breaking low-carbon and renewable energy development (in 2030 
and 2050), the electricity supply sector achieves a 50 and 3 gCO2/kWh intensity as shown 
by the emission trend in Figure 5.1. The dominance of low-carbon and renewable energy 
technologies through this transition period reduces the operation regime of unabated gas 
plants in the mix, and hence the achievement of the emission targets set. High volumes 
of low-carbon and renewable energy deployment during this transition period capture the 
results of a low-carbon driven policy framework which seeks to balance the requirement 
to mitigate climate change while ensuring security of supply and the provision of 
affordable electricity to consumers. The technology deployment presented in Figure 5.1 
characterise a policy undertaking which embraces the “trilemma of energy sustainability” 
devoted to promoting energy security, social security and environmental impact 
mitigation (World Energy Council, 2012). 
The S/Gas50 scenario shown in Figure 5.2 follows a similar trend to that displayed in 
Figure 5.1. The technology development is similar up to 2020 as both pathways use 
natural gas in their generation portfolio as shale gas is presumably under exploration. 
Renewable energy technology deployment in 2020 results in 46.4 GW of installed 
capacity with offshore and onshore wind accounting for 72.6 % of the renewable energy 
technology build-up. The substantial surge in offshore wind (18 GW) during this period 
is consistent with the notion that such a level of deployment could assist the UK in 
meeting the EU 2020 renewable energy target (Heptonstall et al., 2012). In 2030 and 
2050, the S/Gas50 scenario has a cumulative low-carbon and renewable energy 
penetration of 101.9 and 159.1 GW capacity, respectively. There is a 1.7 GW renewable 
energy installed capacity difference between N/Gas50 and S/Gas50 which is simply 
induced by the reduced emission factor and fuel cost applied on shale gas. In both 
scenarios, unabated gas generation is extremely curtailed due to the deep cuts in emissions 
that is required to achieve the 50 gCO2/kWh by 2030 as highlighted in Figures 5.1 and 
5.2. 
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In the absence of high carbon intensive coal in the UK electricity generation mix, 
electricity generation plants using unabated conventional and unconventional gas operate 
at very low load factors in the order of 6 to 8 % for the scenarios seeking to achieve a 
decarbonisation target of 50 gCO2/kWh by 2030. Meanwhile, CCGT plant capacities in 
N/Gas50 and S/Gas50 scenarios remain significantly high, that is, 22.6 GW and 22.9 GW 
as depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The unabated gas capacity portrayed under this 
emission reduction framework is reserved for the provision of reliable and flexible back-
up supplies to mitigate high levels of intermittent generation in the mix (CCC, 2010). The 
low-carbon and renewable energy technology outlay for the two scenarios is almost 
identical, which suggests that the inclusion of shale gas in the electricity generation 
system would not change the technology deployment ambition or dynamics required to 
achieve deep cuts in emissions by 2030.  
 
Figure 5.2. The installed electricity generation capacity–S/Gas50 scenario.  
The introduction of incentive mechanisms in the form of Renewable Obligation (RO), the 
exception from climate change levy (CCL) and feed-in-tariffs (FiT) appears to have 
combined to boost the level of deployment of offshore wind in the UK (Toke, 2011). The 
favourable investment climate for renewable energy technologies has also been 
promulgated by a favourable consenting system driven by The Crown Estate (TCE) which 
owns and leases the near-shore and offshore sea bed up to 12 nautical miles in the UK to 
offshore wind developers (Mani & Dhingra, 2013). In view of this enabling environment 
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for offshore wind development, 32 GW installed capacity is deployed in the two scenarios 
by 2030, which is within reach of the government’s ‘best case’ deployment scenario 
estimated at 39 GW which is also projected in the same period (RenewableUK, 2013).   
However, the policymakers appear to have a different perspective on the role of unabated 
gas vis-à-vis intermittence beyond 2030. The UK government’s policy position appears 
to be that which sees gas as continuing to play an important role in the energy mix well 
into and beyond 2030 and not only restricted to providing back up to renewables” (CCC, 
2012). The adoption and implementation of such a policy perspective could potentially 
compromise on the wider commitment to decarbonise the energy system as well as on the 
objective of promoting rapid emission reduction commensurate with keeping global 
temperature within 2 oC of pre-industrial levels. Nonetheless, electricity generation output 
from unabated gas plants portrayed in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 contradicts the government’s 
position and aspirations on gas as it mirrors the expected contribution of gas in an 
electricity generation infrastructure sector seeking to achieve a near carbon neutrality by 
2050. In view of the technology diversity exhibited in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the electricity 
generation sector is almost carbon neutral in the period leading to 2050 as the renewable 
energy installed capacity reaches 115 GW, while the low carbon technologies grow to 
reach 43.8 GW in the ‘path to 50 g’ scenarios. This technology combination presented in 
this decarbonisation framework would literally squeeze out carbon emissions from the 
electricity sector, thereby allowing the electricity generation infrastructure to achieve a 
grid carbon intensity of 3 g/kWh in 2050 (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).  
The rollout of onshore wind in N/Gas50 and S/Gas50 respectively achieves a 15.7 GW 
growth by 2020 and a 20.1 GW and 19.5 GW growth by 2030, as highlighted in Figures 
5.1 and 5.2. The deployment milestone achieved in this technology during this transition 
period to 2030 is a result of the abundant wind resource in the UK and the maturity and 
proven nature of the technology. However, the prospects of attaining this exceptional 
growth in onshore wind hinges primarily on policy and the availability of sites (Parkes, 
2012). The political willingness and appetite towards the continued onshore wind 
deployment appears to be ebbing away. It can be argued that the lack of enthusiasm for 
this technology on the political front could be attributed to the view that the UK’s 2020 
renewable energy target is almost set to be achieved. In this regard, the seemingly 
polarised attitude towards onshore wind is encapsulated in the remarks made by the Prime 
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Minister in which he suggested that the public is basically fed up with wind 
(RenewableUK, 2014). With the anticipated eradication of subsidies for onshore wind by 
2016 (DECC, 2015c), the prospects of achieving the deployment targets portrayed in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is highly debatable. Nonetheless, the contribution from onshore wind 
would need to reach the deployment levels exhibited in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in order to 
contribute towards achieving the carbon grid intensity commensurate with the ‘path to 50 
g’ by 2030.   
Similarly, the deployment trend for solar PV, shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, depicts a 
growth at unprecedented levels from 2015 to 2050 to reach 24.1 GW in total capacity. 
This solar ‘revolution’, particularly in the period after 2010, was a result of the 
implementation of favourable policies such as the small scale FiT scheme and the RO 
which in September 2011 alone, saw a total of 15855 installations with a total capacity of 
80.5 MW (Muhammad-Sukki et al. 2013). Also, this growth was attributed by the 
significant reduction in installation costs estimated to have fallen by about 50% between 
2010 and 2012 (DECC, 2013c). It was at the backdrop of this growth that solar PV was 
considered as one of the key renewable energy technologies that can assist in creating a 
balanced UK energy mix, with a projected 20 GW upper limit capacity to be achieved by 
2020 (DECC, 2012d). 
However, following the UK government’s decision to close the RO to new solar projects 
above 5 MW by the 1 April 2015, (DECC, 2015b), it remains to be seen whether the 
industry has matured enough to compete for funding under the CfD scheme in order to 
sustain growth in the solar industry up to 2050, as portrayed in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The 
UK government continues to consider renewable energy technologies as instrumental in 
driving a transition to a low-carbon future, and as such, the momentum in the solar energy 
development and that of other renewable energy technologies would need to be sustained 
regardless of the withdrawal in government support. The UK government’s confidence 
in the future performance of the renewable energy industry is borne out of the 
understanding that support mechanisms are designed to help technologies to move from 
a demand-led to a competition-led allocation support (FiT CfD) rather than encourage 
reliance on subsidies (DECC, 2015e).      
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The increased penetration of both low-carbon and renewable energy technologies 
portrayed in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 through the 2020s is consistent with the 30 - 70 GW 
estimated scale of new capacity deployment required by 2030 (HM Government, 2011). 
The build-up in low-carbon and renewable energy technologies demonstrated in N/Gas50 
and S/Gas50 scenarios is 79 % of the total installed capacity by 2030, which is 4 % more 
than the estimated 75 % generation mix projected by the central scenario that meets the 
fifth carbon budget (CCC, 2015). The growth in low-carbon and renewable energy 
portfolio projected for 2030 by the N/Gas50 and S/Gas50 scenarios is earmarked to have 
a dual impact of replacing the ageing UK’s electricity infrastructure, particularly nuclear 
and coal at the end of this decade as well as laying the foundation for sector 
decarbonisation through the 2020s. Irrespective of the use of shale gas in one of the 
scenarios in the ‘path to 50 g’ pathway, the level of greenhouse gas emission reduction 
attained is 17.3 MtCO2e compared to the 17 MtCO2e achieved by the ‘Max’ scenario, 
which represents the maximum feasible deployment capacity of key technologies and 
functional market mechanisms necessary to achieve a 50 g carbon grid intensity by 2030, 
as described in the fifth carbon budget (CCC, 2015). 
The role of nuclear power and CCS in achieving the emission intensity trend, shown in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2, is indispensable. Both scenarios project new nuclear power 
deployment to reach 8.7 GW and 18 GW by 2030 and 2050, respectively. The nuclear 
power projection outlined in these scenarios has been set below the ambitious estimates 
aspired by industry, where a 16 GW capacity of nuclear energy was prospectively targeted 
for 2030 (HM Government, 2013). In recognition of the important role of nuclear power 
in delivering secure, low-carbon and affordable energy for the future (HM Government, 
2013a), the UK government has identified and approved eight potentially suitable sites 
for the development of new nuclear power plants (DECC, 2011b), with a combined 
capacity of 23 GW (Pöyry, 2013). Thus, the rollout of new nuclear capacity presented in 
the scenario assessments presented in this thesis took into account the potential 
investment, technical and planning barriers and uncertainties that could delay or derail 
the ambition to achieve the potential deployment targets anticipated. On the other hand, 
CCS outlay to 2030 is projected to reach 7.1 GW with high prospects of attaining a total 
capacity of 26 GW by 2050, in order to develop a near zero carbon emission sector by 
2050 (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The level of CCS deployment outlay projected by the 
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‘path to 50 g’ scenarios by 2030 is below the 10 GW capacity target estimated by the UK 
government (DECC, 2012a) due to uncertainty on economic and technical viability of the 
technology. 
The level of development of new nuclear power capacity projected in these scenarios is 
anticipated to be driven by the CfD mechanisms, which, if successfully implemented 
could be a game-changer in guaranteeing viability to low-carbon investment, a key driver 
in financing a portfolio of low-carbon technologies necessary for the electricity supply 
decarbonisation. The deployment outlay for nuclear power and CCS presented in 
N/Gas50 and S/Gas50 could certainly achieve the decarbonisation target set in each 
scenario. However, there is uncertainty over the capacity of the current policy to deliver 
the projected capacities on time and budget to contribute towards sector decarbonisation 
through to 2050. As for nuclear power, the level of uncertainty over the potential build 
rates can be attributed to what Mez (2012) observed as the consistently rising costs and 
associated problems of financing nuclear power plants and the shortage of technical 
expertise. These factors, combined with the traditional concerns for accidents and 
radiation risks and nuclear waste management (Teräväinen et al., 2011), have a greater 
potential to stall momentum in both investor interest and the actual deployment of the 
technology. In the context of these constraints, and the on-going delays currently facing 
UK’s first new nuclear plant (Hinkley Point C), an estimated capacity of 8.7 and 18 GW 
of new nuclear portrayed in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 could contribute towards achieving the 
decarbonisation aspirations set by the government to 2050. 
CCS, as a new technology that removes CO2 from the atmosphere, involves either pre-
combustion or post-combustion separation of CO2 in either new or retrofitted plants, and 
thus leading to an energy system with negative emission characteristics (Read & Lermit, 
2005). Retrofitted CCS on fossil fuel and biomass plants account for 7.1 GW of installed 
capacity in 2030, and 70 % of this capacity constitutes gas-fired plants, with the remaining 
proportion constituting coal and biomass plants fitted with CCS. The application of CCS 
technology on biomass power plants has a unique potential to create simultaneously CO2 
negative emissions (IPCC, 2005) without which could be extremely costly and difficult, 
if not impossible to reach emission targets below 450 ppm (Azar et al. 2006). However, 
due to its technical and economic uncertainty, CCS development in the UK is still a 
challenge as it hasn’t been deployed at a commercial scale. The technology is still at 
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demonstration stage and the full chain technology has not yet been demonstrated on a 
working power station or industrial facility in Europe (DECC, 2014a). A new twist in the 
development of the UK energy policy has unfortunately culminated in the cancellation of 
funding for the demonstration and commercialisation of CCS programmes by the UK 
government. Therefore, this implies that CCS technology may not be part of the UK 
generation mix by 2030. However, for the purpose of this thesis, some developments 
within the UK electricity supply system are simulated with the assumption that the UK 
government still supports the technology and still considers it as an integral part of the 
decarbonisation framework.  
The 50 g/kWh carbon grid trajectory by 2030 represented by the N/Gas50 and S/Gas50 
scenarios reflect a greater alignment to the Paris 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) 
agreement pledging to hold the increase in the global average temperature well below 2 
oC pre-industrial levels and pursuance of efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 
oC above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC 2015). The deep cuts in emissions accomplished 
by the technology outlay projected in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is in-keeping with the EU’s 
collective 2030 pledge to reduce emissions by at least 40 % compared to the 1990 levels 
and the 27 % share of renewable consumption (European Commission, 2014). The 50 
gCO2/kWh decarbonisation framework represents a policy ambition which demonstrates 
the important role of offshore wind alongside nuclear and CCS in driving down emissions 
within the power generation sector. However, the potential to achieve the emission 
trajectory exhibited in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is dependent on the capacity of policy 
instruments to overcome barriers and uncertainties that affect technology and energy-
related market developments. While the 50 g/kWh carbon grid intensity could be highly 
ambitious in the context of the current UK electricity generation landscape, the target is 
achievable provided the energy policy position remain consistent and resolute to meeting 
national, regional and global climate change commitments. 
The electricity generation output from the scenarios under a 50 gCO2/kWh 
decarbonisation trajectory follow a similar trend for all the technologies in the mix except 
in unabated gas plants. The influence of a reduced emission intensity in shale gas of 423 
gCO2/kWh compared to 488 gCO2/kWh in natural gas (DECC, 2013b; POST, 2011), 
accounts for the increase in the amount of electricity generated from shale gas as shown 
in Figures 5.3. As a result of the increased generation from shale gas in S/Gasd50, the 
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respective contribution from low-carbon and renewable energy technologies stands at 
188.9 TWh and 260.6 TWh in 2030 and 2050 as shown in Figures 5.3.    
 
Figure 5.3. The total electricity generation output for the S/Gas50 scenario from 
2010-2050. 
A high carbon emission intensity in conventional gas reduces the electricity output from 
gas generation, and hence the marginally higher generation from low-carbon and 
renewable energy technologies. As shown in Figure 5.4, electricity supply from low-
carbon and renewable energy technologies account for 196.5 TWh and 272.6 TWh, 
respectively. This high level of intermittent renewable generation is balanced by a 
baseload electricity generation output from nuclear and CCS in the order of 322 TWh and 
123.5 TWh, 320.7 TWh and 126.7 TWh in 2030 and 2050 as highlighted in Figures 5.3 
and 5.4, respectively. The electricity generation output from low-carbon technologies is 
combined with output from pumped storage and unabated gas CCGT and CHP to mitigate 
any potential supply deficit created as a result of variable supply from renewable energy 
sources such as wind, wave and solar. 
144 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. The Total electricity generated for the N/Gas50 from 2010–2050.  
5.2.2 The 2030 electricity generation infrastructure outlook under a 100 and 200 
gCO2/kWh pathway 
The current emission intensity of the UK electricity generation sector is 450 gCO2/kWh 
(CCC, 2015). In that sense, the adoption of a 100 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target by 
2030 is deemed by the CCC (2015) to be on the cost-effective path to achieving the 80 % 
GHG emission reduction by 2050. As in the ‘path to 50 g’ outlined in Section 5.2.1, the 
N/Gas100 scenario has a high penetration of low-carbon and renewable energy 
technologies commensurate with the requirement to promote deep cuts in emissions in 
order to achieve a 100 gCO2/kWh emission intensity level. By 2030, the low-carbon 
energy technology deployment capacity in N/Gas100 reaches 16.7 GW while renewable 
energy technology penetration reaches 71.9 GW (see Figure 5.5). This capacity outlay in 
renewable energy technologies is significantly higher than that in S/Gas100 where the 
increased electricity generation (54.2 TWh) from unabated shale gas allows about 68.8 
GW renewable energy capacity in the mix (see Figure 5.5). The low-carbon and 
renewable energy technology growth in the ‘path to 100 g’ scenarios achieves 75 % share 
of generation by 2030, a generation mix which is consistent with the central scenario 
developed to inform the fifth carbon budget (CCC, 2015). 
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Figure 5.5. The technology penetration in 2030 under different decarbonisation 
pathways.   
The ‘path to 200 g’ scenarios is representative of an electricity generation sector facing 
delays in the development and deployment of low-carbon energy technologies such as 
nuclear and CCS. A dash for new gas plants, new nuclear power plants and possibly 
offshore wind define the direction of the new UK energy policy framework. In its 
pursuance of energy security, the new energy policy narrative also encourages investment 
in shale gas exploration to reduce import gas dependency. In justifying their 
recommendation for the commencement of exploratory drilling for shale gas, the UK 
Task Force on Shale Gas (2015) argues that it is not feasible to create a renewable energy 
industry that can meet all energy needs in the short-term, and hence shale gas presents an 
environmentally cleaner alternative to coal. While this assessment is undoubtedly true, 
the level of unabated gas generation in the N/Gas200 and S/Gas200 scenarios standing at 
36.5 and 36.7 GW capacity as portrayed in Figure 5.5 does not only limit the penetration 
of low-carbon and renewable energy technologies, but it increases the risk of the 
electricity generation sector being locked-in fossil fuel generation infrastructure. The 
low-carbon and renewable energy development in the ‘path to 200 g’ scenarios 
respectively achieve 8.8 and 7.3 GW and 64.2 and 56.6 GW, for the N/Gas200 and 
S/Gas200 as shown in Figure 5.5.   
In the context of the current UK electricity generation infrastructure development, Figure 
5.6. indicates that the proportion of nuclear power capacity in this low-carbon portfolio 
(N/Gas200 and S/Gas200) is limited to 4.3 GW by 2030, which in this case comprises of 
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a 3.2 GW new nuclear plant, Hinkley Point C, which is expected to be on line potentially 
by 2025 (DECC, 2015a; World Nuclear Association, 2015b) and a 1.198 GW remnant 
capacity from the old fleet which is set to be decommissioned in 2035 (World Nuclear 
Association, 2015b). The projected new nuclear power capacity is based on the 
assumption that only one plant could be commissioned in the period to 2030. The 
deployment outlay for CCS demonstrated in the ‘path to 200 g’ scenarios is up by 3.5 
GW in 2030 (see Figure 5.5) which is unlikely to reflect the ‘serious deployment’ judged 
by the Task Force on Shale Gas to be essential for the medium-term viability of any 
significant shale gas industry (Task Force on Shale Gas, 2015). The CCS deployment 
outlay projected in the ‘path to 200 g’ pathway is likely to be lower or none at all 
following the UK government’s decision to cancel the £1 billion capital investment for 
CCS competition (DECC, 2015d)  
 
Figure 5.6. The 2030 technology deployment under the different decarbonisation 
pathways.  
A higher emission intensity of conventional gas in N/Gas100 results in a 46.9 TWh 
generation outlay compared to 54.2 TWh in S/Gas100, and hence the marginal difference 
in the proportion of technology deployment and the resultant electricity generation output 
portrayed in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. Furthermore, the rollout of low-carbon energy 
technologies in S/Gas100 is 16.7 GW, which is 1 GW less than that in N/Gas100 owing 
to the impact of using shale gas in electricity generation as highlighted in Figure 5.6. The 
emission reduction achieved by the ‘path to 100 g’ scenarios is 34.5 MtCO2e compared 
to the 31 MtCO2e achieved by the Central scenario developed to inform the fifth carbon 
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budget by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2015). It is observed that the 
introduction of shale gas in the UK electricity generation mix would have limited impacts 
on emissions reduction under the 100 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation framework which is 
aligned to the carbon budgets. The inclusion of shale gas in the electricity supply mix 
would not change or hinder the development and deployment of low-carbon and 
renewable energy technologies as demonstrated by the small difference in the level of 
capacities attained in the two scenarios. 
 
Figure 5.7. The 2030 electricity generation output for the different decarbonisation 
pathways.   
Unabated conventional and shale gas plants in N/Gas200 and S/Gas200 scenarios are 
operated at 42 % and 55 % load factors. As a result of the favourable conditions for gas 
generation, a higher electricity generation output in the order of 108 TWh and 142.8 TWh 
is achieved in N/Gas200 and S/Gas200 in 2030 as depicted in Figure 5.7. The scale of 
low-carbon and renewable energy technology deployment is severely curtailed following 
the increase in electricity generation from gas in these two scenarios. The low-carbon 
deployment profile in N/Gas200 and S/Gas200 is 50 % that of the path to ‘50 and 100 g’ 
scenarios as shown in Figure 5.5. The ‘path to 200 g’ limits the deployment of renewable 
energy technologies as indicated in Figure 5.5, where N/Gas200 records a total of 64.2 
GW while as 56.6 GW is deployed in S/Gas200 by 2030. The emergence and 
development of shale gas is not expected to hinder or slow the momentum in the 
development and deployment of low-carbon and renewable energy technologies. Instead, 
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the government is being argued to invest revenues derived from a developed shale gas 
industry to fund research and development and innovation in CCS and other low-carbon 
energy technologies (Task Force on Shale Gas, 2015). The deployment outlay for low-
carbon energy technologies in N/Gas200 and S/Gas200 reaches 8 % and 7 % while the 
renewable energy technology penetration attained is 57 % and 55 % by 2030, 
respectively.   
The energy generation mix outlook portrayed by the ‘path to 200 g’ scenarios is not 
consistent with the goal of achieving the 80 % emission reduction target by 2050. A 200 
gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target by 2030 results in the production of 68.9 MtCO2e 
compared to 34.5 and 17.3 MtCO2e for the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ emission reduction 
frameworks, respectively. The emissions performance of the 200 gCO2/kWh scenarios is 
not close to the 40 MtCO2e emission target achieved by the Committee on Climate 
change’s Barriers scenario, a fifth carbon budget scenario representing unfavourable 
technological and market barriers to power sector decarbonisation by 2030 (CCC, 2015). 
The carbon grid intensity achieved by the Barriers scenario is 116 g/kWh, which is 
attributed by a renewable energy deployment outlay that is 13.9 % less than the capacity 
level achieved in the N/Gas100 scenario. Most importantly, the electricity generation 
portfolio presented by the ‘path to 200 g’ by 2030 fulfils the security of energy supply 
objectives pursued by the energy policy, but it does not meet the carbon emission 
budgetary requirements set by the Climate Change Act. Therefore, the adoption of the 
200 g/kWh carbon grid intensity by 2030 implies that the power sector could fail to reduce 
emissions in line with the estimated cost-effective path (carbon intensity below 100 
gCO2/kWh) to the legislated 2050 emission reduction target. Under these circumstances, 
it means that the power sector may fail to support other sectors of the economy in reducing 
emissions in order to remain on track to the 80 % emission reduction by 2050 relative to 
the 1990 levels.   
The new UK energy policy framework (DECC, 2015a), which is set to be driven by gas, 
nuclear and potentially offshore wind, prioritises security of supply above climate change, 
and thus can be envisaged under the 200 gCO2/kWh emission trajectory. Whatever the 
circumstances, a scenario narrative built on the ‘path to 200 g’ does not align with the 
pledge to limit annual emissions of greenhouse gases to a level consistent with the target 
of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C pre-industrial 
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levels and the pursuance of efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C pre-
industrial levels agreed at the Paris COP21 (UNFCCC, 2015). There appears to be a 
disconnect between the UK government’s new energy policy ‘reset’ and its high-level 
commitment to tackle climate change as demonstrated by its strong stance in the EU, at 
the COP21 climate change summit and its continued support for the Climate Change Act. 
In the event that the new energy policy ‘reset’ adopts the ‘path to 200 g’ emission 
reduction target, it would be extremely difficult for the UK government to fulfil the fifth 
carbon budget (2028-2032) requirements, which proposes the adoption of a low-carbon 
power policy consistent with reducing carbon intensity of the power sector to below 100 
gCO2/kWh in 2030 compared to 450 gCO2/kWh in 2014 and 200-250 gCO2/kWh 
expected in 2020 (CCC, 2015).  
5.2.3 Unabated gas generation regime and the cost implications  
The operation of unabated gas plants under the different decarbonisation trajectories has 
huge implications on both the levelised cost of electricity from CCGT plants and the level 
of capacity likely to be retained on the system to boost security of electricity supply 
objectives. The introduction of the carbon price support (CPS), a policy designed to 
impose a penalty on fossil fuel generation could affect the economics of gas generation. 
The increase in the cost of carbon could escalate the cost of the electricity generation from 
gas plants, and thus impacting on their role in the generation mix, either as back-up 
capacity to variable renewable energy sources, particularly on the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ 
scenarios or in providing baseload generation as in ‘path to 200 g’ scenarios. 
The LCOE for the different technologies that characterise the scenario assessments in this 
thesis is shown in Figure 5.8. This LCOE indicator projected in Figure 5.8 is based on the 
medium cost estimate of the capital investment and the operation and maintenance for 
energy technologies as indicated in Table.3.4. The LCOE outlay incorporates the 2030 
projected carbon floor price (CFP) of £76/tCO2 (DECC, 2013e), which is likely to 
increase the cost of electricity generation from utilities using unabated conventional and 
shale gas fuel resources. The UK government has imposed a cap on the carbon floor price 
to a maximum of £18/tCO2 from 2016/17 until 2019/20 (HM Revenue & Customs, 2014) 
a measure intended to limit any competitive disadvantage British companies face in the 
global market place.   
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The ability of the UK government to intervene in the future development of the carbon 
price has further heightened the level of uncertainty that is likely to affect the carbon 
pricing regime by 2020. To this end, some of the scenario assessments presented in this 
thesis have been built on the assumption that the 2016/17 to 2019/20 capped carbon floor 
price could be extended to 2030. The potential carbon price cap extension up to 2030, as 
investigated in this thesis, could possibly be used as part of an incentive mechanism likely 
to promote the new gas plant infrastructure development sought by the UK government 
in support of its proposed new energy policy ‘reset’. The impact of a carbon freeze on the 
cost of electricity for the conventional and unconventional gas plants is shown in Figure 
5.8, where the LCOE is about one third of the full projected carbon price by 2030. The 
capping of the carbon floor price in the scenarios pursuing radical emission reduction 
does not change the operational regime of the gas plants which continue to operate at very 
low capacity factors, except for the low LCOE.  
 
Figure 5.8. LCOE for the technologies modelled in the different scenarios.   
Based on the LCOE for the technologies projected in Figure 5.8, unabated conventional 
and shale gas in N/Gas50, N/Gas100 and S/Gas50 scenarios with a full carbon price rank 
amongst the most expensive technologies, with costs reaching £0.17, £0.15 and 
£0.11/kWh in 2030, respectively. However, the reduced operational regime for unabated 
conventional and unconventional gas under the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ increases the cost 
of generating electricity as shown in Figure 5.9. The deep cuts in emissions sought by the 
‘path to 50 and 100 g’ decarbonisation trajectories means that the gas plants would have 
to operate at capacity factors below 10 % following the significant penetration of low-
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carbon and renewable energy technologies in the mix. In these scenarios, a total installed 
capacity of between 22 and 25 GW of conventional and unconventional is retained within 
the generation mix (see Figure 5.6) to mitigate intermittent generation. Since unabated 
conventional and shale gas plants are operated at 8 % and 10 % capacity factors, the cost 
of electricity generation with the full carbon floor price projected for 2030 is about 
£0.17/kWh and £0.15/kWh for N/Gas50 and S/Gas50, respectively. Also, gas plants ‘in 
the path to 100 g’ scenarios are operated at 22 % and 25 % load factors, and hence the 
LCOE is significantly higher in N/Gas100 compared to S/Gas100 (see Figure 5.9). The 
higher emission target in N/Gas200 and S/Gas200 allows gas plants to operate at 42 % 
and 55 % capacity factors, and thus the LCOE achieved in each scenario is £0.09/kWh 
(see Figure 5.9). Apart from the effect of reduced load factors, the proportion of the LCOE 
portrayed in Figure 5.9 for each scenario reflects on the impact of the cost of carbon. For 
example, the LCOE for N/Gas50 scenario is £0.11/kWh without the cost of carbon 
included and £0.12/kWh with the carbon floor price (CFP) capped at £18/tCO2 in 2030.  
 
Figure 5.9. Correlation between load factor and LCOE under each decarbonisation 
scenario.  
In the context of this electricity generation and LCOE outlay for the scenarios heavily 
constrained by carbon emissions, the business case for retaining a large fleet of under-
performing gas plants on the system could be hard to justify given the reduced operation 
regime and the electricity generation cost portrayed in Figures 5.7 and 5.9. Assuming that 
most of the unabated gas plant capacity for the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ highlighted in 
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Figure 5.6 is composed of a high proportion of new gas plants to ensure security of supply, 
the potential impact of the ‘investment lock-in’ could force utility operators to operate 
their plants above the operational regimes demonstrated in Figure 5.9. According to a 
study by Chignell and Gross (2013), the capital investment of CCGT plants are generally 
paid off between 10 and 20 years and during this period, utility operators would expect 
maximum utilisation, or ‘baseload’ operation of their plants. However, this is not 
compatible with the decarbonisation agenda pursued under the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ 
scenarios. Since the capital financing for gas generation infrastructure is determined by 
the market prices for both the output and the plant load factor (Chignell & Gross, 2013), 
the generation outlay portrayed in Figure 5.7 and the cost of electricity generation 
demonstrated in Figure 5.9 would not justify the rollout and continued operation of plants 
within the generation mix for the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ scenarios. 
While the future of the carbon price remains uncertain, the continued role of unabated gas 
plants in the mix to mitigate intermittent renewable electricity supplies would need to be 
supported and sustained by a stronger package of economic incentives. This financing 
framework could give utility operators the option of either to temporarily retire or 
radically decrease the level of plant utilisation, especially in the context of the operation 
and cost regime portrayed in Figures 5.7 and 5.9. Since the introduction of the capacity 
markets was primarily unveiled to promote investment in new gas power plants to 
mitigate risk to electricity security of supply (DECC, 2014c), it is imperative that the UK 
government would need to come up with a package of attractive financial incentives to 
utility operators in order to persuade them to keep their plants on stand-by to foster both 
system reliability and security of electricity supply. The case for incentivising gas 
generation utilities becomes even stronger, particularly in the midst of a depressed market 
environment for gas-fired power generation spurred partly by the significantly decreased 
global gas prices (Caldecott and Mcdaniels, 2014). 
5.2.4 The cost of decarbonising the electricity generating infrastructure  
A scenario based study by Jacoby et al., (2012) warned that a shale gas “revolution” could 
temporarily reduce interest in low-carbon emission technologies such as CCS. In 
retrospect, Broderick et al., (2011) envisaged that a £32 billion investment in shale gas 
development has the potential to displace 12 GW and 21 GW of offshore and onshore 
wind capacity, respectively. In contrast, the Task Force on Shale Gas (2015) maintains 
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that with proper policy safeguards in place, the emergence of the shale gas industry would 
not restrict or prohibit the ongoing development of low-carbon and renewable energy 
industry to meet the UK long-term energy needs. The economics of the ‘path to 50, 100 
and 200’ decarbonisation frameworks by 2030 are illustrated in Figures 5.10 where the 
level of investment for low-carbon and renewable energy technologies deployed from 
2015 to 2030 is outlined In order to achieve the 50 gCO2/kWh by 2030, a £200 billion 
capital investment in low-carbon generation is required for the electricity sector (CCC, 
2013c; Ofgem, 2010). 
 
Figure 5.10. The 2015 - 2030 low-carbon and renewable energy technology 
investment for the decarbonisation pathways.  
Large scale investment in wind and nuclear energy is respectively dominant in all 
scenarios with N/Gas50 and S/Gas50 recording £93.7.3 and £92.6 billion in offshore wind 
compared to £81.9, £78.4, £70.2 and £65.5 billion in the ‘paths to 100 and 200 g’ as 
highlighted in Figure 5.10. The large investment outlay for offshore wind is reflective of 
the levelised technology costs that have failed to reduce to a level below the £100/kWh 
threshold anticipated by the UK government by 2020, which is required to maximise its 
deployment in the period between 2020 and 2030 (The Crown Estate, 2012). However, 
there are indications that the offshore wind LCOE could come down well below the 
£100/MWh threshold by 2020 as demonstrated by the £114.39 clearing price achieved 
during the CFD Allocation Round One for the 2018/19 period (DECC, 2015b). 
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The investment outlay for the new nuclear power plants in the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ 
scenarios is £44.7 billion compared to £15.8 billion for N/Gas200 and S/Gas200 due the 
differences in the estimated deployment capacities required to achieve the emissions 
targets set as illustrated in Figure 5.6. It is important to note that this investment outlay 
for nuclear power deployment depicted in the energy pathways (see Figure 5.10) is based 
on the capital investment for the FOAK price range. As more nuclear power plants are 
built, there is a potential that the investment outlay projected in the decarbonisation 
scenarios could come down. Onshore wind investment is high in N/Gas50 and S/Gas50, 
with a total of £26.9 and £25.9 billion estimated to achieve the deployment portfolio 
indicated in Figure 5.6. The investment in onshore wind decreases commensurate with 
the deployment ambitions achieved in the ‘path to 100 and 200 g’ scenarios as shown in 
Figures 5.10 and 5.6, respectively. 
The deployment ambition for coal, gas and biomass generation fitted with CCS portrayed 
in Figure 5.6, could cost £3.1, £7.4 and £6.4 billion in the ‘path to 50 g’ scenarios. As the 
level of CCS penetration reduces with the increase in the level of emission target set, 
particularly in the ‘paths to 100 and 200g’, the cost requirements to deploy CCS 
technology are reduced as demonstrated in Figure 5.10. However, it is important to note 
that CCS is yet unproven at a large scale, and thus the level of deployment to 2030 is still 
uncertain. The investment proportion for the other technologies in all the other scenarios 
is shown in Figure 5.10, where the technology costs are high in scenarios seeking to 
achieve radical emission reduction by 2030.   
The investment challenge for decarbonising the electricity supply was estimated to be 
£110 billion in the period to 2020 (DEEC, 2011b). The UK government envisages that 
between 2014 to 2020, an investment input in the order of £100 billion could be required 
to finance the electricity supply sector alone (DECC, 2014b). The Committee on Climate 
Change estimated that the low-carbon and renewable energy technology deployment for 
scenarios reaching 50 gCO2/kWh by 2030 could reach up to £200 billion between 2014 
and 2030 (CCC, 2013a). While there is uncertainty as to the level of renewable and low-
carbon energy technology that could be deployment to achieve the decarbonisation targets 
set, the total investment outlay between 2015 and 2030 for the scenarios considered in 
this thesis is illustrated in Figure 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11. Total capital expenditure on low-carbon and renewable energy 
technologies in scenarios reaching 50, 100 and 200 gCO2/kWh, both with or without 
conventional and unconventional gas.  
  
The N/Gas and S/Gas50 scenarios indicate that an increased penetration in low-carbon 
and renewable energy technologies could respectively require an estimated investment 
outlay in the order of £252.1 and £246.4 billion to achieve a 50 gCO2/kWh emission target 
by 2030. A policy alternative that opts for a 100 gCO2/kWh by 2030, with or without 
shale gas could achieve this target with an estimated investment portfolio of £206 and 
£218 billion, respectively, as shown in Figure 5.11. The ‘path to 200 g’ has the lowest 
low-carbon and renewable energy resource deployment in the three decarbonisation 
pathways, and thus its investment outlay is £155.3 and £135.5 billion for N/Gas200 and 
S/Gas200, respectively. Despite the increase in the utilisation of unabated conventional 
and unconventional gas in ‘path to 200 g’ scenarios, significant contributions from wind, 
solar and nuclear (see Figure 5.10), assist in driving the investment portfolio to the level 
depicted in Figure 5.11. 
The investment projection outlined in Figure 5.11 is extraordinarily high to be achieved 
within the fifteen year deployment timeframe. In any case, the low-carbon and renewable 
energy technology portfolio projected in these scenarios provide an optimised emission 
abatement generation mix that could assist in achieving the decarbonisation aspirations 
for the electricity generation sector by 2030. Therefore, it is up to the UK government, 
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depending on the decarbonisation target they adopt for the UK electricity supply sector 
by 2030, to create a favourable investment climate that could trigger the flow of this 
enormous investment outlay required to finance the transformation of the power sector. 
The 2013 Energy Act introduced the EMR, a framework which is driven by the FiT CfD 
and the capacity market designed to deliver investment in low-carbon electricity 
infrastructure. These finance mechanisms, particularly the FiT CfD is designed to provide 
certainty to industry and investors by providing long-term price stabilisation to low-
carbon electricity generation in the form of strike prices (DEECC, 2012a). Before being 
superseded by the FiT CfD in 2017, the Renewable Obligation (RO) (DECC, 2014b) will 
continue to drive investment in the development of new renewable energy generation 
resources. The proposed CfD strike prices for renewable energy technologies outlined in 
chapter 2 (see Table 2.1) provide a package of incentives designed to incentivise 
investment in low-carbon energy technologies required to decarbonise the electricity 
infrastructure as well as to guarantee security of electricity in the midst of plant closures. 
The arrangement for the allocation of CfD on CCS and nuclear power plants, as 
demonstrated by the £92.50/MWh strike price awarded to Hinkley Point C plant, over a 
35 year period (DECC, 2014e) is based on bilateral negotiations between government and 
utility operators. 
The delivery of the investment expenditure outlined in Figure 5.11 hinges not only on the 
enabling investment climate promoted by the EMR, but also on a concise and consistent 
policy delivery system which appeals to industry and the investor community. The current 
clamp down on green energy subsidies targeting onshore wind, and solar PV (DECC, 
2015c; DECC, 2015b) could further increase the level of uncertainty over the direction 
and future of the energy policy, and thus undermining confidence among potential 
investors on the UK government’s commitment to developing a low-carbon electricity 
sector. The new energy policy shift which seeks to build more unabated gas plants and 
the UK government’s decision to cancel the £1 billion ring-fenced budget for CCS 
competition (DECC, 2015a; DECC, 2015c) could risk sending wrong signals to potential 
investors as to whether the government is still committed to building a low-carbon or a 
gas-based energy system. The decision to cancel the CCS funding could affect the future 
of the demonstration programmes currently running (White Rose CCS Project and Shell 
Peterhead Project), and thus, further increasing the uncertainty over the future inclusion 
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of CCS technology in the UK electricity generation mix. The apparent stop-start approach 
which appears to characterise some aspect of the energy policy could have irreparable 
implications on cases for low-carbon business development, capital allocation, innovation 
and supply chain investment, and thus undermining the prospects for low-carbon 
investments (CCC, 2012) commensurate with the levels set in Figure 5.11 for the 
alternative decarbonisation ambitions.  
5.2.5 Sensitivity analysis on low-carbon and renewable technology penetration in 
scenarios   
The evolution of the electricity generation infrastructure to a low-carbon future is quite 
dynamic due to a range of uncertainties affecting the future of the electricity demand, 
technology innovation and the effectiveness of policy mechanisms to create a viable 
investment climate for the development of low-carbon and renewable energy 
technologies. With the electricity demand anticipated to increase between 50 and 135 % 
from the 2014 level by 2050 (CCC, 2015), due to the anticipated increase in the 
electrification of transport and heating, a 10 % increase and decrease in electricity demand 
has been applied to assess the potential implications of this demand variation on the low-
carbon and renewable energy technology development in the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ 
scenarios. This assessment incorporates the DECC central cost of carbon set at about 
£76/tCO2e as projected for 2030 (DECC, 2013e). Also, a 10 % increase and decrease in 
wind and solar output has been applied on the N/Gas50 and 100 scenarios to evaluate the 
level of penetration of CCS technologies and nuclear power in the generation mix. A 
sensitivity analysis on the impact of the future of fossil fuel prices is vitally important in 
determining the level of fossil fuel based electricity generation and the penetration of 
other technologies in the electricity generation mix.  
Forecasting future fossil fuel prices is challenging due to a large number of uncertainties, 
including future global economic growth, technology development and global climate 
change policies (DECC, 2015c). Assuming that a complete phase-out of unabated coal 
generation by 2030 in the three decarbonisation pathways, gas remains the dominant 
fossil fuel source of electricity generation in both unabated and CCS fitted plants. Given 
that the capital costs of CCGT investment are lower than most forms of generation both 
on an absolute basis and as a proportion of total levelised cost (Chignell & Gross, 2013), 
the application of any reasonable gas price variation, for example, a 10 % increase or 
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decrease in the cost of gas would neither affect the penetration of unabated gas in the mix 
nor the low-carbon and renewable technologies in the mix. While all forms of CCS 
generation presented in this thesis are at an early stage of deployment by, 2030 (see Figure 
5.6) coal plants with CCS represent one of the technologies that have the highest capital 
investment and LCOE (see Figure 5.8). As a key decarbonisation technology, particularly 
in the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ scenarios, varying the cost of coal by any reasonable rate 
would not change its merit order within the technology cost, as it remains expensive. At 
the backdrop of this fossil fuel price and fossil fuel based technology cost assessment, a 
sensitivity analysis on the impact of fossil fuel prices on technology deployment is 
deemed to have little effect, particularly on scenarios seeking to achieve deep cuts in 
emissions by 2030. Therefore, fuel cost variation on coal CCS would only serve to 
increase its LCOE as well as curtail its penetration in the generation mix.      
5.2.5.1 Sensitivity analysis on energy demand based on the N/Gas50 and N/Gas100 
pathways by 2030 
An increase in the use of electric vehicles and low-carbon heating could lead to a 50 to 
135 % increase in electricity demand above the 2014 supply level (CCC, 2015) by 2050. 
The deployment of a combination of hybrid plug-in and battery electric vehicles across 
cars, vans and smaller HGVs is projected to trigger sales in the region of 60 % in 2030 
(CCC, 2015), and thus increasing the demand for electricity supply. The increase in the 
electrification of transport and buildings could impact on the electricity generation mix, 
especially on scenarios seeking to promote a radical emission reduction from 2030 to 
2050. The application of a 10 % increase in electricity demand in the N/Gas50 scenario 
results in an increase in the installed capacity of offshore wind and coal CCS by 2 and 3 
GW relative to the baseline capacity, respectively. The remaining technologies are built 
to their maximum capacity to meet the demand as shown in Figure 5.12. Similarly, the 
increase in electricity demand in N/Gas100 leads to a 3.7 % increase in offshore wind 
capacity, 70 % coal CCS and CCGT CCS installed capacity. As in N/Gas50, the rest of 
the low-carbon and renewable energy technologies assessed retains the maximum 
installed capacity of the baseline mix as shown in Figure 5.13. The results from this 
sensitivity assessment have important policy implications as they underscore the need for 
a flexible policy framework that creates an enabling environment for the development 
and deployment of low-carbon and renewable energy technologies which achieve both 
energy security and climate change objectives. While the future deployment rates for low-
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carbon technologies remain uncertain, a surge in the rate of deployment of low-carbon 
technologies following an increase in demand could provide insights to policymakers on 
how to develop strategic policy frameworks that ameliorate barriers that hinders progress 
in the deployment of emission reduction technologies.   
 
Figure 5.12. The impact of varying electricity demand on low-carbon and renewable 
technology uptake in N/Gas50 scenario.  
Delays in the electrification of transport and buildings, coupled with significant 
improvements in energy efficiency measures could culminate in electricity demand 
reduction by 2030. On the same note, a slump in economic growth can also account for 
the decline in the demand for energy. Applying these dynamic factors to the electricity 
supply landscape by 2030, the impact of a 10 % electricity demand reduction on the 
N/Gas50 scenario could result in a reduction in the uptake of offshore, onshore and coal 
CCS. Offshore wind capacity is reduced by 3.9 GW while onshore experiences a 2.2 GW 
decline compared to the baseline scenario as shown in Figure 5.12. The high LCOE 
(£0.26/kWh) for coal CCS accounts for the 50 % reduction in capacity following the 10 
% fall in demand. The other technologies (nuclear, solar and CCGT CCS) retain their 
baseline capacity since they have the least LCOE (see Figure 5.8) within the low-carbon 
and renewable energy technologies being assessed. The impact of a 10 % electricity 
demand reduction on the N/Gas100 scenario has a similar effect as that in the N/Gas50 
scenario. The penetration of offshore and onshore wind, as well as coal CCS is reduced 
by an average of 28 %, relative to the baseline mix. Although the low-carbon and 
renewable energy technology development is reduced by a small margin following a 
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decline in demand, the policy plan and momentum would need to remain focused on 
achieving maximum deployment targets to achieve a sectoral transition to a low-carbon 
economy.     
 
Figure 5.13. The impact of varying electricity demand on low-carbon and renewable 
technology uptake in N/Gas100 scenario.  
5.2.5.2  Sensitivity analysis: varying wind and solar PV output on low-carbon 
technologies in N/Gas50 and N/Gas100 pathways by 2030 
The decarbonisation of the electricity generation sector by 2030 would require an 
estimated 40-70 GW of low-carbon and renewable energy technology rollout through the 
2020s (HM Government, 2011). A 10 % increase in electricity generation from wind and 
solar PV in the N/Gas50 scenario would result in a drop in capacity on technologies with 
higher LCOE. Under this scenario, coal CCS deployment falls from 1.9 to 1 GW whilst 
the rest of the other low-carbon energy technologies retain their baseline capacity as 
shown in Figure 5.14. The impact of increasing wind and solar energy output on the 
N/Gas100 scenario affects the rollout of coal and gas CCS plants. The growth in coal 
CCS is reduced by 1.8 GW, a 61 % drop from the baseline capacity outlay of 2.9 GW, as 
depicted in Figure 5.15. The development of a least-cost generation mix ensures that more 
gas CCS at £0.03/kWh is built in place of the high cost coal CCS. As a result, gas CCS 
increases by 2.1 GW following the constrained build-up of coal CCS. Nuclear power 
LCOE is £0.11/kWh and based on this generation cost, a maximum deployment outlay of 
9.9 GW is achieved following the increased output from wind and solar PV. On the other 
hand, at a high LCOE of £0.12/kWh, biomass CCS rollout is limited to a minimum 
capacity of 1 GW contribution to the low-carbon mix as highlighted in Figure 5.15. The 
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high penetration of variable generation sources in the mix has huge implications on 
security of electricity resulting from variable weather patterns. Therefore, the increased 
investment in gas plants fitted with CCS could provide a cost effective approach to 
mitigate the challenges of intermittent generation from wind and solar. 
 
Figure 5.14. The impact of varying wind and solar output on low-carbon technologies 
in the N/Gas50 scenario by 2030.   
The availability of wind and solar power resources as determined by the variability in 
weather patterns has huge implications on the reliability of electricity production within 
the electricity generation system. Decreasing the wind and solar energy output by 10% 
results in all low-carbon energy technologies achieving the maximum deployment 
potential in the N/Gas50 scenario. While nuclear power and gas CCS retrofitted plants 
respectively retain their baseline maximum capacity of 9.9 and 4.9 GW, the deployment 
of coal and biomass CCS plants increase by 2.7 and 0.5 GW following the drop in wind 
and solar energy output, as highlighted in Figure 5.14. A similar drop in wind and solar 
energy output in N/Gas100 scenario results in a 2.1 GW capacity increase in coal and gas 
CCS power plants. Nuclear power deployment is retained at a maximum baseline capacity 
of 9.9 GW while the high LCOE for biomass CCS constrains its deployment to the 
generation mix to a minimum capacity of just 1 GW as indicated in Figure 5.15. The 
results from this assessment underscore the value of nuclear power and CCS applications 
in the decarbonisation framework of the UK energy policy. In the context of these results, 
government policy would need to foster diversity in the development of low-carbon and 
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renewable energy technologies in order to breed competition that could assist in driving 
innovation and cost reductions (HM Government, 2011).       
 
Figure 5.15. The impact of varying wind and solar output on low-carbon technologies 
in N/Gas100 scenario 
5.2.5.3 Sensitivity analysis: varying gas and carbon price by 10 % and the impact 
on gas output in N/Gas50 and N/Gas100 pathways by 2030 
Kaufmann (1994) observed that there is considerable uncertainty associated with the 
effect of the expected energy prices on energy demand. The price of primary energy is 
one of the most important indicators which is used to determine its demand and the level 
of utilisation in various energy transformation processes. Also, energy prices are affected 
by carbon taxes imposed on unabated fossil fuel electricity generation processes. 
Sensitivity assessments have been performed to assess the impact of varying the cost of 
fossil fuel (gas) and carbon tax by 10 % on unabated gas generation in the N/Gas50 and 
N/Gas100 scenarios by 2030. The sensitivity assessments on gas plants fitted with CCS 
technology only apply a 10 % fuel variation as they are exempt from the carbon floor 
price (DECC, 2012a). The same analysis has not been extended to cover the 200 
gCO2/kWh pathway due to its higher decarbonisation target which ultimately favours 
unabated fossil fuel powered generation to low-carbon and renewable energy sources.      
Increasing the cost of gas and carbon on these decarbonisation scenarios neither increases 
nor decreases the penetration of unabated gas plants in the generation mix nor the 
electricity generated. The deep cuts in emissions projected by the ‘path to 50 g’ scenario 
constrains the uptake of gas CCGT to 24.1 GW with a 16.7 TWh generation output when 
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the cost of gas and carbon is increased or decreased by 10 %. The adoption of a 100 
gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target allows a total of 24.9 GW capacity of unabated gas in 
the mix to contribute 46.9 TWh to the total electricity demand by 2030. This deployment 
and generation profile is replicated in this scenario when the cost of gas and carbon is 
increased or decreased by 10 %. The penetration and utilisation of generation plants using 
gas fuel remains unchanged in both the N/Gas50 and 100 scenarios compared to the 
baseline scenarios. This is due to the structural function of the model which sets a 
minimum capacity within the total gas installed capacity as a safety net designed to 
safeguard against energy capacity inadequacies. Another potential reason why the level 
of gas capacity remain unchanged after variations in demand or carbon cost is probably 
due to the build-up rate set in the model which determines the level of unabated gas 
capacity in the generation mix. These issues were discussed in detail in Section 3.3.9. The 
only change that emerges from a sensitivity assessment involving gas and carbon price 
variations on gas plants is that of the cost of electricity generation, as highlighted in Figure 
5.16.  
The cost of electricity generation in the N/Gas50 baseline scenario is £0.17/kWh 
compared to £0.18 and £0.16/kWh following a 10 % increase and decrease in the 
combined cost of gas and carbon emissions, respectively. On the other hand, the 
N/Gas100 baseline scenario’s LCOE is about £0.11/kWh, but the cost of electricity 
generation respectively increases and decreases to £0.12/kWh and £0.1/kWh following a 
10 % increase and decrease in the cost of gas and the carbon floor price as shown in 
Figure 5.16. The difference in the LCOE demonstrated in the N/Gas50 and N/Gas100 
baseline scenarios is influenced by the higher load factor, the increased installed capacity 
and generation output as described in Figure 5.9 (see Section 5.2.3). In all the scenarios, 
the LCOE from gas plants fitted with CCS remain unaffected by the price variations on 
both gas and carbon as depicted in Figure 5.16, where the LCOE is maintained at 
£0.03/kWh. 
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Figure 5.16. The impact of a 10 % variation of gas and carbon price on the LCOE of 
unabated gas and gas CCS.  
5.2.6 Summary 
The UK shale gas development is still at exploration stage. Its use in the electricity 
generation sector is anticipated in the late 2020s. However, the decarbonisation 
framework presented by the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ pathways limits the use of 
conventional and unconventional gas in the generation mix by 2030. Unabated gas plants 
under the ‘path to 50 and 100 g’ scenarios are operated at capacity factors below 10%, 
mainly as back-up up to increased intermittent generation resources within the electricity 
supply system. Based on this limited operational regime of unabated gas plants in the 50 
and 100 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation targets by 2030, the introduction of shale gas in the 
generation mix may not alter the low-carbon and renewable energy technology 
development and deployment framework required to cut carbon emissions.   
The benefits of shale gas in the electricity generation could be realised under large 
decarbonisation targets such as the ‘path to 200 g’ where unabated gas plants are operated 
at 55 % capacity factor. At a baseload operational regime of 55 %, the unabated shale gas 
generates 142.8 TWh, and thus limiting the penetration of low-carbon and renewable 
energy technologies to 7.3 and 56.6 GW by 2030 compared to 17 and 84.8 GW in S/Gas50 
in the same period. The scale of low-carbon and renewable energy technology investment 
under the 200 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation is £135.5 billion compared to £246.4 and £206 
billion in S/Gas50 and S/Gas100, respectively. The reduced capital investment likely to 
be achieved through the increased use of shale gas in electricity generation under the ‘path 
165 
 
 
to 200 g’ could come at the expense of the UK 2050 emission reduction target as well as 
the pledge to limit global annual GHG emissions agreed at the Paris COP21 (UNFCCC, 
2015). 
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Chapter 6 Mitigating the challenge of intermittent energy 
resources 
6.1 Introduction  
The Climate Change Act set a legally binding carbon emission reduction target of 80 % 
by 2050 against the 1990 level to be achieved by the UK economy (HM Government, 
2008). The transition of the UK economy to a low-carbon future by 2050 is highly 
dependent on the rate at which the electricity generation sector is decarbonised. A cost-
effective transition to the 2050 emission reduction target implies that the electricity 
generation sector would have to achieve a 100 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target by 2030 
in order to meet the fifth carbon budget requirements (CCC, 2015). The positioning of 
the electricity generation sector on the path to a low-carbon future would require the 
deployment of low-carbon and renewable energy technologies at unprecedented levels. 
While the UK energy policy seeks to promote a diverse share of low-carbon energy 
technologies in its quest to decarbonise the electricity supply sector by 2030, offshore 
wind is anticipated to be one of the key drivers of this campaign. The prioritisation of 
offshore wind as one of the catalysts for cleaning up the electricity supply sector stems 
from the understanding that the UK has an excellent offshore wind resource (Boston 
Consulting Group, 2010) as well as the fact that the technology is not polarised to public 
attitudes compared to onshore wind farms. 
However, the energy generated from renewable energy technologies is intermittent in 
nature, meaning that their output is determined by weather conditions, in contrast to 
“dispatchable” generators that adjust output as a reaction to economic incentives (Hirth, 
2013). As for wind energy, the projected or predicted power output is a product of an 
interplay of a set of parameters such as wind speed and direction, air density as well as 
spatial/temporal scales of atmospheric motion (Rahimi et al., 2013). In the context of the 
technology’s higher dependency on weather conditions, a high penetration of variable 
wind and solar energy resources have profound implications on the operation of the 
electricity generation and grid systems. High volumes of intermittent wind and solar in 
the generation mix have a huge impact on the operation regime of the flexible fossil-fuel 
plants which would have to be shut down and restarted, ramped up and down, and 
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operated at part-load (Lew et al., 2013) to deal with the effects of variable electricity 
output on the delivery of reliable electricity production systems.  
The configuration of the electricity generation system owing to an increased penetration 
of intermittent wind and solar energy has a potential to increase costs and emissions. The 
displacement of fossil-fuel generation from the system during high wind periods could 
impact on the economics of flexible generation from a utility owner’s perspective. A 
study by BENTEK Energy (2010) suggests that the emissions induced by the ramping up 
and down of flexible generation plants, as a result of the variability and uncertainty of 
wind and solar energy output, could amount to a significant fraction or even larger than 
the emission reduced by wind and solar. 
The impact of the carbon emissions resulting from the variable operation of fossil-fuelled 
generation plants in response to the renewable energy sources on the system could be 
negligible, however, concern over operation costs and the challenge of delivering reliable 
and low-carbon electricity supplies is unavoidable to both utility owners and 
policymakers. Since the development of a renewable electricity generation system is at 
the heart of the UK decarbonisation agenda, it is imperative that a balanced policy 
approach is adopted to mitigate any challenges created by an influx of intermittent 
generation energy sources in the generation mix. A two-prong approach is adopted in this 
chapter to discuss the issue of intermittent renewable energy resources and its 
implications on the electricity generation system.  
The first section explores how the model deals with the issue of intermittency in its current 
state while the second section characterises the concept of wind power variability based 
on analysed wind data. The projected offshore wind power and energy output for the 
scenario achieving a 100 gCO2/kWh grid intensity by 2030 is examined based on the 
meteorological and geographical attributes of the sites from which most of the 2030 
projected capacity is expected to be sourced as well as on the wind turbine model 
specifications selected for this assessment. The wind resource variability on offshore 
wind determined from site wind data analysis is used to assess the overall contribution of 
wind energy against the benchmarked 2030 scenario outlook set by the model in its 
original state. After assessing the potential impact of intermittent energy output from 
offshore wind on the electricity sector decarbonisation by 2030, the section concludes by 
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outlining the model modifications that could be adopted in order to integrate the impact 
of intermittency in its optimal calculations.      
6.2 Conceptualising intermittent/variable electricity generation 
sources  
The concept of variability or intermittency in renewable energy technology analysis is 
vitally important in understanding energy system costs as well as strategies for renewable 
energy development. Intermittent electricity generation affects electricity supply 
operation through system balancing and reliability impacts. The balancing impacts refers 
to the rapid short-term configurations required to manage fluctuations over a time period 
while the reliability influences relate to the measure of confidence that can be ascribed to 
the electricity supply system that sufficient generation could be made available to supply 
peak demand (Gross et al., 2006). The dynamics affecting electricity output from 
renewable energy resources can be determined based on diverse characteristics which 
range from statistical distribution, persistence, frequency or correlations (Coker et al., 
2013). As with wind and solar energy, the concept of variability tends to focus on the 
statistical analysis of the wind and solar resource and its implications on the entire energy 
supply system. The creation and maintenance of a reserve capacity, which has been 
described in Gross et al. (2006) as “standby capacity”, “back-up capacity” or “system 
reserves” in the form of flexible fossil-fuelled generation could provide the level of 
reliability to guard against the potential risk of demand being unmet. 
The variability of the offshore wind energy resource challenge presented in this thesis is 
investigated through a statistical distribution approach, which focuses on the variance of 
intermittent output; the average level of intermittent output and the degree of correlation 
between demand peaks and intermittent out (Gross et al., 2006). It is through this analysis 
that the operation regime of stand-by thermal plants is evaluated to determine the extent 
to which the ‘demand net wind’ resulting from the intermittent generation is mitigated in 
a way that maintains system reliability and energy security standards. Also linked to the 
statistical analysis of energy outputs from different energy sources is the capacity factor, 
a measure of the total energy generated across a period of time to the maximum designed 
power output of an installation (Coker et al., 2013). The characterisation of variability of 
renewable energy sources using statistical analysis provides the means by which unabated 
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fossil-fired and renewable energy supply systems can be integrated in low-carbon 
transition futures.  
6.2.1 Dealing with variability: The ‘Energy Optimisation Calculator’   
The EOC is designed to assemble a least-cost and polluting electricity generation mix 
based on predetermined input parameters. The low-carbon transition narrative projected 
by the model implies that a diverse mix of electricity generation technologies is integrated 
in the model to assemble a supply portfolio that achieves radical emission reductions 
while maintaining security of energy supply over the transition period. With a huge 
proportion of variable renewable energy resources deployed in the mix for the majority 
of the low-carbon pathways, the model calculator, in its original state does not 
characterise the issue of intermittence in a manner described in Section 6.2. In the context 
of the 2030 scenario which achieves a 100 g/kWh carbon grid intensity, the model 
assumes that a 31.3 GW total installed capacity of offshore wind would generate 
electricity at a constant capacity factor of 29.4 % as depicted in Figure 6.1. Similarly, on 
an 11.3 GW installed capacity of onshore wind, the model assumes a persistent annual 
electricity generation pattern in the order of 19 % capacity factor as shown in Figure 6.1. 
However, with the intermittent nature of many types of renewable energy technologies, 
it is evident that the model does not adequately reflect the impacts of intermittent 
generation on the UK electricity supply system.    
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Figure 6.1. The assumed model approach in determining electricity generation from 
offshore wind based on the deployment capacity in the ‘path to 100g’ scenario. 
The optimisation function of the energy calculator can either follow a least-cost or 
emission abatement path depending on the objectives of the energy analysis. In either of 
the optimisation cases, the model can still provide an optimal output that reflects either 
the financial or sustainability credentials of the energy mix desired. The issue of 
intermittency is probably not a major issue in a scenario which seeks to develop a least-
cost generation mix as shown in Figure 6.2. A least-cost generation mix has a respectively 
high unabated CCGT plant and interconnector capacity of 30 and 8 GW as shown in 
Figure 6.2 compared to renewable energy technologies. In that respect, the challenge of 
intermittency to renewable energy sources would not pose any threat to the system 
reliability, even in a case where the model was treating variability based on statistical 
factors. Given an 80 % plant utilisation/availability factor coupled with a baseload 
running regime of 45 %, a 30 GW capacity of gas CCGT has enough scope to address 
any potential supply deficits likely to be induced by the variable renewable energy 
resources. While an optimal cost electricity supply mix developed has a high potential to 
achieve security of supply objectives, its sustainability credentials are not compatible with 
the prevailing low-carbon agenda seeking to decarbonise electricity supply infrastructure.      
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Figure 6.2. The 2030 ‘path to 100 g’ scenario and the technology mix developed 
based on the optimal cost and emission abatement approach. 
The development of a low-carbon energy technology mix that meets the 100 gCO2/kWh 
emission target by 2030 as shown by the emission abatement mix in Figure 6.2 would 
require a policy framework that has the fortitude to breakthrough technical, economic and 
social barriers. Ideally, the high penetration of onshore and offshore wind and solar PV 
in the order of 16, 31.3 and 17 GW respectively, could have profound implications on 
system reliability and security of supply, especially where flexible generation capacity 
(CCGT plant) is substantially constrained. However, since the model apportions capacity 
to renewable energy technologies sources with no due regard to variability, the issues of 
reliability and security of supply become irrelevant in this scenario. This is because the 
contribution from offshore wind to the electricity demand (80.6 TWh) is sufficiently high 
to promote system adequacy. This level of energy output from offshore wind is assumed 
to be supplied constantly throughout the year without any fluctuations associated with 
wind resource variability. Thus, it is important to note that the contribution from offshore 
wind to total energy supply does not reflect the impact of variability in the final energy 
output as exhibited in energy scenario outputs. 
The levelised cost of electricity indicator for the optimal cost and emission abatement 
scenarios is £0.07 and £0.1/kWh respectively, based on the model calculations. While the 
cost of electricity output favours the optimal cost over the emission abatement scenario, 
the emission performance of the two scenarios, particularly the least-cost mix presented 
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in Figure 6.3 suggests a worrying outcome to the policy objective of creating a low-carbon 
electricity supply future. The optimal cost mix has a cumulative emission outlay of 63 
MtCO2e based on the ‘path to 100 g’ technology mix. This emission performance of this 
fossil fuel dominated least-cost generation mix has a grid carbon intensity of 183 g/kWh. 
On the other hand, the high penetration of low-carbon and renewable electricity 
generation technologies such as nuclear, fossil fuel fitted with CCS, wind and solar in the 
abatement technology mix reduces cumulative emissions by 45 % compared to the 
optimal cost mix to achieve a reduction capacity of 34.4 MtCO2e at a 100 gCO2/kWh grid 
intensity. 
It is important to note that such a drastic emission reduction would incur a cost penalty 
as demonstrated by the difference in the cost of electricity between the two energy 
generation mix scenarios. The electricity generation mix and the associated emission 
output characterised in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 as presented by the model in its original state, 
could be used to provide a guide to the technology mix that could be developed to meet 
energy policy objectives with regard to electricity sector transition. In order to shed more 
insight into the technical, economic and planning dynamics affecting each of the 
technologies and their implications on the development of low-carbon energy futures, the 
analysis approach similar to that adopted in the following sections is vitally important in 
enhancing the credibility of the modelling framework for future energy pathways.  
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Figure 6.3. The comparison of the emission performance of the cost and emission 
optimisation generation mixes based on the ‘path to 100 g’ decarbonisation scenario 
by 2030. 
6.2.2 Offshore wind energy: wind data analysis  
The offshore wind energy resource, which is central to this thesis has been analysed and 
evaluated using calculated Weibull density function shape k and scale c parameters 
summarised in Table 6.1 based on wind speed data measured at 50 and 80 m height. The 
shape k parameter represents the width/peak of the wind speed distribution at any given 
geographical location while the scale factor c describes how windy the location is (Shu et 
al., 2015). As noted in Section 3.3.7.1, these parameters provide a quantitative assessment 
of the available wind resource and the potential electrical power output likely to be 
converted by a wind turbine at any given site. The Weibull shape and scale (k and c) 
parameters highlighted in Table 6.1 are used to determine the wind power density, a 
measure of the energetic nature of winds at any given place and time (Shu et al., 2015). 
Shape k values at 50 and 80 m height shown in Table 6.1 appears to be similar which 
could suggest that the variability of the wind at the assessed heights could be construed 
to be the same. The dimension of the scale parameters given in Table 6.1 are dependent 
on both the shape parameter and the observed wind speed which invariably is influenced 
by the quality of the wind at the assessed heights. 
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Table 6.1. Calculated Weibull density function parameters for characterising the 
wind resource at different UK offshore wind development zones. 
Weather stations Offshore wind site  Shape (k) Scale (c) 
  50 m 80 m 50 m 80 m 
Boulmer Dogger Bank 2.18 2.181 9.94 9.949 
Bridlington Hornsea 2.237 2.237 8.868 9.358 
Dunbar Firth of Forth 2.216 2.216 8.695 9.175 
Hemsby Norfolk 2.218 2.218 9.34 9.855 
Mumbles Head Bristol Channel 2.37 2.376 8.25 8.254 
Ronaldsway Irish Sea 2.109 2.109 9.082 9.584 
Shoreham Airport Hastings 2.353 2.353 8.055 8.499 
Swanage West of Isle of Wight 2.14 2.144 9.75 9.757 
Wick Airport Moray Firth 2.358 2.358 9.536 10.063 
The Weibull density function parameters shown in Table 6.1 have been used to 
characterise the nature of the wind resource at the nine offshore wind sites at different 
hub heights, in terms of the wind speed frequency and the probability of occurance. The 
frequency and strength of the wind resource for each site is illustrated in Figures 6.4 to 
6.21. It is evident from Figures 6.4 to 6.21 that the wind speeds show a high degree of 
variation, and they are unevenly distributed at each of the sites assessed. Within this 
spectrum of fluctuating and unevenly distributed wind speeds, it is worth noting that most 
of the time there are weak winds with occassional strong winds which could impact on 
the dynamics of wind turbines, and hence the variations in the potential site power/energy 
output. Nonetheless, the frequency of the wind resource portrayed on the selected 
offshore wind sites (see Figures 6.4 to 6.21) indicates a wider threshold between the cut-
in speed and the cut-out speed at which the operability and productivity of the wind 
turbines is ascertained. Furthermore, most of the assessed offsshore wind sites have a high 
probable (most frequent) wind speed of about 8 m/s which has a greater potential to 
increase the wind turbine capacity to capture the maximum power in the wind.  
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Figure 6.5. Boulmer wind resource at 
80m. 
 
Figure 6.6. Bridlington wind resource 
at 50m. 
 
Figure 6.7. Bridlington wind resource 
at 80m. 
 
Figure 6.8. Dunbar wind resource at 
50m. 
 
Figure 6.9. Dunbar wind resource at 
80m. 
Figure 6.4. Boulmer wind resource at 
50m. 
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Figure 6.10. Hemsby wind resource at 50 
m. 
 
Figure 6.11. Hemsby wind resource at 80 
m. 
 
Figure 6.12. Mumbles Head wind 
resource at 50 m. 
 
Figure 6.13. Mumbles Head wind 
resource at 80 m. 
 
Figure 6.14. Ronaldsway wind resource 
at 50 m. 
 
Figure 6.15. Ronaldsway wind resource 
at 80 m. 
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Figure 6.16. Shoreham Airport wind 
resource at 50m. 
 
Figure 6.17. Shoreham Airport wind 
resource at 80m. 
 
Figure 6.18. Swanage wind resource at 
50m. 
 
Figure 6.19. Swanage wind resource at 
80m. 
 
Figure 6.20. Wick Airport wind resource 
at 50m. 
 
Figure 6.21. Wick Airport wind resource 
at 80m. 
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The high wind distribution frequency observed from the analysed data in Figures 6.4 to 
6.21 ranges between 4 m/s to 25 m/s threshold which forms an important measure of the 
potential power likely to be yielded at the wind farm site observed. On the basis of the 
wind speed distribution and the wind power density of each site portrayed in Figures 6.4 
to 6.21, the potential power output of the 8 MW and 10 MW power rated wind turbines 
installed at different heights at each offshore wind farm site is determined. The interaction 
between the mean annual wind speed and wind density distribution shown in Figures 6.4 
to 6.21 and the turbine power characteristics is used in the analysis of the electrical power 
and energy output from the offshore wind farm sites considered in this thesis. The 
power/energy output of the wind turbines selected (8 and 10 MW) is calculated by 
integrating the cut-in and the cut-out speeds of the turbine within the wind probability 
function and the characteristics of the turbine power curve (Olaofe & Folly, 2013). In the 
context of the wind power/energy analysis carried out in this thesis, the cut-in and cut-out 
wind speed ranged between 4m/s and 25m/s with variations observed from site to site.  
The wind power resource potential exhibited in Figures 6.4 to 6.21 provides an important 
economic and policy tool for assessing the development and  integration of wind energy 
technology into the UK electricity supply system. The temporal and spatial variations in 
the annual wind speed has a direct influence on the wind energy density variations, which 
in turn provides a measure of the potential power/energy yield from wind farm 
developments. The assessed wind energy resource demonstrated in Figures 6.4 to 6.21 
for the proposed offshore wind sites is projected to contribute towards the 2030 capacity 
(31.3 GW) for the ‘path to 100 g’ scenario. The impact of variability is of great 
significance in the context of the policy ambition to achieve a 100 g/kWh carbon grid 
intensity for the electricity sector by 2030 (CCC, 2015). The magnitude of the wind 
resource variability as determined by the assessments in Figures 6.4 to 6.21 is important 
in determining the aggregated power from offshore wind farm sites against the optimised 
offshore power capacity projected by the model without accounting for the impact of 
intermittency. Therefore, the power/energy output from offshore wind sites based on the 
assessed wind resource in Figures 6.4 to 6.21 and the 8 and 10 MW turbine power curve 
characteristics is used to analyse the impact of offshore wind intermittency on electricity 
sector decarbonisation by 2030.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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The mean annual wind speeds for the nine offshore wind sites shown in Figure 6.22 
confirm the views of the Energy Technologies Institute that the UK has the Europe’s 
biggest offshore wind resource, probably accounting for over a third of the total European 
potential (ETI, 2015). The mean annual wind speeds for the different weather stations for 
the UK offshore wind development range between 7 m/s and 8.6 m/s with the highest 
recordings corresponding to 80 m hub height as shown in Figure 6.22. For example, the 
maximum mean wind speeds of between 7.6 m/s to 10.8 m/s were observed at 
Ronaldsway at 80 m hub height during the spring, autumn and winter seasons. This trend 
is replicated in all the assessed weather stations regardless of the height at which the wind 
resource is recorded. This seasonal resource characteristic observed at the selected 
offshore wind sites concurs with the assessment in Coker et al. (2013) suggesting greater 
incidences of high wind speed during winter and spring with pronounced high and low 
wind events lasting several days, at all times of the year. 
 
Figure 6.22. The annual monthly averages of wind speed for the nine offshore wind 
stations.    
The summer wind speed averages at 50 and 80 m hub heights at all the nine weather sites 
range between 5.7 to 6.8 m/s and 6 to 7.2 m/s, respectively. While the UK summer season 
is synonymous with low average wind speeds, the wind resources demonstrated at the 
selected weather stations during this period is sufficiently high to allow a sustained 
offshore wind power output. The huge energy potential in the offshore wind resource 
demonstrated in Figures 6.4 to 6.22 has significant implications on the power and energy 
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yields which are required to meet the UK’s electricity demand and to assist in 
decarbonising the electricity supply sector by 2030. The extent to which the UK offshore 
wind resource is harnessed to meet energy policy ambitions is discussed in the following 
sections. 
6.2.3 Intermittent offshore wind: power output and sector decarbonisation  
In its original design, the EOC does not take into account the impact of variance in output 
from renewable energy technologies such as offshore wind in the development of 
scenarios for energy system transitions. To this end, the optimisation function of the 
model allocates the maximum installed generation capacity of offshore wind assuming 
that the allocated power capacity would supply demand at a constant rate throughout the 
year. Offshore wind is ranked amongst the low-carbon energy technologies expected to 
contribute in driving down GHG emissions during the fifth carbon budget period (2028–
2032) (CCC, 2015). Therefore, it is vitally important that a modelling environment 
designed to be a credible source of information to policymakers, renewable energy 
developers and investors on the potential contribution of offshore wind to electricity 
sector decarbonisation should endeavour to incorporate the key issues underpinning the 
dynamics affecting renewable energy technologies such as variability.  
The energy output from wind farms in general varies with environmental conditions, such 
as wind strength and frequency, which unfortunately are beyond the control of utility 
operators. These factors have a potential to influence the power/energy output from 
offshore wind which in turn can impact on the operation of the electricity network. While 
the geographical distribution of the offshore wind developments (see Section 3.3.7) could 
significantly reduce the fluctuations in wind output across the UK, it is crucial that the 
full extent of variance in intermittent power/energy output from offshore wind energy 
resources is ascertained. In this respect, the power/energy performance of each offshore 
wind farm is determined based on the wind resource characterisation presented in Figures 
6.4 to 6.22 combined with the turbine power curve (illustrated in equation 3.14 in Section 
3.3.7.2) of the 8 and 10 MW rated power wind turbines at different hub heights as shown 
in Figures 6.23 and 6.24.  
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Figure 6.23. Turbine power output at 
Norfolk offshore wind farm–turbine 
power curve and wind resource 
characteristics at Hemsby station. 
 
Figure 6.24. Turbine power output at 
Norfolk offshore wind farm–turbine 
power curve and wind resource 
characteristics at Hemsby station. 
Having determined the turbine power performance at a given offshore wind farm site as 
shown in Figure 6.23 and 6.24, the total power output of the entire offshore wind farm is 
calculated taking into account the total number of turbines at each development site. A 
comparison of the turbine power output between 8 and 10 MW rated wind turbines at 80 
m height (see Figures 6.23 and 6.24) shows a 2.04 MW difference in favour of the 10 
MW capacity turbine due to a larger swept area. The 10 MW wind turbine model at 80 m 
height could emerge as the most preferable offshore wind technology option likely to be 
deployed through the 2020s to achieve the capacity levels required for the 2030 energy 
scenario because of its potential capacity to maximise power output. Since the variability 
nature of wind has a potential to reduce the power/energy output from offshore wind 
farms, the deployment of this wind turbine model could still increase the output from 
offshore wind despite the negative impact of intermittency as outlined in the following 
sections. The proportional power output achieved at each of the nine offshore wind farm 
sites is determined based on the approach illustrated in Figures 6.23 and 6.24 and the 
results are highlighted in Figure 6.25.  
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Figure 6.25. Total power output at each wind farm site relative to the site power 
capacity. 
The results shown in Figure 6.25 respectively indicate that a wind farm site with 8 MW 
wind turbines powered by winds blowing at 50 and 80 m height produce an average power 
output of 58 % and 64 % of the total installed capacity. On the other hand, offshore wind 
farm sites with 10 MW turbines exposed to wind streams blowing at 50 and 80 m height 
achieve an average power output of 62 % and 70 % of the total installed capacity. The 
SeaTitan 10 MW has a greater potential to capture the energy in moving wind due to its 
huge swept area (28353m2) compared to the V164-8.0 MW (21124m2) (AMSC, 2012; 
MHI Vestas Offshore Wind, 2014), and hence the difference in power output at the same 
height as exhibited in Figure 6.25. The influence of wind characteristics at different 
heights on turbine power output is demonstrated by a 0.02 % increase in the average 
power output of the V164-8.0 MW at 80 m over the SeaTitan 10 MW at 50 m despite the 
later having a greater swept area (see Figure 6.25).  
It is important to note that there is on average a 0.05 % and 0.1 % difference in the amount 
of power produced by each wind turbine model at 50 and 80 m, and hence the small 
difference in the aggregated power output from the offshore wind farms shown in Figure 
6.26.  
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Figure 6.26. The aggregated power output from offshore wind sites relative to the 
2030 scenario capacity. 
While exposed to respectively high wind speeds blowing at 50 and 80 m height, the 
cumulative power output of wind farms with the V164-8.0 turbines is about 20.1 and 21.9 
GW. As the SeaTitan 10 MW’s wind power capture potential is boosted by its greater 
swept area, which is about 1.3 times larger than that of the V164-8.0, the aggregated 
power yield from the offshore wind farms is 21.7 and 23.3 GW (see Figure 6.26) at 50 
and 80 m height, respectively. The scenario developed by the Energy Optimisation 
Calculator for the ‘path to 100 g’ by 2030 projects 31.3 GW of offshore wind capacity 
required to contribute towards the energy demand and electricity sector decarbonisation 
by 2030. The offshore wind power output portrayed in Figure 6.26 indicates that the 8 
MW rated power turbines at 50 and 80 m height could respectively accrue a power 
shortfall of about 36 % and 30 % relative to the modelled target required to contribute 
towards meeting the UK energy demand as well as cutting greenhouse gas emissions. 
Similarly, the 10 MW turbines on the same offshore wind developments powered by 
winds moving at 50 and 80 m height fall short of the 31.3 GW projected offshore wind 
capacity by 31 % and 26 %, respectively.  
The difference in the total aggregated power capacity between the assessed offshore wind 
farms and that of the optimised capacity set by the model (see Figure 6.26) demonstrates 
the impact of variability, a major characteristic of weather based renewable energy 
sources. Assuming that the model’s projected overall offshore wind capacity to meet 
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energy demand and to decarbonise the electricity supply infrastructure by 2030 is derived 
from the assessed nine wind farms, it implies that more offshore wind capacity would 
need to be developed to cater for the variability induced shortfall in order to achieve the 
target set by the model. By so doing, the full impact of wind energy variability on the 
energy system development could be reflected, and thus proving vital insights into policy 
and energy supply infrastructure development.   
The electricity supply output shown in Figure 6.27 is reflective of the proportionate power 
yields demonstrated in Figure 6.25. The electricity generation outlay from the assessed 
offshore wind farms is calculated based on a 34 % capacity factor. The offshore wind 
electricity generation output determined by the model for the scenario achieving a 100 
g/kWh carbon grid intensity is 80.6 TWh, assuming a capacity factor of 29.4 % (see 
Figure 6.1). In the context of the model estimated contribution from offshore wind by 
2030, the aggregated energy supply from the 8 and 10 MW  rated turbine wind farms with 
the wind resource captured at 50 and 80 m heights is 59.2 and 64.5 TWh and 63.3 and 
68.9 TWh, respectively.  
 
Figure 6.27. Energy output from offshore wind farms based on different turbine 
models and hub heights. 
Wind variability induced deficit to the projected offshore wind contribution to the 
generation mix by 2030 is illustrated in Figure 6.28, where the electricity supply 
calculated based on wind data analysis fails to achieve the estimated supply target. It is 
noticeable from Figure 6.28 that the capacity of the 8 and 10 MW turbines to capture and 
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convert wind power at 50 and 80 m height fail to reach the 80.6 TWh target by about 21.4 
and 16.1, 17.3 and 11.7 TWh, respectively. The energy supply deficit illustrated in Figure 
6.28 underscores the full impact of the intermittent nature of wind energy resources on 
the future contribution of offshore wind energy technologies on the generation mix. 
However, with wind turbine innovation and development such as the SeaTitan 10 MW 
model developed to capture wind speeds at 80 m and above, there could be an increase 
the wind power capture potential, and thus reducing the full impact of variability on total 
power/energy output achieved from offshore wind farms.  
 
Figure 6.28. Electricity supply deficit resulting from variance in intermittent offshore 
wind output. 
Studies on the impact of renewable energy variability on electricity systems have in 
general sought to quantify the value of capacity credit, that is, the capacity of fossil fuel 
generation that can be displaced from the electricity supply system. Other approaches to 
variability in electricity system assessments have focused on establishing the level of 
intermittent output and the degree of correlation between demand peaks and the 
intermittent output (Gross et al., 2006). While these study areas on the implications of 
variability of some renewable energy source offer valuable insights in understanding the 
economics, energy security and climate change related impacts on the electricity supply 
transition to a low-carbon futures, the scope of this thesis aims to understand and quantify 
the variance of offshore wind intermittent output visa vis electricity supply sector 
decarbonisation aspirations by 2030. As this research does not endeavour to assess the 
cost of offshore wind generation relative to conventional generation, Figure 6.29 
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highlights the capacity of back-up fossil fuel plant that could be required to mitigate 
offshore wind intermittent output. The electricity generation outlay from CCGT plants 
(see Figure 6.28) used to mitigate the supply deficit created by variance in offshore wind 
output is used to determine the reserve CCGT capacity portrayed in Figure 6.29. 
 
Figure 6.29. Back-up fossil fuel plant capacity to meet the electricity demand deficit 
resulting from the variance of offshore wind output. 
The level of CCGT plant capacity presented in Figure 6.29 would need to be incorporated 
into the generation mix in 2030 in order to maintain the reliability of the electricity supply 
system as a result of the capacity deficit created by the variability of offshore wind. The 
maximum back-up fossil fuel plant capacity of 3.7 GW is required to meet the demand 
deficit from offshore wind farms with 8 MW turbines powered by winds at 50 m height 
while the remainder of the wind farm sites have a back-up capacity of less than 3 GW as 
shown in Figure 6.29. The level of offshore wind penetration from the nine offshore wind 
sites with 8 and 10 MW rated turbines, powered by winds at 80 m height represent about 
20% of the total installed capacity. This level of renewable energy penetration is assessed 
based on the optimal generation mix modelled by the calculator in line with the 2030 
carbon grid target of 100 g/kWh. In terms of the capacity credit, a measure of the 
contribution of intermittent generation to system reliability (Gross et al., 2006), the 20 % 
offshore wind penetration (from the 8 and 10 MW turbines at 80 m height) has a capacity 
credit of approximately 20-30 % in line with the UK conditions (Gross et al., 2006). 
Generally, the capacity credit for intermittent generation from the offshore sites (see 
Figure 6.26) assessed for the purpose of this thesis is considerably high, which implies 
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that less capacity from dispatchable generation would be required to maintain system 
reliability. Although the economic implications of providing a dedicated back-up capacity 
to mitigate variance in intermittent output is beyond the scope of this study, Milborrow 
(2009) suggests that a 20 % wind penetration with an assumed capacity factor of 35 % 
could have the effect of reducing the load factor of the thermal generation plants. As a 
result, the generation cost of thermal plants increases as capital cost repayments are 
spread over reduced generation output, and thus providing the basis for estimating the 
additional cost of back-up (Milborrow, 2009). Based on the up to date CCGT price of 
£700/kW, a 20 % and 40 % wind penetration level could approximately incur additional 
back-up cost in the region of about £2.5/MWh and £6/MWh, respectively (Milborrow, 
2009). As the additional costs for maintaining system reliability are bound to be passed 
down to the consumer, this could negatively impact on the energy policy objective of 
promoting the delivery of affordable energy supplies to consumers through low-carbon 
energy development. 
The reserve capacity required to mitigate variance in intermittent output from offshore 
wind portrayed in Figure 6.29 would have to be operated at a capacity factor of 66 % in 
order to achieve the electricity demand deficit shown in Figure 2.28. Offshore wind 
generation, as with the majority of renewable energy technologies, is highly anticipated 
to contribute towards decarbonising the electricity supply systems by reducing the 
amount of unabated carbon intensive fossil fuel plants such as coal and gas. However, 
while offshore wind, a low-carbon technology is considered to be one of the key players 
which could steer the UK electricity supply sector  towards the 100 g/kWh carbon grid 
intensity target by 2030 (CCC, 2015), the inherent intermittent nature of wind brings 
along the emission penalty owing to the requirement to use back-up fossil fuel plant to 
promote energy system adequacy. In the light of this assessment, Gross et al. (2006) noted 
that wind energy does not reduce carbon dioxide emissions since the intermittent nature 
of its output requires back-up by fossil fuel plant.   
The fifth carbon budget set the cumulative emission from the electricity supply sector at 
about 31 MtCO2e in order to achieve the 100 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target by 2030 
(CCC, 2015). The optimised generation mix developed by the Energy Optimisation 
Calculator achieves the 2030 carbon grid carbon intensity with a cumulative emission 
inventory of 34 MtCO2e, and hence the proportion of emissions from intermittent 
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offshore wind relative to the 2030 target portrayed in Figure 6.30. The European 
Environmental Agency (EEA) argues that the future technological development of wind 
energy could result in the 10 MW rated wind turbines dominating the offshore wind farms 
by 2030 (EEA, 2009). Assuming that this technological progress in offshore wind power 
supply system is realised, Figure 6.30 indicates that offshore wind farms with 10 MW 
turbine installations at 50 and 80 m height could respectively have a cumulative 
intermittent induced carbon emission of 1.4 and 1 MtCO2e. It is important to note that 
this observation on the emission performance of this wind turbine model deployed at 
different heights is assessed in the context of the ‘path to 100 g’ transition pathway by 
2030. Therefore, this implies that the impact of intermittence based on the technological 
progress in offshore wind turbine development could increase the cumulative electricity 
supply emissions to 35.4 and 35.8 MtCO2e, respectively. In the context of the fifth carbon 
budget’s carbon emission grid intensity target, the cumulative emissions from 10 MW 
turbine offshore wind farms powered by wind speeds at 50 and 80 m height could equate 
to a carbon grid intensity of 103 and 104 g/kWh by 2030.   
 
Figure 6.30. The environmental impacts of intermittent offshore wind to electricity 
sector transition to a low-carbon future. 
Although the 8 MW rated turbine currently represents the third largest offshore wind 
turbine by capacity (Power-technology.com, 2014), the EEA envisages that it could 
dominate the offshore wind generation landscape by 2020 (EEA, 2009). In the event that 
this turbine technology progresses to shape the offshore wind farm development outlook 
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by 2030, the emission outlay presented in Figure 6.30 indicates that emission target for 
the electricity sector decarbonisation (34.4 MtCO2e) could respectively increase by 1.8 
and 1.3 MtCO2e to reach 36.2 and 35.7 MtCO2e owing to the influence of variable output 
from wind. The overall emission performance of the 8 MW rated power turbines across 
the offshore wind farms powered by winds blowing at 50 and 80 m heights could increase 
the 2030 decarbonisation emission target by 5.2 and 3.8% to reach 104 and 105 
gCO2/kWh.  
The increase in the amount of emissions resulting from the variance in intermittent output 
from offshore wind is relatively small. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the intermittent 
induced emissions could negatively impact or derail the wider policy ambition of guiding 
the UK economy towards the 2050 legally binding emission reduction target. Having 
established the nature of the wind resource expected to power the offshore wind for the 
2030 UK generation mix, the increase in the emissions derived from the intermittent wind 
displayed in Figure 6.30 could be mitigated by increasing the penetration levels of wind 
in the mix. However, this premise is based on the assumption that the assessed offshore 
wind characteristics would deliver power output consistently throughout the period under 
study. Although low wind events are likely to be experienced over the course of the year, 
the analysis undertaken in this thesis is of the view that as wind capacity in the system 
increases, the increased geographical spread of offshore wind developments could reduce 
the energy output fluctuations and any significant changes in wind output across the 
whole of the UK (Milborrow, 2009). 
In the event that the intermittent output drops below the levels portrayed in Figure 6.26 
due to low wind output over the whole of the UK offshore wind site developments, the 
proportion of back-up capacity and the emission outlook in Figures 6.29 and 6.30 could 
increase. However, the implications of such an increase in the intermittent induced 
emissions over the overall UK economy decarbonisation aspirations could be dependent 
on the emission reductions from other sectors of the economy. In any case, a 20 % 
offshore wind penetration which is geographically widespread across the British 
territorial waters is not likely to underperform to the extent of derailing the entire 
economy from the path to the 2050 emission reduction target.   
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6.2.4 Wind variability in the ‘Energy Optimisation Calculator’   
The offshore wind analysis undertaken in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 has exposed the 
inadequacies of the model used in this thesis to address the issue of intermittency from 
renewable energy sources, particularly from offshore wind. The optimised low-carbon 
and renewable energy technology capacities projected by the model to meet emission 
reduction targets appears to have been overestimated as demonstrated by the analysis 
carried out in this section. This is borne from the fact that the contribution from some of 
the renewable energy sources to the generation mix did not incorporate the potential 
output differential resulting from variability associated with weather. A comparison of 
the total offshore wind capacity in the context of a 100 gCO2/kWh decarbonisation target 
portrayed in Figures 6.1 and 6.29 shows that variance in intermittent output reduces the 
power capacity of offshore wind determined by the calculator by an average of about 30 
%. Having quantified the level of intermittent output from offshore wind, it is vitally 
important that this aspect is reflected in the model framework in order to improve and 
enhance the plausibility of the scenario outputs developed by the model. Ultimately, as 
the robustness of the scenario outputs from the model are ascertained, a level of 
confidence could be ascribed to the EOC as one of the key modelling frameworks that 
could be used to provide insight into policy, technological and electricity supply 
infrastructure development.  
While there is no need to modify the fundamental optimal cost and emission abatement 
mathematical framework of the model, the crux of the matter centres on the need to ensure 
that the intermittent renewable energy capacity computed in the model has been 
synthesised to incorporate variability. Running the model in its original state should only 
provide a benchmark of the level of renewable energy capacity that could be required to 
meet energy demand and emission target set, optimally. With the UK offshore wind 
developments geographically spread across the British Isles, the actual renewable energy 
(offshore wind) capacity and the capacity factor can be assessed based on site and turbine 
characteristics by adopting an integrated approach which employs other analysis tools 
such as the MERRA to be assessed outside of the EOC. The methodology and analysis 
framework outlined in Sections 3.3.7.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 could form a blueprint by which 
the intermittent output from wind can be ascertained before the indicative capacity can be 
computed into the model.  
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The technical plant utilisation/availability factor used in the calculator determines the 
percentage of the time the electricity generation plant is available to produce energy (Feng 
et al., 2010). As a function of plant reliability, the EOC sets the utilisation factor for 
renewable energy sources at 70 % while unabated and CCS fitted fossil fuel and nuclear 
power plants are operated at 80 %. In determining the energy output of any given plant 
within the model, the capacity factor is reduced in line with the utilisation factor ascribed 
to each power generating plant. For example, based on the 70 % utilisation factor, a 42 % 
capacity factor for offshore wind implies that the overall energy output is calculated using 
a 29.4 % capacity factor, having accounted for the 30% of the time the generating plant 
is unavailable to produce electricity to the grid. 
As modern wind turbines have a guaranteed availability of about 95 % (Salvacao & 
Guedes Soares, 2015), this utilisation factor would need to be incorporated in the 
calculator to replace the original capacity allocated to offshore wind. Therefore, in 
ensuring that the offshore wind capacity factor is reflective of the site wind data and 
turbine characteristics, the value computed in the model would be increased by about 5 
% to cater for the plant unavailability which the model deducts in its calculations. Once 
the level of intermittency is quantified and the model settings are configured to assimilate 
the element of intermittency from offshore wind or any other renewable energy resources, 
then confidence can be ascribed to the model’s capability to develop low-carbon energy 
scenarios that truly reflect on the dynamic impacts of variability on some of the renewable 
energy sources.  
6.2.5 Summary  
The UK has an abundant offshore wind resource which is vital to offshore wind energy 
development. While the future role of offshore wind in contributing towards meeting the 
domestic and regional renewable energy and emission reduction targets is unequivocal, 
wind energy is intermittent in nature. Variable energy output from renewable energy 
technologies such as offshore wind have the potential to impact on the operation and 
economics of electricity networks, markets and the output of other forms of generation 
(Gross et al., 2006). Thus, it is important that energy modelling environments are 
developed in a manner that quantifies the level of variance in intermittent output from 
renewable energy resources including wind.  
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Assuming that the total offshore wind installed capacity from the nine offshore wind 
development zones constitutes 31.3 GW, the aggregated output from all the wind farm 
sites could respectively achieve a power capacity outlay of about 20.1 and 21.9 GW and 
21.7 and 23.3 GW from 8 MW and 10 MW turbines at 50 and 80 m heights. The 
difference between the total installed capacity and aggregated power output from the wind 
farm development zones serves to highlight the level of variability induced by 
environmental conditions on offshore wind.  
In the context of the 100 gCO2/kWh grid carbon intensity decarbonisation target, variance 
in intermittent output from offshore could results in a supply deficit which could be 
mitigated by adding unabated fossil fuel plants to the generation mix, thereby increasing 
the level of carbon emissions relative to the 34.4 MtCO2e target set for the electricity 
sector decarbonisation by 2030. A 10 MW rated wind turbine at 80 m height has a high 
energy output which results in less unabated reserve gas plant generation capacity being 
deployed to mitigate the supply deficit created by the variance in intermittent output. The 
increase in the amount of emissions resulting from the variance in intermittent output 
from offshore wind is relatively small. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the intermittent 
induced emissions could negatively impact or derail the wider policy ambition of guiding 
the UK economy towards the 2050 legally binding emission reduction target. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and future work 
7.1  Conclusions 
The new UK energy policy may not achieve the deployment targets for new gas and 
nuclear generation plants. The supply gap created could be filled by unabated coal and 
diesel generators, thus compromising on the decarbonisation ambition especially in the 
absence of CCS technology in the mix. The UK new energy policy would need to be 
revised in line with the Climate Change Act in order to build a strong link between 
security of supply and a low-carbon electricity supply system. Thus, an accelerated 
deployment of CCS, conventional and SMR nuclear plants and renewable energy 
technologies after 2030 is central in developing a near zero carbon grid intensity 
electricity generation sector by 2050.                     
The potential shale gas use in unabated gas plants could be limited in decarbonisation 
pathways which achieve 50 and 100 gCO2/kWh by 2030. The increased use of shale gas 
in electricity generation could be enhanced in gas plants retrofitted with CCS technology.  
Based on this limited operational regime of unabated gas plants in the 50 and 100 
gCO2/kWh decarbonisation targets by 2030, the introduction of shale gas in the 
generation mix may not alter the low-carbon and renewable energy technology 
development and deployment framework required to cut carbon emissions. The benefits 
of shale gas in the electricity generation could be realised under large decarbonisation 
targets such as the ‘path to 200 g’ where unabated gas plants are operated at high capacity 
factors. Thus, the penetration of low-carbon and renewable energy technologies is 
curtailed by the increased use of shale in unabated gas plants in this scenario. Therefore, 
shale gas development and use in the UK electricity generation sector has limited benefits 
unless used plants fitted with CCS. 
Renewable energy technologies contribute significantly to developing low-carbon 
electricity supply systems. Their energy output is variable due to environmental 
conditions. The UK has an abundant offshore wind resource. Based on the energy 
scenario that achieves the 100 g/kWh carbon grid intensity by 2030, the aggregated 
offshore wind energy output from the 8 and 10 MW rated WT at 50 and 80 m height could 
respectively be mitigated by 2.8 and 2 GW capacity of unabated gas CCGT. Therefore, 
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the emissions resulting from intermittency are in the order of 3 to 4 %, which by all 
accounts is not likely to affect the UK decarbonisation targets.  
7.2 Research limitations  
Intermittency of renewable energy resources such as onshore wind, solar PV, Wave and 
tidal is not assessed in this research. These energy resources are distributed over a large 
geographical scale across the UK. Hence, time and data availability have been key factors 
that constrained this research from incorporate the assessment of intermittency of these 
renewable energy technologies. A study on the impact of variability on offshore wind is 
not modelled to evaluate the interaction between intermittent out, peak demand and the 
operation of dispatchable generation. This is constrained by time, data as well as the 
model framework which is limited in its assessment of the peaks and troughs in electricity 
demand. The research did not examine the evolution of the whole UK energy system to a 
low-carbon future. The scope of the EOC is only focused on developing scenarios for 
decarbonising the electricity generation sector in line with the 2050 emission reduction 
target. Due to the model limitations, other sectors of the energy economy such as the built 
environment, industry and transport have not been integrated in this research. 
7.3 Future research  
The UK electricity generation could remain dominated by fossil fuels dominated well 
beyond the 2030s in the context of the current policy developments. An integrated 
modelling approach which incorporates the EOC, PLEXOS and ESME could be 
employed to develop scenarios that reflect on the whole energy system. It is through this 
whole system analysis approach that suitable policy, technological and economic 
mechanisms could be put in place to support some sectors of the energy economy which 
were once deemed too expensive and difficult to precipitate deep cuts in emissions. 
Variability of renewable energy sources examined in this research is confined to offshore 
wind. Furthermore, the analysis is limited in detail as it doesn’t explore the short-term 
fluctuations in offshore wind output. Hence, the interaction between intermittent output, 
peak demand and the operation of a reserve fossil fuel plant is not explored in this thesis. 
These aspects are critically important in determining the way the electricity system works. 
In this respect, the scope of the research planned for the future on this subject could 
initially focus on mapping the renewable energy resource (wind, solar and wave), 
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followed by the quantification of variability on onshore wind, solar PV, tidal and wave 
output based on statistical data analysis. The next phase of this analysis would progress 
to evaluate the short-term implications of renewable energy intermittency to system 
reliability and the cost of maintaining and operation of the reserve generation plant. The 
EOC could be used in conjunction with PLEXOS to simulate the economics, technical 
and operation levels of fossil fuel and renewables technologies within the generation mix.   
196 
 
 
References  
Ahmed Shata, A.S. & Hanitsch, R., 2006. Evaluation of wind energy potential and 
electricity generation on the coast of Mediterranean Sea in Egypt. Renewable 
Energy, 31(8), pp.1183–1202. 
Aldridge, J., 2015. Mad Maths: How Diesel Generators are securing exclusive returns at 
billpayers’ expense. Available at: http://www.ippr.org/publications/mad-maths-
how-new-diesel-generators-are-securing-excessive-returns-at-billpayers-expense 
[Accessed January 7, 2016]. 
AMSC, 2012. SeaTitan 10 MW Wind Turbine. Available at: 
http://www.amsc.com/documents/seatitan-10-mw-wind-turbine-data-sheet/ 
[Accessed February 22, 2016]. 
Anandarajah, G., Strachan, N, Ekins, P., Ramachandran, K.and Hughes, N., 2009. 
Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy: Energy Systems Modelling. Available at: 
www.ukerc.ac.uk/asset/367AAF90-FCBB-4478-98D6F3B7987075FC [Accessed 
August 14, 2015]. 
Andrews, I.J., 2013. The Carboniferous Bowland Shale gas study: geology and resource 
estimation. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/226
874/BGS_DECC_BowlandShaleGasReport_MAIN_REPORT.pdf [Accessed 
September 26, 2014]. 
Ang, B.W., Choong, W.L. & Ng, T.S., 2015. Energy security: Definitions, dimensions 
and indexes. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 42, pp.1077–1093.  
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, 2007. A quest for Energy Security in The 21st 
Century. Available at: www.ieej.or.jp/aperc [Accessed October 28, 2015]. 
Arslan, T., Bulut, Y.M. & Altın Yavuz, A., 2014. Comparative study of numerical 
methods for determining Weibull parameters for wind energy potential. Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 40, pp.820–825.  
Azar, C., Lindgren, K., Larson, E. and Mollersten, K., 2006. Carbon capture and storage 
from fossil fuels and biomass - Costs and potential role in stabilizing the 
197 
 
 
atmosphere. Climatic Change, 74(1-3), pp.47–79. 
Barnacle, M., Robertson, E., Galloway, S., Barton, J. and Ault, G., 2013. Modelling 
generation and infrastructure requirements for transition pathways. Energy Policy, 
52, pp.60–75.  
BENTEK Energy, 2010. HOW LESS BECAME MORE...Wind, Power and Unintended 
Consequences in the Colorado Energy Market. Available at: 
www.bentekenergy.com/windcoalandgasstudy.aspx. [Accessed February 22, 
2016]. 
Bilir, L., Imir, M., Devrim, Y. and Albostan, A., 2015. Seasonal and yearly wind speed 
distribution and wind power density analysis based on Weibull distribution 
function. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 40(44), pp.15301–15310.  
Biomass Energy Centre, 2011. Fuel costs per kWh. Available at: 
http://www.biomassenergycentre.org.uk/portal/page?_pageid=75,59188&_dad=por
tal [Accessed April 15, 2014]. 
Birol, F., 2007. Energy economics: A place for energy poverty in the agenda? Energy 
Journal, 28(3), pp.1–6.  
Boston Consulting Group, 2010. The Offshore Valuation. Available at: 
http://publicinterest.org.uk/the-offshore-valuation-an-overview/ [Accessed 
February 23, 2016]. 
Bradshaw, M. & Watson, J., 2014. The UK ’ s Global Gas Challenge Research Report 
The UK ’ s Global Gas Challenge. Available at: 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/publications/the-uk-s-global-gas-challenge.html [Accessed 
July 28, 2015]. 
Bradshaw, M.J., 2010. Global energy dilemmas: A geographical perspective. 
Geographical Journal, 176(4), pp.275–290.  
Broderick, J., Anderson, K., Wood, R., Gilbert, P., Sharmina, M., Footitt, A., Glynn, S. 
and Nicholls, F., 2011. Shale gas: an updated assessment of environmental and 
climate change impacts. Available at: 
http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/coop_shale_gas_report_update_v3.10.p
198 
 
 
df [Accessed August 4, 2015]. 
Broderick, J. & Anderson, P.K., 2012. Has US Shale Gas Reduced CO2 Emissions? 
Examining recent changes in emissions from the US power sector and traded fossil 
fuel. Available at: 
http://tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/broderick_and_anderson_2012_impact_of_sh
ale_gas_on_us_energy_and_emissions.pdf [Accessed January 6, 2016]. 
Burton, Tony, Jenkins, Nick, Sharpe David, Bossanyi, E., 2011. Wind Energy 
Handbook Second Edition., Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
British Wind Energy Association/RenewableUK, 2010. Offshore wind; development 
rounds. Available at: http://www.renewableuk.com/en/renewable-energy/wind-
energy/offshore-wind/ [Accessed March 8, 2016]. 
Caldecott, B. and Daniels, J., 2014. Stranded generation assets : Implications for 
European capacity mechanisms , energy markets and climate policy Working 
Paper. Available at: http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research-
programmes/stranded-assets/Stranded Generation Assets - Working Paper - Final 
Version.pdf [Accessed July 16, 2015]. 
Carbon Connect, 2014. Future Electricity Series Part 3: Power from Nuclear. Available 
at: 
http://www.policyconnect.org.uk/cc/sites/site_cc/files/carbonconnect_powerfromn
uclear.pdf [Accessed February 12, 2016]. 
Carrasco-Díaz, M., Rivas, D., Orozco-Contreras, M. and Sanchez-Montante, O., 2015. 
An assessment of wind power potential along the coast of Tamaulipas, 
northeastern Mexico. Renewable Energy, 78, pp.295–305.  
Chang, T.J., Chen, C.L., Tu, Y.L., Yeh, H.T. and Wu, Y.T., 2015. Evaluation of the 
climate change impact on wind resources in Taiwan Strait. Energy Conversion and 
Management, 95, pp.435–445. 
Chignell, S. & Gross, R.J.K., 2013. Not locked-in? The overlooked impact of new gas-
fired generation investment on long-term decarbonisation in the UK. Energy 
Policy, 52, pp.699–705.  
199 
 
 
Christophe McGlade & Paul Ekins, 2015. The geographical distribution of fossil fuels 
unused when limiting global warming to 2°C. Nature, 517(7533), pp.187–190.  
Clarke, D., 2016. ETI analysis of the UK energy system design implications of delay to 
deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the UK. Available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/energy-and-climate-
change/ETI-letter-to-Chair-on-Future-of-CCS.pdf [Accessed January 30, 2016]. 
Coker, P., Barlow, J., Cockerill, T. and Shipworth, D., 2013. Measuring significant 
variability characteristics: An assessment of three UK renewables. Renewable 
Energy, 53, pp.111–120.  
Committee on Climate Change, 2010a. Building a Low-Carbon Economy – The UK’s 
Contribution to Tackling Climate Change. Available at: 
http://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/building-a-low-carbon-economy-the-uks-
contribution-to-tackling-climate-change-2/ [Accessed September 9, 2014]. 
Committee on Climate Change, 2013a. Fourth Carbon Budget Review part 2; technical 
report – sectoral analysis of the cost-effective path to the 2050 target. Available at: 
http://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/fourth-carbon-budget-review/ [Accessed July 
18, 2014]. 
Committee on Climate Change, 2013b. Fourth Carbon Budget Review: technical report: 
Sectorial analysis of the cost-effective path to the 2050 target. Available at: 
https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1785b-
CCC_TechRep_Singles_Book_1.pdf [Accessed July 30, 2015]. 
Committee on Climate Change, 2016. Implications of he Paris Agreement for the ffth 
carbon budget. Available at: https://documents.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Paris-Agreement-and-fifth-carbon-budget-CCC-letter-to-
Rt-Hon-Amber-Rudd.pdf [Accessed February 2, 2016]. 
Committee on Climate Change, 2014. Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2014 Progress Report 
to Parliament Meeting. Available at: http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/CCC-Progress-Report-2014_web_2.pdf [Accessed 
August 18, 2014]. 
Committee on Climate Change, 2013c. Next steps on Electricity Market Reform – 
200 
 
 
securing the benefits of low-carbon investment. Available at: 
http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/1720_EMR_report_web.pdf [Accessed July 18, 2014]. 
Committee on Climate Change, 2015. The Fifth Carbon Budget: The next step towards 
a low-carbon economy. Available at: https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/the-
fifth-carbon-budget-the-next-step-towards-a-low-carbon-economy/ [Accessed 
December 4, 2015]. 
Committee on Climate Change, 2010c. The Fourth Carbon Budget: Reducing Emissions 
Through the 1990s. Available at: http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws2/4th 
Budget/CCC_4th-Budget_interactive.pdf [Accessed July 18, 2014]. 
Committee on Climate Change, 2012. The need for a carbon intensity target in the 
power sector. Available at: http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/EMR-letter-September-12.pdf [Accessed April 10, 2015].  
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014a. 2013 UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
Provisional Figures and 2012 UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Final Figures by 
Fuel Type and End-User Statistical release. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/295
968/20140327_2013_UK_Greenhouse_Gas_Emissions_Provisional_Figures.pdf 
[Accessed January 29, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2010. 2050-calculator-with-costs. Available 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2050-pathways-calculator-with-
costs [Accessed July 12, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015a. Amber Rudd’s speech on a new 
direction for UK energy policy. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/amber-rudds-speech-on-a-new-
direction-for-uk-energy-policy [Accessed November 18, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014b. Annual Energy Statement September 
2014. Available at: http://www.ccsassociation.org/news-and-events/reports-and-
publications/ [Accessed April 10, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012a. CCS Roadmap. Supporting 
201 
 
 
deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage in the UK. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/483
17/4899-the-ccs-roadmap.pdf [Accessed July 30, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015b. CFD Auction Allocation Round One-
a breakdown of the outcome by technology, year and clearing price. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cfd-auction-allocation-round-one-a-
breakdown-of-the-outcome-by-technology-year-and-clearing-price [Accessed June 
1, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015c. Consultation on changes to financial 
support for solar PV Controlling spending on solar PV projects of 5MW and below 
within the Renewables Obligation. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447
321/Solar_PV_within_the_RO_consultation.pdf [Accessed December 3, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011a. Consultation on proposals for the 
levels of banded support under the Renewables Obligation for the period 2013-17 
and the Renewables Obligation Order 2012. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment... [Accessed 
August 4, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015d. Contracts for Difference Allocation 
Round One Outcome. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/contracts-for-difference-cfd-allocation 
[Accessed January 20, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015e. DECC 2015 Fossil Fuel Price 
Assumptions. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/477
958/2015_DECC_fossil_fuel_price_assumptions.pdf [Accessed December 21, 
2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014c. Delivering UK Energy Investment. 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/331
202 
 
 
071/DECC_Energy_Investment_Report.pdf [Accessed December 9, 2015]. 
The Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015f. Digest of United Kingdom 
Energy Statistics (DUKES) 2015. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digest-of-united-kingdom-energy-
statistics-dukes-2013-printed-version-excluding-cover-pages [Accessed May 5, 
2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012b. Electricity Demand Reduction: 
Consultation on options to encourage permanent reductions in electricity use. 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/665
61/7075-electricity-demand-reduction-consultation-on-optio.pdf [Accessed 
January 21, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012c. Electricity Market Reform : Update 
on the Emissions Performance Standard. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/483
75/5350-emr-annex-d--update-on-the-emissions-performance-s.pdf [Accessed 
August 21, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015g. Electricity Market Reform: 
Announcement of de-rating methodology for interconnectors in the Capacity 
Market. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/404
260/Inteconnector_de-rating_methdology_final_final.pdf [Accessed January 21, 
2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012d. Electricity market reform: policy 
overview. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/.../7090-electricity-market-reform-
policy-overview- [Accessed August 16, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014d. Electricity Market Reforms-Capacity 
Market: Impact Assessment (IA). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/324
430/Final_Capacity_Market_Impact_Assessment.pdf [Accessed January 6, 2016]. 
203 
 
 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015h. Electricity: Chapter 5, Digest of 
United Kingdom Energy Statistics (DUKES). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/electricity-chapter-5-digest-of-united-
kingdom-energy-statistics-dukes [Accessed January 18, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011b. Emissions Performance Standard 
Impact Assessment ( IA ) Summary :Interventions and Options. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/481
37/2179-eps-impact-assessment-emr-wp.pdf [Accessed July 28, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012e. Energy Security Strategy. Available 
at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/656
43/7101-energy-security-strategy.pdf [Accessed August 4, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013a. Energy trends section 5: Fuel used in 
electricity generation and electricity supplied (ET 5.1). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/437
802/Electricity.pdf [Accessed July 27, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012f. Feed-in Tariff with Contracts for 
Difference: Operational Framework (Annex A). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/656
35/7077-electricity-market-reform-annex-a.pdf [Accessed July 30, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012g. Gas Generation Strategy. Available 
at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/656
54/7165-gas-generation-strategy.pdf [Accessed July 12, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012h. Gas will support the decarbonisation 
of the electricity mix. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/gas-will-
support-decarbonisation-of-the-electricity-mix [Accessed January 20, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014e. Government response to consultation 
on changes to financial support for solar PV. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/656
204 
 
 
83/7335-national-grid-solar-pv-briefing-note-for-decc.pdf [Accessed April 13, 
2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015i. HM Government Statement 
Regarding Carbon Capture, Storage Competition: London Stock Exchange. 
Available at: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-
news/market-news-detail/12597443.html [Accessed December 10, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014f. Implementing Electricity Market 
Reform (EMR). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/implementing-electricity-market-
reform-emr [Accessed July 28, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015j. Information on exploration, hydraulic 
fracturing (fracking) and approach to teh development of teh shale gas oil and gas 
industry in the UK. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/shale-oil-gas-and-fracking [Accessed 
May 26, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013b. Investing in renewable technologies – 
CfD contract terms and strike prices. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263
937/Final_Document_-_Investing_in_renewable_technologies_-
_CfD_contract_terms_and_strike_prices_UPDATED_6_DEC.pdf [Accessed April 
16, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011c. National Policy Statement for 
Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6) Volume I of II. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478
59/2009-nps-for-nuclear-volumeI.pdf [Accessed December 4, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015k. Onshore wind: closure of renewables 
obligation on 31st March 2016. Available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/impact-assessments/IA15-007D.pdf 
[Accessed December 3, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011d. Planning our electric future: a White 
205 
 
 
Paper for secure, affordable and low‑carbon electricity. Available at: 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/white_papers/emr_wp_2011/e
mr_wp_2011.aspx [Accessed July 18, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013c. Potential Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Associated with Shale Gas Extraction and Use. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/237
330/MacKay_Stone_shale_study_report_09092013.pdf [Accessed September 27, 
2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014g. Quarterly energy prices. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/quarterly-energy-prices-june-2013 
[Accessed February 2, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015l. Review of the Feed-in Tariffs 
Scheme. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/487
300/FITs_Review_Govt__response_Final.pdf [Accessed December 18, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011e. Review of the generation costs and 
deployment potential of renewable electricity technologies in the UK Study 
Report. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/.../file/42843/3237-cons-ro-banding-
arup-report.pdf [Accessed July 18, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2016. Solar photovoltaics deployment. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/solar-photovoltaics-
deployment#history [Accessed February 8, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012i. Solar PV cost update. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/430
83/5381-solar-pv-cost-update.pdf [Accessed July 18, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014h. State aid approval for Hinkley Point 
C nuclear power plant - Press releases - GOV. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/state-aid-approval-for-hinkley-point-c-
nuclear-power-plant [Accessed July 30, 2015]. 
206 
 
 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013d. UK Renewable Energy Roadmap. 
Available at: 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/renewable_ener/re_roadm
ap/re_roadmap.aspx [Accessed July 30, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011f. UK Renewable Energy Roadmap. 
Available at: 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/renewable_ener/re_roadm
ap/re_roadmap.aspx [Accessed July 31, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012j. UK Renewable Energy Roadmap 
Update 2012. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/802
46/11-02-13_UK_Renewable_Energy_Roadmap_Update_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf 
[Accessed April 9, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013e. UK Solar PV Strategy Part 1: 
Roadmap to a Brighter Future. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249
277/UK_Solar_PV_Strategy_Part_1_Roadmap_to_a_Brighter_Future_08.10.pdf 
[Accessed April 9, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014i. Updated energy and emissions 
projections. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/239
937/uep_2013.pdf [Accessed July 28, 2014]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014j. Updated short-term traded carbon 
values used for modelling purposes. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/240
099/short-
term_traded_carbon_values_used_for_modelling_purposes_2013_URN.pdf 
[Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015m. Updated short-term traded carbon 
values used for UK public policy appraisal. Available at: 
207 
 
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/477
540/Updated_short-
term_traded_carbon_values_used_for_UK_policy_appraisal__2015_.pdf 
[Accessed January 21, 2016]. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013f. Updated short-term traded carbon 
values used for UK public policy appraisal. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/240
095/short-
term_traded_carbon_values_used_for_UK_policy_appraisal_2013_FINAL_URN.
pdf [Accessed July 28, 2014]. 
Digest of UK Energy Statistics, 2008. Digest of United Kingdom 2008. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130109092117/http://decc.gov.uk/ass
ets/decc/statistics/publications/dukes/dukes08.pdf [Accessed August 12, 2013]. 
Digest of UK Energy Statistics, 2014. Historic energy statistics dukes 5_1_2. Available 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/.../dukes5_1_2.xls [Accessed 
July 8, 2015].  
Doyle, D.C. and Mattenson, L.B. ed. (1995). Advanced Guide to Program Design: 
Microsoft Excel/Visual Basic Programmer's Guide. Washington. Microsofr Press.  
Economic Affairs Committee, 2014. House of Lords - The Economic Impact on UK 
Energy Policy of Shale Gas and Oil. Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldeconaf/172/17207.ht
m [Accessed March 14, 2016]. 
EDF Energy, 2015. EDF Energy’s nuclear power stations. Available at: 
http://www.edfenergy.com/energyfuture/edf-energys-approach-why-we-choose-
new-nuclear/current-nuclear-sites [Accessed July 30, 2015]. 
European Environment Agency, 2009. Europe’s onshore and offshore wind energy 
potential. Available at: www.eea.europa.eu [Accessed April 30, 2016]. 
Energy Information Administration, 2012. International Energy Statistics - EIA. 
Available at: 
http://eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=1&pid=7&aid=1 
208 
 
 
[Accessed July 20, 2015]. 
Energy Information Administration, 2013. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale 
Gas Resources : An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside 
the United States. Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/overview.pdf [Accessed 
July 23, 2015]. 
Ekins, P., Keppo, I., Skea, J., Strachan, N., Usher, W. and Anandarajah, G., 2013. The 
UK energy system in 2050: Comparing Low-Carbon, Resilient Scenarios. 
Available at: www.ukerc.ac.uk [Accessed July 18, 2014]. 
Environment Agency, 2013. European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) 
Regulatory guidance for installations (including excluded installations). Available 
at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/296
963/LIT_7592_b90555.pdf [Accessed January 28, 2016]. 
Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales, N.I.E.A. and S.E.P.A., 2013. The 
Industrial Emissions Directive: Chapter III Plant. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/296
461/LIT_8298_c8fd64.pdf [Accessed January 28, 2016]. 
Erbach, G., 2014a. EU climate and energy policies post-2020: Energy security, 
competitiveness and decarbonisation. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/130681/LDM_
BRI(2014)130681_REV1_EN.pdf [Accessed July 13, 2015]. 
Erbach, G., 2014b. Shale gas and EU energy security. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/542167/EPRS_BRI(20
14)542167_REV1_EN.pdf [Accessed May 26, 2016]. 
Energy Technologies Institute, 2015a. System Requirements For Alternative Nuclear 
Technologies. Available at: http://www.eti.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/ANT-Summary-Report_ETI-website.pdf [Accessed 
February 1, 2016]. 
Energy Technologies Institute, 2015b. TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION TO IMPROVE 
209 
 
 
THROUGH-LIFE COSTS. Available at: http://www.eti.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Offshore-Wind-Programme-Brochure-.pdf [Accessed 
May 11, 2016]. 
EURACOAL, 2013. Coal Industry Across Europe. Available at: 
http://www.energy.eu/publications/Energy-trends_to_2030-2.pdf [Accessed July 
15, 2015]. 
Eurelectric, 2014. Flexible gas markets for variable renewable generation. Available at: 
http://www.eurelectric.org/media/130545/flexiblegasmarketpaper_final_lr-2014-
2250-0001-01-e.pdf. 
European Comission, 2008. An EU Energy and Solidarity Action Plan. Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52008DC0781 
[Accessed July 14, 2015]. 
European Comission, 2015. Connecting power markets to deliver security of supply , 
market integration and the large-scale uptake of renewables. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4486_en.htm [Accessed January 
21, 2016]. 
European Comission, 2010. EU energy trends to 2030 - UPDATE 2009. Available at: 
http://www.energy.eu/publications/Energy-trends_to_2030-2.pdf [Accessed July 
15, 2015]. 
European Comission, 2007. Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius The 
way ahead for 2020 and beyond. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52007DC0002 [Accessed July 13, 2015]. 
European Comission, 2014. The European Energy Strategy. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&qid=1407855611566 [Accessed 
July 14, 2015]. 
European Commission, 2015. Renewable energy progress report. Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4f8722ce-1347-11e5-8817-
01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF [Accessed May 24, 2016]. 
210 
 
 
European Council, 2009. Brussels European Council 29/30 October 2009: Precidency 
Conclusions. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/110889.pdf 
[Accessed July 13, 2015]. 
European Council, 2010. Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution 
prevention and control). Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32010L0075 [Accessed February 8, 2016]. 
European Union, 2012. Roadmap 2050. Available at: http://www.roadmap2050.eu/ 
[Accessed July 13, 2015]. 
Eurostat, 2015a. Eurostat: Your Key to European Statistics. Energy from Renewable 
sources. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares 
[Accessed July 20, 2015]. 
Eurostat, 2015b. Renewable energy statistics - Statistics Explained. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_
statistics [Accessed July 15, 2015]. 
European Wind Energy Association, 2014. Wind in Power: 2013 European Statistics. 
Available at: 
http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/files/library/publications/statistics/EWEA_Annual
_Statistics_2013.pdf [Accessed July 20, 2015]. 
Feng, Y., Tavner, P.J., Hong, H. and Bialek, J.W., 2010. Review of early operation of 
UK round 1 offshore wind farms. In IEEE PES General Meeting, PES 2010. 
Available at: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=5590159 
[Accessed March 1, 2016]. . 
Foxon, Timothy J. Geoffrey P. Hammond, P.J.G.P., 2010. Developing transition 
pathways for a low carbon electricity system in the UK. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 77(8), pp.1203–1213.  
Foxon, T.J., 2011. A coevolutionary framework for analysing a transition to a 
sustainable low carbon economy. Ecological Economics, 70(12), pp.2258–2267.  
211 
 
 
Foxon, T.J., 2013. Transition pathways for a UK low carbon electricity future. Energy 
Policy, 52, pp.10–24.  
Global Energy Assessment, 2012. Global Energy Assessment-Towards a Sustainable 
Future. Available at: http://www.globalenergyassessment.org/ [Accessed March 1, 
2016]. 
Geels, F.W., 2004. From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems: 
Insights about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory. 
Research Policy, 33(6-7), pp.897–920. 
Geels, F.W., 2005. Processes and patterns in transitions and system innovations: 
Refining the co-evolutionary multi-level perspective. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 72(6 SPEC. ISS.), pp.681–696.  
Geels, F.W., 2002. Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: 
a multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy, 31(8-9), pp.1257–
1274. 
Geels, F.W., 2011. The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: Responses 
to seven criticisms. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 1(1), 
pp.24–40. 
Green Alliance, 2011. Avoiding gas. Available at: http://www.green-
alliance.org.uk/resources/Avoiding gas lock-in.pdf [Accessed February 23, 2016]. 
Gross R, Speirs J, Hawkes A, Skilling S, H.P., 2014. Could retaining old coal lead to a 
policy own goal? Available at: 
http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/wwf_coal_report_imperial_college_final.pdf 
[Accessed November 12, 2014]. 
Gross, R., 2015. Approaches to cost reduction in carbon capture and storage and 
offshore wind. Available at: https://documents.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Gross-2015-Approaches-to-cost-reduction-in-carbon-
capture-and-storage-and-offshore-wind.pdf [Accessed February 3, 2016]. 
Gross, R., Heptonstall, P., Anderson, D., Green, T., Leach, M., and Skea, J., 2006. The 
costs and impacts of intermittency: An assessment of the evidence on the cost and 
212 
 
 
impacts of intermittent generation on British electricity networks. Available at: 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/publications/the-costs-and-impacts-of-intermittency.html 
[Accessed February 28, 2015]. 
Gross, R., Blyth, W. & Heptonstall, P., 2010. Risks, revenues and investment in 
electricity generation: Why policy needs to look beyond costs. Energy Economics, 
32(4), pp.796–804.  
Hayashi, M. & Hughes, L., 2013. The Fukushima nuclear accident and its effect on 
global energy security. Energy Policy, 59, pp.102–111.  
Heaton, C., 2014. Modelling Low-Carbon Energy System Designs with the ETI ESME 
model. Available at: http://www.eti.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/ESME_Modelling_Paper.pdf [Accessed October 20, 
2015]. 
Herzog, H.J., 2011. Scaling up carbon dioxide capture and storage: From megatons to 
gigatons. Energy Economics, 33(4), pp.597–604.  
Hirth, L., 2013. The market value of variable renewables. The effect of solar wind 
power variability on their relative price. Energy Economics, 38, pp.218–236.  
Her Majesty's Government, 2010. 2050 Pathways Analysis. Available at: 
papers2://publication/uuid/6DBCC6C2-D307-4058-9EA2-C8F6D0E9EE0F 
[Accessed October 20, 2015]. 
Her Majesty's Government, 2008. Climate Change Act 2008. Available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/pdfs/ukpga_20080027_en.pdf 
[Accessed July 12, 2014]. 
Her Majesty's Government, 2013a. Long-term Nuclear Energy Strategy. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/168
047/bis-13-630-long-term-nuclear-energy-strategy.pdf [Accessed December 18, 
2015]. 
Her Majesty's Government, 2013b. Off Shore Wind Industry Strategy: Business and 
Government Action. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243
213 
 
 
987/bis-13-1092-offshore-wind-industrial-strategy.pdf [Accessed July 21, 2014]. 
Her Majesty's Government, 2011. The Carbon Plan: Delivering our low carbon future. 
Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/tackling-climate-
change/carbon-plan/3702-the-carbon-plan-delivering-our-low-carbon-future.pdf 
[Accessed July 18, 2014]. 
Her Majesty's Government, 2013c. The Nuclear Industrial Startegy: The UK ’s Nuclear 
Future. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/168
048/bis-13-627-nuclear-industrial-strategy-the-uks-nuclear-future.pdf [Accessed 
July 30, 2015]. 
Her Majesty's Government, 2015. The Queen’s Speech 2015. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015 [Accessed 
February 5, 2016]. 
Her Majesty's Government, 2009. The UK Renewable Energy Strategy. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228
866/7686.pdf [Accessed July 18, 2014]. 
Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs, 2014. Carbon price floor : reform and other 
technical amendments. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293
849/TIIN_6002_7047_carbon_price_floor_and_other_technical_amendments.pdf 
[Accessed July 28, 2015]. 
Her Majesty's Treasury, 2014. Budget 2014. Available at: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national budget/2014/ [Accessed October 
19, 2015]. 
Her Majesty's Treasury, 2011. Carbon price floor consultation: the Government 
response. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/190
279/carbon_price_floor_consultation_govt_response.pdf [Accessed July 28, 2015]. 
Honore, A., 2014. The Outlook for Natural Gas Demand in Europe. Available at: 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/NG-87.pdf 
214 
 
 
[Accessed July 16, 2015]. 
Hughes, L., 2012. A generic framework for the description and analysis of energy 
security in an energy system. Energy Policy, 42, pp.221–231.  
Hughes, N. & Strachan, N., 2010. Methodological review of UK and international low 
carbon scenarios. Energy Policy, 38(10), pp.6056–6065.  
International Energy Agency, 2015. Energy and climate change: World Enrgy Outlook 
Special Report. Available at: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2015SpecialRe
portonEnergyandClimateChange.pdf [Accessed July 10, 2015]. 
International Energy Agency, 2014a. ENERGY Supply Security; Emergency Response 
of IEA Countries. Available at: 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ENERGYSUPPLYS
ECURITY2014.pdf [Accessed April 2, 2015]. 
International Energy Agency, 2014b. European Union. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/geninfo/atoz/en/index_1_en.htm [Accessed July 24, 2015]. 
International Energy Agency, 2010. Projected Costs of Generating Electricity. Available 
at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/oecd/content/book/9789264008274-
en\nhttp://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/projected-costs-of-generating-electricity-
2010_9789264084315-
en\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Projected+C
osts+of+Generati [Accessed November 6, 2015]. 
International Energy Agency, 2005. Projected Costs of Generating Electricity. Available 
at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/oecd/content/book/9789264008274-
en\nhttp://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/projected-costs-of-generating-electricity-
2010_9789264084315-
en\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Projected+C
osts+of+Generati [Accessed April 19, 2015]. 
International Energy Agency, 2012. Securing Power during the Transition. Available at: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/insights/insightpublications/SecuringPowerTransi
tion_Secondeedition_WEB.pdf. 
215 
 
 
International Energy Agency, 2014c. World Energy Investment Outlook. Available at: 
http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Fatih-Birol.pdf 
[Accessed July 16, 2015]. 
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 2016. Engineering the UK Electricity Gap. 
Available at: http://www.imeche.org/docs/default-source/position-statements-
energy/imeche-ps-electricity-gap.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [Accessed January 30, 2016]. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014a. Climate Change 2014 Mitigation 
of Climate Change: Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at: 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf 
[Accessed July 13, 2015]. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014b. Climate-Change-Implications-for-
the-Energy-Sector-Summary-from-IPCC-AR5-2014-Full-report - Shortcut. 
Available at: https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Climate-
Change-Implications-for-the-Energy-Sector-Summary-from-IPCC-AR5-2014-
Full-report.pdf. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2005. IPCC Special Report on CARBON 
DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE. Available at: 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf [Accessed 
April 9, 2015]. 
Jacoby, H.D., O’Sullivan, F.M. & Paltsev, S., 2012. The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. 
Energy and Environmental Policy. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 
1(1), pp.37–52.  
Johnson, C. & Boersma, T., 2013. Energy (in)security in Poland the case of shale gas. 
Energy Policy, 53, pp.389–399.  
Kallis, G., 2007. When is it coevolution? Ecological Economics, 62(1), pp.1–6.  
Kallis, G. & Norgaard, R.B., 2010. Coevolutionary ecological economics. Ecological 
Economics, 69(4), pp.690–699. 
Kannan, R., Strachan, N., and Pye, S., 2010. Appendix EH-III : List of Electricity and 
216 
 
 
Heat Generation Technologies. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/energy-
models/models/uk-markal/uk-markal-manual-chapter-5-appendix[Accessed May 
12, 2015].  
Kannan, R., 2011. The development and application of a temporal MARKAL energy 
system model using flexible time slicing. Applied Energy, 88(6), pp.2261–2272.  
Kannan, R., Strachan, N., Pye, S., Anandarajah, G., and Belta-Ozkan, N., 2007. UK 
MARKAL Model Documentation. Available at: 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/ES_MARKAL_Documentation_2010 [Accessed 
November 5, 2015]. 
Kannan, R., 2009. Uncertainties in key low carbon power generation technologies – 
Implication for UK decarbonisation targets. Applied Energy, 86(10), pp.1873–
1886.  
Kaufmann, R.K., 1994. The effect of expected energy prices on energy demand: 
implications for energy conservation and carbon taxes. Resource and Energy 
Economics, 16(2), pp.167–188.  
Lachman, D.A., 2013. A survey and review of approaches to study transitions. Energy 
Policy, 58, pp.269–276.  
Lew, D., Brinkman, G., Ibanez, E., Florita, A., Heaney, M., Hodge, B.M., Hummon, M. 
and Stark, G., 2013. The Western Wind and Solar Integration Study Phase 2. 
Available at: http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/55588.pdf [Accessed February 22, 
2016]. 
Lipponen, J., Burnard, K., Beck, B., Gale, J. and Pegler, B., 2011. The IEA CCS 
Technology Roadmap: One year on. Energy Procedia, 4, pp.5752–5761.  
Littlecott, C., 2015. G7 Coal Phase Out: United Kingdom, A Review for Oxfarm. 
Available at: http://www.e3g.org/docs/UK_G7_Analysis_October_2015_Final.pdf 
[Accessed January 25, 2016]. 
Liu, F., Chen, P., Kuo, S., Su, D., Chang, T., Yu, Y. and Lin, T., 2011. Wind 
characterization analysis incorporating genetic algorithm: A case study in Taiwan 
Strait. Energy, 36(5), pp.2611–2619.  
217 
 
 
Lu, X., Salovaara, J. & McElroy, M.B., 2012. Implications of the Recent Reductions in 
Natural Gas Prices for Emissions of CO2 from the US Power Sector. 
Environmental Science & Technology, 46(5), pp.3014–3021.  
Lun, I.Y.. & Lam, J.C., 2000. A study of Weibull parameters using long-term wind 
observations. Renewable Energy, 20(2), pp.145–153. 
Mani, S. & Dhingra, T., 2013. Critique of offshore wind energy policies of the UK and 
Germany—What are the lessons for India. Energy Policy, 63, pp.900–909.  
McAlinden, B., 2013. Shale gas. Available at: https://www.ice.org.uk/disciplines-and-
resources/briefing-sheet/shale-gas [Accessed September 21, 2014]. 
Mez, L., 2012. Nuclear energy–Any solution for sustainability and climate protection? 
Energy Policy, 48, pp.56–63.  
MHI Vestas Offshore Wind, 2014. V164-8.0 MW® breaks world record for wind 
energy production. Available at: http://www.mhivestasoffshore.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/21-10-2014-Press-release.pdf [Accessed February 22, 
2016]. 
Milborrow, D., 2009. Managing Variability. Available at: 
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefing_notes/managing_variability_jul09.pdf 
[Accessed May 12, 2016]. 
Modi, V., McDade, S., Lallement, D. and Saghir, J., 2005. Energy Services for the 
Millennium Development Goals. Available at: 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/MP_Energy_Low_Res.pdf 
[Accessed July 23, 2015]. 
Mohammadi, K., Alavi, O., Mostafaeipour, A., Goudarzi, N. and Jalilvand, M., 2016. 
Assessing different parameters estimation methods of Weibull distribution to 
compute wind power density. Energy Conversion and Management, 108, pp.322–
335.  
Monaghan, A., 2014. The Carboniferous shales of the Midland Valley of Scotland : 
geology and resource estimation. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/360
218 
 
 
471/BGS_DECC_MVS_2014_MAIN_REPORT.pdf [Accessed October 17, 2014]. 
Mott MacDonald, 2010. UK Electricity Generation Costs Update. Available at: 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/statistics/projections/71-uk-electricity-
generation-costs-update-.pdf [Accessed July 12, 2014]. 
Muhammad-Sukki, F., Ramrez-Iniguez, R., Munir, A., Hajar, S., Yasin, M., Hawa Abu-
Bakar, S., McMeekin, G.G. and Steward, B.G., 2013. Revised feed-in tariff for 
solar photovoltaic in the United Kingdom: A cloudy future ahead? Energy Policy, 
52, pp.832–838. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2016. GMAO MERRA: Modern Era 
Retrospective-Analysis for Research and Applications. Available at: 
http://gmao.gsfc.nasa.gov/research/merra/file_specifications.php [Accessed April 
12, 2016]. 
National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory, 2014. UNFCCC: Pivot table for the UK 
GHG inventory based on UK National Statistics coverage. Includes the UK, and 
the Crown Dependencies. Available at: 
naei.defra.gov.uk/resources/PivotTableViewer_2015_GHG_Final.xlsx [Accessed 
March 2, 2015]. 
National Audit Office, 2012. Briefing for the House of Commons Energy and Cliamte 
Change Committee: The nuclear energy landscape in Great Britain. Available at: 
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/ECCC_briefing_nuclear_energy_landscape.pdf 
[Accessed July 31, 2015]. 
National Nuclear Laboratory, 2014. Small Modular Reactors (SMR) Feasibility Study. 
Available at: http://www.nnl.co.uk/media/1627/smr-feasibility-study-december-
2014.pdf [Accessed February 1, 2016]. 
Norgaard, R.B., 1994. Development Betrayed: The end of progess and the 
coevolutionary revisioning of the future, London and New York: Routledge. 
Ntoko, N.M., 2009. The expected power coefficient of a horizontal-axis wind turbine. 
International Journal of Ambient Energy, 30(2), pp.79–82. 
219 
 
 
Nuclear Industry Association, 2015. Operational Power Stations: The planned lifetime 
of the UK’s operating nuclear power stations. Available at: 
http://www.niauk.org/operational-power-stations [Accessed July 28, 2015]. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010. Energy Poverty: 
How to make modern energy access universal? Available at: 
http://www.iea.org/IEAnews/4710/Poverty_jones.pdf [Accessed July 22, 2015]. 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2014. Ofgem electricity interconnectors. 
Available at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-
networks/electricity-interconnectors [Accessed January 21, 2016]. 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2010. Project Discovery: Options for delivering 
secure and sustainable energy supplies. Available at: 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/MARKETS/WHLMKTS/DISCOVERY/Documents1/Pr
oject_Discovery_FebConDoc_FINAL.pdf [Accessed August 12, 2014]. 
Olaofe, Z.O. & Folly, K.A., 2013. Wind energy analysis based on turbine and 
developed site power curves: A case-study of Darling City. Renewable Energy, 53, 
pp.306–318.  
Parkes, R., 2012. Stormy skies over Scotland. Renewable Energy Focus, 13(6), pp.32–
36.  
Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2014. Coal and Gas Assumptions. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315
717/coal_and_gas_assumptions.PDF [Accessed January 1, 2014]. 
Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2011. Electricity Generation Cost Model - 2011 Update - 
Revision 1. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/481
26/2153-electricity-generation-cost-model-2011.pdf [Accessed August 14, 2014]. 
Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2012. Electricity Generation Cost Model - 2012 Update of Non 
Renewable Technologies. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/223
634/2013_Update_of_Non-Renewable_Technologies_FINAL.pdf [Accessed 
September 9, 2014]. 
220 
 
 
Pearson, I., Zeniewski, P., Gracceva, F., Zastera, P., McGlade, C., Sorrell, S., Speirs, J., 
Thonhauser, G., Alecu, C., Eriksson, A., Toft, P. and Schuetz, M., 2012. 
Unconventional Gas: Potential Energy Market Impacts in the European Union. 
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_report_2012_09_unconventional_gas.pdf 
[Accessed October 4, 2014]. 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2011. Carbon Footprint of Electricity 
Generation. Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/postpn_383-
carbon-footprint-electricity-generation.pdf [Accessed August 18, 2014]. 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2014. Intermittent Electricity 
Generation. Available at: www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/POST-PN-464.pdf 
[Accessed July 30, 2015]. 
Power-technology.com, 2014. The world’s 10 biggest wind turbines - Power 
Technology. Available at: http://www.power-technology.com/features/featurethe-
worlds-biggest-wind-turbines-4154395/ [Accessed May 16, 2016]. 
Pöyry, 2013. Technology Supply Curves for Low- Carbon Power Generation; A report 
to the Committee on Climate Change 2013. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/483
37/5142-bioenergy-strategy-.pdf [Accessed April 9, 2014].  
Pöyry, 2011. The impact of unconventional gas on Europe. Available at: 
http://www.poyry.co.uk/sites/www.poyry.uk/files/The_Impact_of_Unconventional
_Gas_on_Europe.pdf [Accessed June 3, 2016]. 
Pye, S., Sabio, N. & Strachan, N., 2014. An integrated systematic analysis of 
uncertainties in UK energy transition pathways. Energy Policy, 87, pp.673–684. 
Rahimi, E., Rabiee, A., Aghaei, J., Muttaqi, K.M. and Nezhad, A., 2013. On the 
management of wind power intermittency. Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 28, pp.643–653.  
Raven, R.P.J.M. & Verbong, G.P.J., 2009. Boundary crossing innovations: Case studies 
from the energy domain. Technology in Society, 31(1), pp.85–93.  
221 
 
 
Read, P. & Lermit, J., 2005. Bio-energy with carbon storage (BECS): A sequential 
decision approach to the threat of abrupt climate change. Energy, 30(14), pp.2654–
2671.  
RenewableUK, 2013. Offshore Wind : Decision Time. Available at: 
http://www.renewableuk.com [Accessed April 16, 2015]. 
RenewableUK, 2016a. Onshore Wind Energy. Available at: 
http://www.renewableuk.com/en/renewable-energy/wind-energy/onshore-
wind/index.cfm [Accessed February 8, 2016]. 
RenewableUK, 2016b. RenewableUK | Offshore Wind. Available at: 
http://www.renewableuk.com/en/renewable-energy/wind-energy/offshore-
wind/index.cfm [Accessed January 26, 2016]. 
RenewableUK, 2014. RenewableUK News - New Government figures show Cameron 
was wrong to attack onshore wind. Available at: 
http://www.renewableuk.com/en/news/renewableuk-news.cfm/2014-12-18-new-
government-figures-show-cameron-was-wrong-to-attack-onshore-wind [Accessed 
April 9, 2015]. 
Rogers, H., 2011. Shale gas--the unfolding story. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
27(1), pp.117–143. 
Royal Academy of Engineering, 2015. A critical time for UK energy policy: what must 
be done now to deliver the UK’s future energy system - A report for the Council 
for Science and Technology. Available at: 
http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/a-critical-time-for-uk-energy-policy 
[Accessed January 5, 2016]. 
Salvacao, N. & Guedes Soares, C., 2015. Offshore wind energy assessment for the 
Iberian coast with a regional atmospheric model. In C. Guedes Soares, ed. 
Renewable Energies Offshore. London: Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 219–228. 
Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282358818_Offshore_wind_energy_asse
ssment_for_the_Iberian_coast_with_a_regional_atmospheric_model. 
Sandbag, 2014. UK Capacity Market Is the Capacity Market slowing UK power 
222 
 
 
decarbonisation? Available at: 
https://sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/Capacity_Mech_19-Dec-14.pdf 
[Accessed February 1, 2016]. 
Sandbag, 2015. UK Capacity Market Results: Is the Capacity Market slowing UK 
decarbonisation? Available at: 
https://sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/Capacity_Mechanism_analysis4.pdf 
[Accessed January 21, 2016]. 
Schneider, M., Froggatt, A., Ayukawa, Y., Burnie, S., Piria, R., Thomas, S., Hazemann, 
J. and Suzuki, T., 2014. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014. Available 
at: http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/201408msc-
worldnuclearreport2014-hr-v4.pdf [Accessed July 15, 2015].  
Scottish Government, 2015. UK energy policy “fails objectives.” Available at: 
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/UK-energy-policy-fails-objectives-1f9b.aspx 
[Accessed February 12, 2016]. 
Shah, N., Vallejo, L., Cockerill, T., Gambhir A., Heyes, A., Hills, T., Jennings, M., 
Jones, O., Kalas, N., Keirstead, J., Khor, C., Mazur, C., Napp, T., Strapasson, A., 
Tong, D. and Woods, J., 2013. Halving global CO2 by 2050: technologies and 
costs. Available at: 
http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/climatechange/publications/collaborative/halving-
global-co2-by-2050 [Accessed November 10, 2014]. 
Short, W. & Packey, D.J., 1995. A Manual for the Economic Evaluation of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technologies. Available at: 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/legosti/old/5173.pdf [Accessed July 12, 2014]. 
Shu, Z.R., Li, Q.S. & Chan, P.W., 2015. Statistical analysis of wind characteristics and 
wind energy potential in Hong Kong. Energy Conversion and Management, 101, 
pp.644–657.  
Sithole, H., Cockerill, T.T., Hughes, K.J, Ingham, D.B., Ma, L., Porter, R.T.J. and 
Pourkashanian, M., 2016. Developing an optimal electricity generation mix for the 
UK 2050 future. Energy, 100, pp.363–373. 
Sithole, H., Cockerill, T., Edmunds, R., Hughes, K.J., Ma, L., Porter, R. and 
223 
 
 
Pourkashanian, M., 2015. The impact of the “Shale Gas Revolution” on the United 
Kingdom Electricity Generation Outlook. The International Journal of 
Environmental Sustainability, 11(4), pp.1–23.   
Skea, J., Anderson, D., Green, T., Gross, R., Heptonstall, P., and Leach, M., 2007. 
Intermittent renewable generation and the cost of maintaining power system 
reliability. Generation, Transmission & Distribution, IET, 2(1), p.324. 
Skea, J., Chaudry, M. & Wang, X., 2012. The role of gas infrastructure in promoting 
UK energy security. Energy Policy, 43, pp.202–213.  
Skillings, S., 2013. The future of existing coal plant in GB and implications for security 
of supply and affordability Paper prepared for the European Climate Foundation. 
Available at: http://www.trilemma-
uk.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/ecf_paper_on_the_future_of_coal_plan
t.pdf [Accessed July 27, 2015]. 
Smith, A. & Stirling, A., 2008. Social-ecological resilience and socio-technical 
transitions: critical issues for sustainability governance. Available at: 
http://www.steps-centre.org/PDFs/STEPS [Accessed November 3, 2015]. 
Stacey, K., 2016. UK coal sector set for showdown on closures - Financial Times (ft). 
Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6b12df44-b47c-11e5-8358-
9a82b43f6b2f.html#axzz49ndhDxGr [Accessed January 21, 2016]. 
Strachan, N., 2011. UK energy policy ambition and UK energy modelling—fit for 
purpose? Energy Policy, 39(3), pp.1037–1040.  
Strachan, N., Pye, S. & Kannan, R., 2009. The iterative contribution and relevance of 
modelling to UK energy policy. Energy Policy, 37(3), pp.850–860.  
Task Force on Shale Gas, 2015. Task Force on Shale Gas: Final Conclusions and 
Recommendations. Available at: https://www.taskforceonshalegas.uk/ [Accessed 
December 16, 2015]. 
Teräväinen, T., Lehtonen, M. & Martiskainen, M., 2011. Climate change, energy 
security, and risk—debating nuclear new build in Finland, France and the UK. 
Energy Policy, 39(6), pp.3434–3442.  
224 
 
 
The Crown Estate, 2012. Offshore wind cost reduction-Pathways study. Available at: 
http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/5493/ei-offshore-wind-cost-reduction-
pathways-study.pdf [Accessed December 18, 2015].  
Toke, D., 2011. The UK offshore wind power programme: A sea-change in UK energy 
policy? Energy Policy, 39(2), pp.526–534.  
Toke, D. & Vezirgiannidou, S., 2013. The relationship between climate change and 
energy security : key issues and conclusions. Environmental Politics, 22(4), 
pp.537–552. 
Tricarico and Gerebizza, 2012. Beyond our borders. Available at: 
http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/520a34976f493.pdf [Accessed July 14, 2015]. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015. Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement. Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf [Accessed December 
16, 2015]. 
Unruh, G.C., 2002. Escaping carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 30(4), pp.317–325.  
Unruh, G.C., 2000. Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 28(12), pp.817–830.  
Unruh, G.C. & Carrillo-Hermosilla, J., 2006. Globalizing carbon lock-in. Energy 
Policy, 34(10), pp.1185–1197.  
Usher, W. & Strachan, N., 2010. UK MARKAL Modelling - Examining 
Decarbonisation Pathways in the 2020s on the Way to Meeting the 2050 Emissions 
Target. Available at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1298585/1/CCC MARKAL Final 
Report - UCL Nov10.pdf [Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
Verma, P., 2013. Multi Rotor Wind Turbine Design And Cost Scaling. University of 
Massachusetts. Available at: http://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses [Accessed 
March 8, 2015].   
Wenehenubun, F., Saputra, A. & Sutanto, H., 2015. An experimental study on the 
performance of Savonius wind turbines related with the number of blades. Energy 
Procedia, 68, pp.297–304.  
225 
 
 
Winzer, C., 2012. Conceptualizing energy security. Energy Policy, 46, pp.36–48.  
World Energy Council, 2012. World Energy Trilemma: Time to get real – the case for 
sustainable energy policy. Available at: http://www.worldenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/Time-to-get-real-the-case-for-sustainable-energy-policy-
VOL-I1.pdf [Accessed April 5, 2015]. 
World Nuclear Association, 2015a. Nuclear Power in the European Union. Available at: 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/European-Union/ 
[Accessed July 15, 2015]. 
World Nuclear Association, 2015b. Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom |UK Nuclear 
Energy. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-
Profiles/Countries-T-Z/United-Kingdom/ [Accessed December 7, 2015]. 
 
226 
 
 
Appendices A: The interactive interface of the ‘Energy 
Optimisation Calculator   
Appendices A1 to A4 show the data input worksheets which represent the interactive 
interface of the ‘Energy Optimisation Calculator’. The green colour coding shown on 
worksheets indicates the data input used to develop the energy transition pathways as 
determined by the user. The yellow colour on the worksheets are the calculated result 
elements based on the background optimisation operations of the model. The worksheets 
are arranged in the order in which the data is computed up until the results are presented 
after the model has complete each run or scenario development process as shown in 
Appendices A3 and A4. 
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A1: United Kingdom_Input_Sheet  
  
United_Kingdom INPUT DATA
OVERALL PARAMETERS Emissions Factors Misc 49.5
LMS Generation 379.2 TWh/a NumTech= 16 Indirect Stem: United_Kingdom_in 19.8
LMS Total GHG Emissons 185.8 Mte CO2e /a LMS g/kWh 489.9789 Calculated
HMS Generation 344.0 TWh/a
EmissionsTarget 34.4 MteCO2/a HMS g/kWh 100 Calculated
OPEX_Percent_Default 3 Percent of CAPEXUsed unless specified for each tech
ALT_opex_localisation 1 Factor
USED_opex_localisation 1 Factor Cost localisation factor actually used From DECC
Data
NEW ELECTRICITY GENERATING TECHNOLOGIES/MIX (HMS)
Overall EfficiencyNetwork Physical Load factor development
Technology CAPEX £/GW OPEX £/a LearningRateFuel cost £ per GWh(fuel)Fuel to Power Utilisation Factor Load Factor (LF1) kgCO2/KWh(e.)Installation Limit IL (GW) IC1 (GW) LF2 IC2 LF3 IC3 LF4 (at IL) OPEX as %
(not used) CAPEX /yt
Wind Onshore 1596000000 7.50E+06 0 0 1 0.7 0.27 0.003 18 ####### 0.27 ####### 0.27 1.35E+01 0.27 0.47
Wind Offshore 2851000000 1.82E+07 0 0 1 0.7 0.42 0.005 50 ####### 0.42 ####### 0.42 3.75E+01 0.42 0.64
Pumped Storage 1958000000 1.17E+06 0 0 1 0.8 0.18 1.50E-02 3 7.50E-01 0.18 ####### 0.18 2.19E+00 0.18 0.06
Solar PV 780000000 2.03E+06 0 0 1 0.7 0.11 0.04 18 ####### 0.11 ####### 0.11 1.35E+01 0.11 0.26
Hydro 2417000000 8.94E+06 0 0 1 0.8 0.37 0.01 2 5.00E-01 0.37 ####### 0.37 1.50E+00 0.37 0.37
Nuclear 4427760000 9.30E+06 0 8000 0.33 0.8 0.8 0.005 14 ####### 0.8 ####### 0.8 1.05E+01 0.8 0.21
Biomass 2532000000 1.52E+07 0 23292.25427 0.261 0.8 0.6 0.27 4 ####### 0.6 ####### 0.6 3.00E+00 0.6 0.6
BECCS 4117780000 1.32E+07 0 23292.25427 0.375 0.8 0.85 -0.9 3 7.50E-01 0.85 ####### 0.85 2.25E+00 0.85 0.32
Interconnectors 539196563 1.05E+07 0 0 0.44 0.7 0.5 0.004 10 ####### 0.5 1.25E-01 0.5 7.50E+00 0.5 1.94
Gas CCGT 598500000 2.27E+06 0 49519.096 0.64 0.8 0.6 0.488 35 ####### 0.6 ####### 0.6 2.63E+01 0.6 0.38
Coal CCS 3916120000 1.02E+07 0 66391.07 0.335 0.8 0.85 0.189 6 ####### 0.85 ####### 0.85 4.50E+00 0.85 0.26
Gas CCGT CCS 1369030000 3.97E+06 0 7648.696 0.508 0.8 0.85 0.07 6 ####### 0.85 ####### 0.85 4.50E+00 0.85 0.29
Wave 3610000000 1.99E+07 0 0 1 0.7 0.28 0.025 3 7.50E-01 0.28 ####### 0.28 2.25E+00 0.28 0.55
Tidal 2750000000 3850000 0 0 1 0.7 0.24 0.025 4 1 0.24 2 0.24 3 0.24 0.14
Conventional CHP 617940000 4696344 0 49519.096 0.384 0.8 0.3 0.488 3 0.75 0.3 1.5 0.3 2.25 0.3 0.76
Renewable CHP 4272000000 32467200 0 23292.25427 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.27 8 2 0.3 4 0.3 6 0.3 0.52
LOW MITIGATION MIXTechnology Decimal Percent CapacityPercent GeneratedLoa  FactorGHGEmissions Minimum CapacityRepresentative OPEX FUELCOST Overall Effy Utilisation factor InstCap GW Annual Annual Fuel CostOpex Construction 
Calculated kgCO2/KWh(e.) GW USD/GWh USD/GWh(fuel) Fuel to Power Gen (TWh) US$/yr US$/yr Cost (US$)
Wind Onshore 0.027096774 0.02 0.27 0.003 1.00 3169.315791 0 1 0.87 2.1 4.97032 0 1.58E+07 3.35E+09
Wind Offshore 0.00516129 0.01 0.28 0.005 1.00 7433.916756 0 1 0.87 0.4 0.98179 0 7.30E+06 1.14E+09
Pumped Storage 0.03483871 0.03 1.61E-01 0.015 1.00 832.408671 0 1 0.87 2.7 3.81058 0 3.17E+06 5.29E+09
Solar PV 0 0.00 1.10E-01 0.04 1.00 0 0 1 0.87 0 0 0 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Hydro 0.018064516 0.01 0.363 0.01 1.00 2810.413889 0 1 0.87 1.4 4.45488 0 1.25E+07 3.38E+09
Nuclear 0.140645161 0.13 0.596 0.005 1.00 1779.736229 8000 0.9 0.87 10.9 56.9474 506199.49 1.01E+08 4.83E+10
Biomass 0.020645161 0.03 0.56 0.2 1.00 3094.749193 23292.25427 0.4 0.87 1.6 7.85434 457362.98 2.43E+07 4.05E+09
BECCS 0 0.00 0.5 -0.9 1.00 0 23292.25427 0.35 0.87 0 0 0 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Coal 0.362580645 0.32 0.625 0.78 1.00 1909.270057 0 0.45 0.87 28.1 153.953 0 2.94E+08 1.52E+10
Gas 0.390967742 0.39 0.632 0.488 1.00 410.5151665 49519.096 0.6 0.87 30.3 167.865 1.385E+10 6.89E+07 1.81E+10
CoalCCS 0 0.00 0.5 0.19 1.00 0 66391.07 0 0.87 0 0 0 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
GasCCS 0 0.00 0.5 0.07 1.00 0 7648.696 0 0.87 0 0 0 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Wave 0 0.00 0.5 0.025 1.00 0 0 0 0.87 0 0 0 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Tidal 0 0.00 0.5 0.025 1.00 0 0 0 0.87 0 0 0 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Conventional CHP 0.067096774 0.06 0.58 0.18 1.00 0 49519.096 0.384 0.87 5.2 26.4383 3409371.2
Renewable CHP 0.067096774 0.01 0.58 0.2 1.00 0 23292.25427 0.3 0.87 0.16 0.81348
SUM 1.067096774 0.93606383 82.7 400.838 1.386E+10 527250631 9.9E+10
LMS Cost of Energy (US$/kWh):0.06557
Emission factor for shale gas set at 0.423-the lower end 
228 
 
 
A2: Master Control Sheet  
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A3: United Kingdom_output _sheet: Least-cost generation mix 
  
230 
 
 
A4: United Kingdom_Output_Sheet; Optimal low-carbon generation mix 
 
Technology mix
Total Generation Fuel Energy (TWh) Fuel cost per year OPEX Per Year
Energy Technology Installed (GW) per year (TWh) Consumed per yr US$ US$
Wind Onshore 11.3 18.7 18.65842819 0 84470273.97
Wind Offshore 31.3 80.6 80.57979584 0 570480540.9
Pumped Storage 1.8 2.3 2.263569355 0 2105479.185
Solar PV 17.3 11.7 11.67565536 0 35077768.52
Hydro 1.4 3.6 3.597309828 0 12389454.72
Nuclear 9.9 55.6 168.5330478 1348264382 92167287.64
Biomass 2.2 9.2 35.29449258 822088295.5 33244702.7
BECCS 2.2 13.0 34.57832591 805407159.2 28650832.26
Interconnectors 7.8 24.1 54.70727574 0 82058019.82
Gas CCGT 18.1 76.2 119.0810323 5896785069 41191122.78
Coal CCS 1.0 6.0 17.81155885 1182528451 10181912
Gas CCGT CCS 4.9 29.0 57.02140388 436139383.7 19289111.91
Wave 2.7 4.7 4.719872952 0 54523388.44
Tidal 3.7 5.5 5.4741745 0 14307068.44
Conventional CHP 1.0 2.1 5.484195426 271572399.8 4696344
Renewable CHP 1.0 2.1 7.019770145 163506271.1 32467200
TOTALS 117.5523838 344.192116 626.4999086 10926291411 1117300507
Cost of Energy Calculation Misc Data
LMS Investment 98762157420 LMSInvestCell United_Kingdom_in!LMS_Investment Fuel Energy Used
HMS_CAPEX 2.27366E+11 Biomass Biomass_Used_CCS
Biomass_Used_Unabated
HMS_Ongoing 12043591918 Coal Coal_Used_CCS
Coal_Used_Unabated
HMS_COE 0.105064534 Gas Gas_Used_CCS
Gas_Used_Unabated
